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Title - Essay on Labour Supply, Retirement, and Consumption
Taehee Oh
This PhD dissertation is a study of the individual level behaviour of labour supply,
retirement, and consumption in different contexts.
The first chapter studies the importance of intrafamily supports in elderly
people’s work and retirement choice. I build a dynamic programming model with
extended families consisted of elderly parents and their adult-child households who
do not live together, are imperfectly-altruistic toward each other and engage in a
non-cooperative dynamic game. The two key innovations are allowing both parents-
and child-household to provide transfers to each other and investigation of joint
decisions making in older people’s labour supply, savings, and intrafamily transfer
choices.
The structural parameters are estimated using the Korean Labour and Income
Panel Study. I find that taking account of inter-vivos financial transfers can provide
a better explanation of older people’s life-cycle choices and reliance on government
supports. The estimated model is used to evaluate the impact of two policies of
social security expansion on elderly people’s life-cycle choices. First, the expansion of
guaranteed minimum income for the elderly results in crowding-out private transfers
and unintended redistribution of resources rather than mitigating old-age poverty.
Also, the welfare evaluation of policy can be biased if the strategic interaction
between family members is not accounted for adequately. Second, the rise in state
pension income amount just has a limited effect on older people’s work incentives,
and the vast amount of intrafamily resource sharing could be partly caused by high
elderly poverty.
The second chapter builds and estimates a dynamic model of older people’s joint
decisions of labour supply, savings, and social security benefit (SSB) application.
One new feature of the model relative to the existing literature is that I allow for the
selection into self-employment jointly with paid-employment and retirement. Agents
vi
in the model observe their own paid-sector productivity but are uncertain of their
productivity in the self-employment sector. However, the learning process enables
people to reduce initial uncertainty by observing the performance of their business.
The parameters of the dynamic programming model are estimated using the U.S.
Health and Retirement Survey. I find that allowing for the transition between paid-
and self-employment delays the retirement of older workers. In the counterfactual
simulation, I compare the effects of payroll tax-cut and self-employment subsidy
program and find that these policies can contribute to strengthening security in
retirement and have a large effect on the proportion of people who choose paid- and
self-employment. However, they have limited effects on elderly people’s retirement
choice.
The third chapter is co-authored with Kai Liu, Shawn Ni and Youn Seol. We
estimate the wealth effect on consumption by exploiting the differential effect of
housing price booms and busts across households with different holdings in housing
wealth. We also extend the analysis of the wealth effect from the consumption growth
to its inequality by allowing income shocks and the ability to smooth consumption
against income shocks to vary over housing wealth and housing market-driven
wealth shocks. Using household-level panel data on consumption, income, and
wealth from the Korean Family Income and Expenditure Survey, we find that the
house price change has a significant and large differential effect on consumption
growth, and homeowners exhibit a stronger ability to insure consumption against
income fluctuations. Also, the ability to insure consumption against income risks is
imperfect, and the effect of transitory shocks on consumption is smoothed more
than that of permanent shocks.
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Estimating A Dynamic Model of
Labour Supply and Retirement
1.1 Introduction
Population ageing is an important social issue observed widely in many countries,
around the world. In most OECD countries, people are staying in the labour force
longer than ever before. In order to explain elderly workers’ labour force participa-
tion (LFP) choice, many studies have focused on the increase in life-expectancy,
improvement in health status, and demographics such as rising average educational
attainment or widening inequality (??). In particular, much attention has been
devoted to the role of changes in social security rules because the transition from
work to retirement is concentrated at the pension entitlement age (??).
These studies also have made significant contributions to understanding elderly
people’s incentives to save and show the importance of intergenerational resource
allocation which occurs in the form of bequest. However, a bequest is not the
only factor that captures intra-family linkage. Comparing it with patterns of in-
tergeneration transfers which take the form of a one-time bequest at the time or
near the time of death, inter-vivos transfers during the lifetime tend to take place
more frequently, and a vast amount of resources is being transferred in the form of
inter-vivos financial transfers (IVFT). However, retirement literature is silent on
the potential connection between elderly people’s LFP choice and IVFT between
parents and children.
2 Intrafamily Altruism and Inter-Vivos Financial Transfers
While some structural studies have examined both life-cycle choices and IVFT,
they do not model retirement choice and have mainly devoted to unidirectional
transfers (either downstream (from parents to children) or upstream (from children
to parents)). In reality, however, upstream transfers are widely observed in real-
world data as the reverse flow between family members does. Moreover, considering
the fact that the need for financing resources to support their children or having
an additional source of income from other family members are closely associated
with older workers’ labour force choice, it is important to study their work and
retirement behaviour, together with bidirectional IVFT choice.
The aim of this paper is to investigate how bidirectional IVFT have effects
on elderly people’s labour supply decision and their security in retirement in a
game structure. The first innovation of my model is that I allow not only parents
but also children to make transfers toward each other. The second is providing a
framework for investigating joint decisions of labour supply, savings, and intrafamily
transfer choices. I derive a Markov-Perfect Equilibrium (MPE) of altruistically
linked family members who live finite horizon and play a dynamic non-cooperative
inter-generational game. In order to capture important aspects of intra-family
interaction and yet keep model tractability, I focus on bilateral financial transfers
between parents- and child-couple households who do not live together and have
a different extent of altruism toward the other party in the same family.1 Each
household in the model independently decides its own household-specific choices
at the same time, so one party cannot affect the other party beyond the impact
caused by its own choice of financial support.
Under the assumption of non-cooperative simultaneous move game structure and
imperfect altruism toward the other household in the same family, this study shows
that it is optimal for at most one party to provide net-IVFT under the pure strategy
MPE.2 As a result, the model covers both types (downstream and upstream) of
IVFT and allows for three kinds of equilibria: (1) no one provides support (corner
solution), (2) only parents make transfers (interior solution of parents) and (3)
only upstream transfers are made by a child (interior solution of a child). Thus,
this study does not predetermine who will become a donor, recipient or neutral
of IVFT, and one of the above equilibria is endogenously decided by interactive
optimization between parents- and child-household. Moreover, as the model assumes
that individuals are altruistic toward other family members, it characterizes the
1i.e. Among diverse kinds of within family supports, this study concentrates on intergenerational
financial net-transfers and bequests that take place within a family.
2The amounts of net-transfers denote the gross provision minus the gross receiving amounts
of IVFT. Unless specified otherwise, IVFT always imply a net-amount of financial transfers,
henceforth.
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positive correlation between each member’s economic capacity and the likelihood
as well as the size of transfers.
I estimate the model on the longitudinal data from the Korean Labour and
Income Panel Study (KLIPS) because South Korea (henceforth Korea) provides
particularly suitable settings to study families’ decisions on labour supply and
IVFT. First, Korean data provide relatively rich patterns of both upstream and
downstream IVFT, so it is suitable to study the relationship between inter-vivos
transfers and elderly labour supply. Second, KLIPS tracks split-offs who have
moved out of the original household, and each interview is conducted along with the
original households. Thus, it allows for constructing the sample of families through
matching non-cohabitant children to their parents. Third, due to negligible public
social security spending and pre-mature pension, elderly people are less likely to
be affected by the pension scheme.3 Thus, the analysis can be more focused on
elderly people’s labour force choice and transfer decisions. Finally, as a much higher
proportion of elderly Korean people aged 55 or more participates in the labour force
than that of the OECD average, it provides a suitable environment to study elderly
people’s work and retirement choice near the end of their career (figure 1.2).
The constructed model adequately reproduces important features of family
members’ life-cycle choices observed in the data, and in particular, the model can
propose an answer to the question that literature has not answered on what it
is that becoming donors or recipients of IVFT is related to elderly people’s work
and retirement choice. The estimated model is used to conduct two counterfactual
analyses. The first experiment is to conduct policy analysis. This study performs
two sets of policy counterfactuals; one is an expansion of the maximum amount
of non-contributory guaranteed minimum income, and the other is an increase in
the amount of national pension income.4 It is assumed that such a change in the
economic environment is known for all family members at the beginning of the
model period.
The policy counterfactual of guaranteed minimum income expansion for the
elderly suggests three important findings. First, the effectiveness of the government
transfer programme could be hugely dampened in countries where intergenerational
family insurance is widely observed. A unit increase in mean-tested benefit causes a
0.36 unit reduction in the pre-existing private transfers. Thus, the policy results in
3On average in OECD countries, tax, and public transfer systems decrease the relative poverty
rates of people aged 66 or higher from 68% to 13%, however, in Korea, they just decrease the rate
by 1.2%p (?).
4This study utilizes a partial equilibrium model of work and retirement choice, so it does
not go into details about the linkage between the policy implementation and the source of the
government’s budget financing.
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partly crowding-out private transfers and redistribution of resources from parents
and government to children rather than having the intended effect of alleviating
senior poverty.5 Second, the expansion causes a sharp increase in the proportion
of elderly people who rely on support. As a result, one-unit rises in the maximum
amount of mean-tested benefits increases the yearly average amount of government
benefit payments each household receives by 0.46 units. Finally, the impact of
the increase in guaranteed minimum income on elderly people’s work incentives is
relatively small.
Several interesting results also emerge from the policy counterfactual of changes
in the state pension income amount. First, the rise in benefits has a limited effect
on the labour force choice as strategic behaviour between parents and children is
accounted for. The second is that a unit increase in contributory benefits causes
a 0.22 unit reduction in the pre-existing intrafamily transfers. This implies that
the large amount of intrafamily resource sharing observed in the data could partly
stem from the relatively high elderly poverty rate. Third, there is no or just limited
substitutability between pension benefits and precautionary savings, so the rise in
retirement benefits does not discourage elderly people’s incentive to save.
The second experiment is to quantify the contribution of intrafamily resource
allocation to elderly people’s labour supply, asset holdings, and reliance on govern-
ment supports by solving an alternative model which does not allow for IVFT in any
direction. This implies that older people now make the best possible choices under
the constraint that they directly face, and there is no interaction with a child.6 In
order to reflect such model environmental and potential behavioural changes, the
set of preference and wage process parameters is newly estimated in the context of
the model excluding IVFT.
Although the model without strategic interaction still reasonably accounts for
older people’s patterns of life-cycle choices, the elderly under the alternative model
leave the labour force more gradually, so 2.1%p more elderly people under the
alternative model participate in the labour force on average than those under the
full-model. Also, older parents under the alternative framework are more reluctant
to use their precautionary savings. Thus, they hold 20.7% more assets on average
than those under the full-model as they cannot rely on insurance from family
members. This alternative model demonstrates that the welfare evaluation of policy
counterfactuals can be biased if the strategic interaction within a family is not
5These imply that the elderly can derive a higher present value of lifetime utility as the
government introduces the policy. However, the existing private insurance channel is partly
substituted with government benefits.
6Similar to other typical structure models of retirement (???), parents still value bequests of
assets when they die.
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accounted for adequately.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 reviews the
related literature. Section 1.3 describes the data and patterns of two-sided IVFT.
The dynamic model is presented in section 1.4. The identification and estimation
strategy is explained in section 1.5. Section 1.6 provides the parameter estimates
and the overall model fits. Section 1.7 focuses on counterfactual regimes, and section
1.8 concludes.
1.2 Related Literature
This paper contributes to the knowledge that is required to understand the relation
between bidirectional IVFT and older people’s choices in the latter part of life.
First, this study expands upon models of work and retirement choice of elderly
people by incorporating extended family interaction. The retirement literature
has particularly devoted to capturing the dynamics of the labour supply, asset
accumulation and health transition near the end of their career (????). Typical
retirement models assume that individuals purely pursue a strategy to maximize
their own self-interest and do not consider the non-market factors. However, the
investigation of IVFT is particularly important in relation to parental labour supply.
For example, in the case of providing transfers from parents to children during
their lifetime, these additional expenditure is needed to be financed, and the most
obvious source of income comes from an increase in the extensive margin through
delaying the timing of retirement (?). On the contrary, receiving transfers from
children would encourage parents to leave the labour force earlier. With regard to
these channels, little is known whether the elderly actually adjust their work and
retirement choice when they need to finance or become a recipient of IVFT.
Moreover, this study complements the literature that analyses the role of ex-
tended family insurance and adds knowledge to understanding the additional
channels which affect older people’s lifetime choices. Ageing individuals face a
diverse source of risks, and these risks can stem not only from themselves but from
their children. Elderly people’s capacity for responding to the risks and how well
they are insured depends on other family members as well as their own ability.7 In
the countries which have well-developed public old-age insurance, the majority of
IVFT flows from parents to offspring. In order to reflect such an empirical regularity,
researchers’ interest mainly concentrates on the downstream intra-household alloca-
tion of family resources. To give it another way, the literature has focused more
7The goal of family supports is to promote the welfare of its members through providing a
range of supportive resources which include informal as well as formal support (???).
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on the special case of intra-family relation and has paid relatively little attention
to the dynamic interaction between altruistic family members.8 To the best of
my knowledge, the model framework suggested in this study is among the first
to capture the effect of the interaction of extended family members’ bidirectional
financial transfers on older people’s retirement behaviour in a dynamic life-cycle
framework. Thus, it contributes to synthesize two series of literature that have
evolved separately from one another.
Second, this study contributes to add knowledge on the research which aims
at understanding the motivation of intergenerational resource sharing. One of the
important issues in the relevant literature is the motivation behind intergenerational
transfers choice. There is a lack of clarity about the motives, however, the two
most widely accepted explanations are altruism and exchange. Under the altruistic
incentive, transfers occur if the welfare of one party is influenced by the other party
(??). The main prediction of the altruistic model is that transfers are positively
related to the economic resources of providers and negatively associated with the
financial abilities of receivers.9 Until now empirical studies using reduced-form
models have not provided critical evidence that certainly rejects one of two alterna-
tives. Although they generally support that the amount of transfers from parents
to children is an increasing function of parental resources, controversy still remains
regarding the relations between the recipient’s income and the size of transfers from
parents.
For instance, ? shows that an unemployment spell of young workers largely
increases the probability of receiving cash transfers from parents. ? finds that infor-
mal family insurance is widely observed, and negative life-cycle shocks of children
such as job separation or divorce can be a good predictor of downstream transfers.
These findings are consistent with the prediction suggested by the altruistic model.
In this paper, both parties directly derive utility from the other. Thus, I implicitly
assume that there is a positive correlation between the donor’s economic capacity
and the amount of transfers.
To my best knowledge, the model structure suggested by ? is the only other
paper that is directly in line with this study in that they construct a theory for
the behaviour of imperfectly altruistic agents who can give transfers to each other.
8For example, ? develops a one-sided altruism model which only allows parents to make
transfers for their children. Such a simplification may be permissible in many countries especially
areas of western Europe and the U.S (figure 1.1a). In most areas of Asia where nearly half or
three-fifth of households provide upstream transfers, however, the one-sided transfer model needs
to be adjusted for accommodating empirical regularities observed in these countries (figure 1.1b).
9Following the exchange model, on the other hand, IVFT may be made for the party that
provides more service either explicitly or implicitly (??). Under the exchange model framework,
the amount of transfers can be either positively or negatively related to each party’s earnings.
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They use a continuous model framework without labour income and propose a
Markov perfect equilibrium, which allows both agents to save. Thus, their method-
ology requires well-defined continuous time, and policy functions are needed to
be continuously differentiable. In other words, their method cannot be applicable
in a framework with a discrete choice. On the contrary, I model elderly people’s
labour force, especially work and retirement, choice and focus more on the effect of
intrafamily interaction on parents-households’ security in retirement. In order to
achieve these goals and maintain the tractability of the model, I simplify children’s
labour choice and does not allow the children to save.
With regard to the family interaction from the perspective of competition mode,
this study is closely related to the papers such as ??? which introduce a dynamic
model with a lack of commitment and cooperation. The great attraction of the
non-cooperative framework is that the equilibrium is self-enforcing because each
person’s behaviour maximizes her well-being.10,11 Moreover, even if it is always
possible for family members to achieve Pareto optimum, non-cooperative outcomes
can be regarded as a threat point.12 To put it another way, although no-commitment
may impede cooperation across households and generate inefficiency, the assumption
would play a role as a lower bound of family resource allocation or policy evaluation.
Thus, it is important to study household decision in a non-cooperative setting to
understand household behaviour in a cooperative environment (?).
Although it is beyond the scope of this study, it would be worthy to mention
that a growing body of research has studied other forms of intergenerational support.
In particular, studies on cohabitation has been established to explain the broadly
observed cohabitation of extended family members and its underlying motivation.
? models a dynamic game between a parent and a child over coresidence and
shows that the option to move in and out of parental home is an important source
of insurance against a child’s labour force risk. Also, in regard to the mode of
competition, he suggests four reasons why a non-cooperative structure, which causes
10? argues that the non-cooperative model without commitment is an appealing choice in light
of existing empirical evidence on imperfect risk sharing within families.
11? argues that observable data do not provide sufficient information to identify the size of the
Pareto weight using observable data. Therefore, many studies which adopt the collective model
simply assume that the relative Pareto weight between two decision-makers is half, and this is an
important limitation.
12Although cooperative bargains allow for members to achieve Pareto optimum, maintaining
particular allocation usually depends crucially on what happens in the event of disagreement
known as the “threat point”. In other words, the results and prediction from the collective
bargaining model heavily rely on the definition of threat points. However, due to legal obstacles
and transaction costs, families rarely write explicit contracts governing their behaviour, and it is
very difficult to enforce any kind of agreement (?).
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more theoretical difficulties is preferable.13 Although I limit the scope of research
subject to financial support, the method introduced in this paper can be applied to
other forms of intra-family supports.
1.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
Most variables for this study are drawn from the Korean Labor and Income Panel
Study (KLIPS). KLIPS is a labour-related panel survey that comprises cross-
sectional and time-series data. It is conducted annually on a sample of 5,000
urban households (original households) and their members.14 The first wave starts
in 1998 with the latest 21st wave completed in 2018. It collects diverse kinds
of households’ and their members’ information including income, consumption,
educational attainment, assets, debts, labour market status, and so forth. One
of the important advantages of this survey is that it tracks split-offs who have
moved out of their parent’s household, and each interview is conducted along
with the original households. Thus, matching non-cohabitant children to their
original household allows for constructing the sample of families which are consisted
of parents-child household pair and provides rich information on socio-economic
characteristics of both sides.15
1.3.1 Sampling Criteria
In this study, data from waves 9-19 (eleven years between 2006 and 2016) of
KLIPS are used.16 Due to the panel household attrition, I start with 4,329 families
consisting of 7,102 independent households and 59,143 household-year observations.
An observation is dropped from the sample if it cannot satisfy any of the following
six criteria: (1) a family consisted of just one household, or parents who form
separated households (i.e. each male- and female-parent is counted as an independent
13First, generating outcomes reflecting the nature of the relation between parents and children.
Second, more in touch with reality. Third, due to the limitation on identifying both Pareto-weight
and altruism separately, people would face difficulties in using the model to conduct a policy
experiment. Finally, it is better to connect with the existing literature.
14KLIPS defines a household as a unit of living, which is composed of one or more persons who
gather to live together. Household members include not only family members living in the same
household but also independently living children who still do not achieve economic independence.
15A family in this study is defined by both a group of people currently living together and
members who belonged to the original household but now form separate households.
16Data from previous waves are not included because the information on financial transfers
between parents and children living separately is collected from wave-9. Also, the Korea government
has newly introduced various kinds of national employment policies to boost the employment of
elderly people since 2017. Thus, considering the difficulty of separating these policy effects from
the entire labour force trend, wave-20 and -21 are also excluded from the sample.
1.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics 9
household), (2) a parents-children pair with more than one independent child
households, (3) a family whose age difference between the male-parent and -child is
less than 15, (4) a family composed of single-parent, (5) a family whose independent
child household consists of single-adult, and (6) a parents-couple whose male-member
is less than 55 years old.17 Families which do not satisfy all these conditions are
included in the sample. The final sample consists of 2,623 yearly observations of
604 parents-child pairs (see table 3.2).
KLIPS contains detailed information on intra-family financial transfers such
as the main reason for making transfers and their amount from both the parents-
and child-household. However, it does not collect transfer information between
parents and children who are living together. Thus, in this study, the analysis
is limited to the IVFT between non-coresident household in the same family and
ignores the transfers between parents and child who are living together. However,
there is a concern about the bias on the results which do not consider the transfers
of within household parents-child pairs if there is a correlation between parental
coresidence and the amount (or the direction) of support. ? studies that living
arrangement plays a role as a valuable insurance channel. Also, if parents who are
willing to endure the disadvantage of living with adult children are more altruistic
than parents who do not live together and are more likely to provide both monetary
support and non-pecuniary support in the form of shared residence, excluding
cohabiting extended families may under-estimate the amount of downstream (from
parents to children) transfers.18
Although parental coresidence can be used as another important source of
intergenerational support that elderly parents give their children, the relative
importance of parent-youth living arrangement usually decreases as children become
older and get married. Because ? studies about male youth ranging in ages 17-23
and their option to move-in and -out of the parental home, the relatively large
proportion of youth in his study co-resides with their parents.19 However, the object
of analysis in this study is elderly parents approaching the end of their working
lives, so children in my sample are older than those in Kaplan’s study and less likely
to live together with their parents.
For the purpose of comparison, I additionally construct a separate sample of
17While families can have more than one non-coresident children, the analysis in this study is
restricted to the intergenerational interaction between one-parents couple and one-child household
pair. This restriction is introduced for the computational tractability of the model because
introducing more than one child-household adds considerable complexity in the strategic behaviours.
18Living with adult-children has negative effects on parent’s well-being (?).
19Kaplan shows that 32% and 40% of 22-year-olds youth in the sample live together with their
parents and have moved back home.
10 Intrafamily Altruism and Inter-Vivos Financial Transfers
households which consists of married-parents or -children or both who are currently
in a marriage. Figure 1.3a shows that a relatively small proportion of married
children live together with their parents after the age of 25, and the proportion
decreases rapidly with children’s age.20 Considering the fact that financial support
for elderly parents generally increases with children’s age (figure 1.3b), this paper
can be regarded as a study that analyses within-family interaction that occurs at a
later age than those of Kaplan. Also, some literature shows that a selection bias
caused by the exclusion of parents-youth living arrangement is not serious. ? argues
that additional consideration on coresidence has a limited effect on the IVFT.
1.3.2 Identifying Major Variables
The labour force participation status shows whether an individual is working or not.
In order to avoid the ambiguity that may arise in defining retirement, this study
defines a male-parent as a retiree if he is not in the labour force. Thus, anyone who
has a formal-job (full-time or part-time) or run their own business (self-employed) is
treated as a participant, and no matter what the reason behind it, an individual is
categorized as a retiree if he does not fall in the category of participants.21 Thus, it
means that this study does not distinguish between involuntary unemployment and
retirement.22 Also, just 1.4% of male-parent and 1.5% of male-child observations
in the sample work as a part-timer. Thus, for simplicity, I assume that parents
and children always hold down a full-time job if they work (i.e. do not consider
a part-time job), and self-employed are not treated separately from paid-workers.
Also, if a male-parent and -child work, they are assumed to work 2,500 and 2,250
hours per year, respectively.23
The employed persons in KLIPS are divided into two groups: one is paid, and
the other is self-employed (non-paid workers). In the case of paid workers, KLIPS
requires all paid workers to report their average weekly working hours and collects
more than a single measure of the earnings. If respondents are self-employed, the
survey does not provide their hours of work and just collects monthly earnings.
Thus, there are some limitations in deriving the relation between work and leisure
choice. In order to maintain consistency on the measure of labour income, post-tax
20On average, 1.44% of observations of parents live with their married children in the separately
constructed sample.
21Individuals searching for a job or working in a family business without pay are regarded as
retired people (labour force non-participants).
22This definition is similar to ?. They do not distinguish between unemployment and non-
participation in the labour force.
23In the sample, male-parent and -child who have a full-time job work 50.2 and 44.4 hours per
week on average, respectively.
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yearly earnings of full-time workers and self-employed are used. In addition, all
variables measured in money are deflated by the yearly consumer price index of the
year 2015.
In this study, the net-amount of across household financial transfers is used to
define inter-vivos support.24 A parents-household (child-household) is defined as
making downstream (upstream) IVFT if the amount they provide is greater than the
amount that they receive from their child (parents). Thus, the net-transfer amount
is the gross provision minus the gross receiving amounts. Also, many small transfers
are caused by social customs, and its effect on people’s labour force and saving
choices would be negligible, so I just consider the occurrence and amount of financial
or material support converted in the unit of net currency at least 300,000KRW (i.e.
net-transfers are left-censored at 0.3 million KRW ).25 Moreover, in order to control
the irregular transitory huge amount of support, the amount of transfers is upper
bounded at the top 5% of each party’s support amounts.
I assume that intra-family resource sharing is incentivised by altruism, and thus
provision of IVFT is closely related to the amount of consumption. With regard to
the incidence of IVFT motivated by house purchasing, provision funds for business,
purchasing durable goods, or repaying debts, however, households do not directly
derive utility from consuming them in a given period, but from the flow of services
that they provide.26 Thus, it is assumed that if a household receives durable-IVFT,
and the amount of their service flows derived by multiplying the amount of transfers
by real-interest rate is greater than 0.3 million KRW, the household receives the
amount equivalent to the flow of service as per-period IVFT since the year the
household received the corresponding amount of net-transfers.27 The sample shows
that 52.4% of yearly child-household observations make IVFT, however, just 13.3%
24In the sample, 94% of families answer both of the following two questions: "Have you ever
provided economic support toward your children who do not live together since the last survey"
and "Have you ever received economic support from your children who do not live together since
the last survey". Thus, the possibility of non-response bias would be limited.
25Similar to this study, the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) also
collects the amount of financial transfers greater than 250 euros (approximately equivalent to
325,000KRW).
26The provision of IVFT motivated by these four reasons is called ‘durable-IVFT’ henceforth.
Table 2.3 shows the proportion and amount of downstream and upstream IVFT by the motivation
of one-parents and independent one-child couple pairs. Among 11 motivations, the proportion of
downstream and upstream transfers provided for durable-IVFT just accounts for 5.6% and 0.8%
of the transfer provision incidence, respectively. Except for these, all other 7 motivations can be
broadly categorized as the support for maintaining daily life.
27If the calculated flow of services is less than the truncation criterion, such durable-IVFT is
assumed as one-off support, and thus the total amount is consumed in the given period.
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of parents-household observations support their child couple.28,29 The summary
statistics of the parents- and child-households are given in table 2.1.
1.3.3 Empirical Evidence on Two-Sided Inter-Vivos Finan-
cial Transfers
This subsection shows the likelihood and average amount of two-sided IVFT between
2006-2016. Also, using the simple Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) model, I
provide a preliminary understanding of the factors associated with the incidence of
two-sided IVFT.
Likelihood of providing IVFT: Figure 1.4a shows the direction of financial
support by male-parent’s age. In both directions of supports, they present a clear
trend by age: relatively older parents are more likely to receive support and less
likely to become a donor. Since the age of 70, the proportion of parents receiving
support has increased remarkably. After the mid-70s, over 70% of them received
IVFT from their child. On the contrary, the fraction of parents providing supports
decrease with age as more parents leave the labour force, and insufficient pension
benefits cause them to dis-save their wealth.
Figure 1.4b captures the relation between parents’ labour supply and the in-
cidence of IVFT. The horizontal axis shows the combination of within parents-
household labour force participation status. For example, Work-Retire denotes an
elderly couple consisted of a working husband and a non-working spouse. There is
a clear trend in providing and receiving transfers in relation to parents’ working
conditions. The transfer rate of the parents-group whose husband participates in the
labour force is higher than those of couples whose husbands do not work, and the
receiving rate shows the opposite trend. These also capture the life-cycle dynamics
28The final sample in this study shows that 74.8% of child-households and 38.5% of parents-
households make gross IVFT (counting all the incidence of transfers), and these results correspond
to the incidence of IVFT that are observed in other data sets. For example, the Survey of
Living Conditions and Welfare Needs of Korean Older Persons in 2017 shows that among elderly
people whose age is 65 or over and who have one independent child, 80.6% (28.2%) of them have
received (provided) non-regular financial support from (toward) their child. Also, ? uses the
National Research Foundation of Korea in 2009 Regarding Inter-Generational Resources Transfer
and Preparation for Latter Life of Middle-Aged Households and suggests that 62.2% of parents
received financial supports from their married independent children, and 38.9% of parents made
downstream transfers. These two different sources of statistics show that the sample in this study
captures the reality of intergenerational transfer choices between parents and independent children
households in Korea properly.
29Conditional on the households, which provide IVFT toward the other party in the same family,
the amount of total transfer provision accounts for 16.9% and 8.8% of working male-parent’s and
-child’s yearly earned income.
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of individuals’ work and retirement decision. As people become older, they tend to
spend more leisure, and declining participation in the labour force leads to a drop
in the economic capacity for providing transfers and an increase in the need for
supporting them.30 These results support the necessity of treating the decisions on
IVFT in the context of dynamic framework and validity of altruistically motivated
transfers.
Figure 1.4c and 1.4d break down figure 1.4a by parents’ wealth quartiles with
two age groups: 55-66 (Group A) and 67 or over (Group B).31 These figures show
how parents’ wealth is correlated with the likelihood of providing and receiving
transfers. Figure 1.4c confirms the clear relationship between parents’ economic
capacity and the likelihood of support toward their child. Moreover, this relationship
does not change with age. Among people in group A, just 12.4% of parents in the
bottom quantile make IVFT, while 30.5% of parents in the top quantile become a
donor. The trend is more apparent for parents in age-group B. Only 1.6% in the
bottom quantile make transfers which increased more than 19 times (30.9%) for
the parents in the top quantile. Figure 1.4d shows that before the age 67, there is a
weak relationship between parents’ wealth and the likelihood of upstream transfers,
however, for the parents in group B, there is a negative relationship between parents’
economic capacity and upstream transfers.
Figure 1.4e and 1.4f show the proportion of downstream and upstream transfers
by male-parent’s earnings quartile. As expected, the results of downstream transfers
are equivalent to figure 1.4c. Regardless of age groups, there is a positive correlation
between the amount of earned income and the likelihood of transfer provision. 35.7%
of parents aged 55-66 in the top earnings quantile support their child-household,
and the proportion monotonically decreases for the parents in the bottom (16.3%).
Such a trend is more apparent in group B. Among people in group B, 26.9% of
parents in the bottom make financial transfers which increase to 54.5% those in the
top quantile. However, figure 1.4f shows that such a clear tendency is not observed
in the incidence of upstream transfers.
Size of intergenerational financial transfers: Figure 1.5a shows the amount
of downstream and upstream transfers conditional on household observations which
make transfers toward the other party in the same family by male-parent’s age.
One of the most noticeable points is that from the age of 70, the average amount
of upstream transfers generally exceeds those of downstream transfers. Second,
there have been general patterns between parent’s age and the average downstream
30The average males’ age is 63.7 and 69.5 for workers and retired group, respectively.
31In order to maintain a sufficient number of observations, the sample is divided into two groups.
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transfer amounts. Parents’ average cash transfers recorded their peak at the age
of late 60s. After then, the amount decreases with age. However, in general,
the amount transferred from child-households increases with age. The parents-
households aged 55-57 are received 2.5 million which go up to 7.5 million KRW for
the age group 82-84.
Figure 1.5b shows that there is a clear negative correlation between upstream
transfer amount and parents’ labour supply. This confirms that parental income is
closely related to the amount of financial supports from their child. However, the
average conditional downstream amount does not show a specific trend over parents’
labour force status.32 Figure 1.5c and 1.5d break down figure 1.5a by parents’
wealth and earnings quartiles, respectively. These two figures show how parents’
economic capacity is correlated with the size of transfers. As expected, there is a
negative correlation between upstream transfer amounts and parents’ wealth (figure
1.5c). The conditional average for the top quartile is 3.0 million KRW which go
up to 4.9 million KRW for the bottom quartile. In the case of conditional average
downstream amounts, except for the bottom earnings quartile parents, there is a
positive relation between earnings and the size of transfers. The conditional average
for the 25-50th percentile is 1.9 million KRW which go up to 4.2 million KRW for
the top earnings quartile. It may be caused by the fact that the amounts of support
are determined not just by donors’ economic capacity but by recipients’ needs. For
example, if children who have parents in the bottom wealth quantile are relatively
economically vulnerable, parents may have incentives to support more for children’s
welfare. Similar patterns are observed in figure 1.5d. The amount of upstream
transfers is negatively associated with parents’ earnings. However, there seems to
be no pattern between the amounts of downstream transfers and parents’ earnings
quartile.
Descriptive Regression on Inter-Vivos Financial Transfers: Before exe-
cuting the structural approach, I provide a preliminary understanding of the factors
associated with non-resident family members’ intra-family transfer choice. For this
purpose, a reduced-form two-equation SUR analysis is adopted.33 The empirical
32The static fixed-effect linear probability model (FE-LPM) of male parent LFP shows that 10%
increase in the amount of transfers from child household is estimated to decrease the probability of
LFP by 7.5%, and the coefficient is statistically significant at the 1% level. Although the incidence
of downstream transfers is associated with the rise in the probability of male-parent’s participation,
the coefficient is insignificant at the 10% level. This estimation result can be provided upon
request.
33The SUR consists of regression equations that satisfy the assumptions of the standard regression
model. However, ? argues that the SUR is more efficient than the independent equation-by-
equation estimation method because jointly estimated coefficients account for contemporaneous
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analysis strategy can be generalized in the following two sets of downstream and
upstream transfer incidence regression equations:
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where Y pit (Y cit) is a dummy variable which has the value one if the parents (child)
household in a family i makes financial transfers to the non-resident child (parents)
household in period t and is equal to zero if not. Thus, two binary decisions
yield a bivariate seemingly unrelated linear probability model.34 Ajit, j ∈ {p, c}
is the amount of agent j household’s log net-asset holdings, and superscript p
(c) denotes the parents (child) household. LFP jit is labour force status dummy
which has the value one if the male-agent j participates in the labor force. Xit is a
set of covariates that abstract parents- and child-household’s life-cycle factors. It
includes the amount of parents’ log national pension income, health condition of
male-parent, female-parent’s LFP status, male parent’s yearly age dummies, female
child-household member’s LFP status, and time-invariant information about each
household members’ educational attainment and its interaction effect. τ jt is calendar
year fixed effects.
The coefficients gained from the SUR are presented in table 1.4.35 The estima-
tion results well reflect the main findings of ?: the provision of IVFT is positively
related to the economic capacity of providers and negatively related to the income of
recipients. These features are more pronounced in conjunction with the observable
characteristics of parents-households. Parents who have higher economic capacity
are more likely to make IVFT toward their child. The first panel shows that a 1%
increase in parental net-asset holdings and male-parent’s LFP are associated with
the rise in the incidence of downstream transfers by 2.1% and 8.8%, respectively.
However, the child-household’s resources have a limited effect on the parent’s trans-
fer decision, and their coefficients are statistically insignificant in general.
Equivalent results for the probability of IVFT from child to parents are summa-
rized in the second panel. Although the coefficient on the effect of parental net-assets
correlation in the errors across equations. Thus, SUR provides more precise estimates of coefficients
if error terms are correlated across equations.













35Considering the estimated high correlation coefficient of the residuals (-0.317) and Breusch-
Pagan test result (p-value=0.0000) indicating the possible correlation between the errors of
separate equations, the SUR estimation is more suitable than the separate equation-by-equation
OLS method.
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on upstream transfers has a positive sign, the magnitude of the effect is negligible
(0.0039) and statistically insignificant. Thus, contrary to the hypothesis that the
upstream transfer decision is strategically made for securing a future bequest from
a rich parent, the result is in line with the altruism model and justifies the model
framework that will be explained in section 1.4.36 In addition, the marginal effects of
the SUR are consistent with the results obtained from different estimation methods
and model specifications.37
1.4 Model
In this section, I develop a dynamic programming model of an altruistically linked
family. To capture important aspects of intra-family interaction and yet keep the
model in a computationally tractable manner, the model assumes that each family
consists of one elderly parents-couple (the parents-household with superscript p)
and their independent one child-couple (non-cohabiting child-household with super-
script c). The model focuses on bilateral financial transfers between the parents-
and child-household who do not live together (a couple consists of husband and
wife).38,39 Thus, a child who is living together with their parents is not considered
as a child-household but just regarded as a family member who cannot involve
in the decision-making process. It is assumed that couples always jointly make
decisions and maximize their household utility, so whether a parents-household is
connected to a child-couple through a biological son or daughter does not cause any
differences.
Both parents- and child-households are assumed that they are altruistic toward
each other, however, the extent of their altruism can differ. Each household inde-
36? show that there is a positive correlation between parental wealth and the incidence of
downstream transfers in Botswana.
37I additionally find that the signs and magnitude of marginal effects gained from different
estimation model (the probit and logit) and specification (capturing the ageing effects through age
and age-squared rather than age-dummies) are not sensitive to changes in the model specification,
and the relation between variables still holds. This estimation result can be provided upon request.
38As the grandparents’ choice of looking after grandchildren would be another important issue
and needed to be treated properly, there would be a concern about the family structure that this
paper focuses on. However, the data show that just 1.8% of grandchildren are living together
with their grandparents. Thus, considering additional computational difficulties of introducing
the choice of time allocation for looking after grandchildren, it would be acceptable simplification
and just has a limited effect on the results.
39Although KLIPS does not provide proper information about grandparents’ time allocation for
their grandchildren, another Korean elderly panel, Korean Longitudinal Study of Ageing (KLoSA),
includes this information. Among grandparents who meet the similar sample selection criteria that
I use in the study, only 3.6% of grandparents look after their grandchildren. Thus, the problem
which can be caused by missing time allocation of looking after grand-children and related money
transfers would be limited.
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pendently chooses how much to consume and transfer simultaneously, so family
members play a non-cooperative and non-commitment simultaneous-move game in
each time period.40,41 One party’s decision has an influence on the other’s choice,
however, any household cannot force the other to make particular choices. To give
it another way, one party cannot affect the other party beyond the impact caused
by the choice of IVFT and bequests.
In each period t, parents optimally choose consumption cpit, next-period asset
holdings Ait+1, financial transfers TRpit, and male member’s LFP choice, simulta-
neously.42 A male-parent who chooses not to participate in the labour force is
regarded as a retiree. However, retirement is not an absorbing status, so retired
people can return to work in the next period. It is assumed that child-households
are not allowed to save, and their labour force status is decided exogenously, so a
child-household chooses their amount of consumption ccit and financial transfers to-
ward their parents TRcit in each period.43 The uncertainty in the model comes from
seven different sources; four are related to parents-household and three factors stem
from child-household. The parents are uncertain about the changes in health status
(including the incidence of death), the existence of non-labour income, stochastic
shocks on medical costs and current earnings. The child-household faces uncertainty
on his own earned income, husband’s labour force status and the existence of
non-labour income.
40The competition mode in this study can be regarded as a part of a Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium
for the strategic interaction between the parents and child because the recipient takes the
donor’s decision as given. However who becomes a donor (leader) or recipient (follower) is not
predetermined but determined simultaneously as a result of optimization, so in this respect, the
game is a simultaneous move game. Each party independently pursues a goal to maximize their
own expected utility over the remainder of life, and the extent of altruism toward each other as
well as relative economic capacity determine who becomes a leader, follower or neutral.
41If a party in a family can commit over transfers, she would announce the transfer schedule
and follow it as long as the other party satisfies the condition that the donor suggests. As this
study adopts the no-commitment assumption, it can reflect rich patterns of strategic transfer
behaviour between family members.
42Although workers, in reality, can work or retire voluntarily at any time, this study assumed
that people aged 79 and over are not allowed to work exogenously. Thus, everybody retires at the
age of 79. Also, in both parents- and child-household, it is assumed that the wife’s decision on her
LFP choice is drawn in a random manner.
43It is assumed that male-child always works whenever he receives a job offer or has a job. Also,
employed (unemployed) child-workers can be exogenously separated from their current-job (get a
job-offer).
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1.4.1 Family Type
A time-invariant family type ski is defined as a combination of observed characteristics
(Edui × ∆i) and unobserved heterogeneity (µk):
ski ∈ {Edui × ∆i × µk} , (1.3)
where i is for family, and k is for unobserved type. The details of each component
are explained below.
Observed characteristics: Family background is characterized by its members’
educational attainment Edui and age difference ∆i.44 As this analysis separates
two education groups, a family’s educational attainment is included in one of the
following four categories; Edui ∈ [(L,L), (L,H), (H,L), (H,H)], where the first
argument denotes the male-parent’s education level Edupi , and the second argument
is male-child’s education Educi . With regard to parents-household, an individual
who has received a high-school or higher degree is assigned to a high educational
attainment group H. If he did not graduate from high-school or has received less
education, he is classified as a group L. However, in the case of child-household,
the high group is defined as having received two-year college or higher education.
∆i denotes the gap between the age of male-parent agepit and -child agecit (time-
invariant initial condition), which captures the difference in economic capacity of
child-households at a given male-parent’s age and is discretized by three values;
∆i = agepit − agecit ∈ [25, 28, 31].45
Edui =

1 if Edupi = L & Educi = L
2 if Edupi = L & Educi = H
3 if Edupi = H & Educi = L
4 if Edupi = H & Educi = H
 ,∆i =

25 if agecit = age
p
it − 25
28 if agecit = age
p
it − 28




Unobserved heterogeneity: The probability that a family makes any particular
choice at a certain time point can be related to both observable and unobservable
determinants. If two exogenously identical families continue to make different
choices, the behavioural differences may be induced by unobservable characteristics
44This study does not include each household members’ education choice.
45The model period in this study begins from the age 55 of male-parent, and comparing it
with male-child workers aged 25 (∆i = 31), the yearly income of men aged 28 (∆i = 28) and 31
(∆i = 25) is 43.1% and 53.4% higher on average.
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(??). As failures to appropriately control for the differences across family may
cause severe bias, the modelling of unobservable characteristics plays a role in
capturing different choices of families who have similar underlying demographic or
economic conditions. In order to capture heterogeneous resource sharing response
of altruistically linked family members, this study introduces type-specific altruism
factors. The use of panel structure data allows for the modelling of unobservable
heterogeneity captured by several types of individuals who differ in unobservable
permanent characteristics.
For a family, its unobserved type-specific attributes µk are given by the combina-
tion of ηk and κk (µk = (ηk, κk)), and there are three different types of family in the
model (µk ∈ {µ1, µ2, µ3}). The probability that a family belongs to type-k pr(k|Xi)













if k = 1, 3
1 − Σl ̸=2pr(l|Xi) if k = 2
 , (1.5)
where ηk and κk reflect the extent of parents- and child-household’s altruism toward
the other household in the same family which belong to type k.46. The vector of
Xi contains a constant, family members’ educational attainment Edupi &Educi , and
an indicator function I{Sibi≥1} which has the value one if the child has one or more
siblings who co-reside with parents. These variables reflect economic capacity as
well as the necessity of each household’s IVFT provision and may be associated
with the probability that a family belongs to an unobservable type reflecting its
members’ consideration of the other party. The parameters λ1 and λ3 which decide
the probability of a family belongs to an unobservable type are estimated together
with other parameters by structure model.
Therefore, there are 36 different types of family in the model, and a family
is assigned to one combination of these time-invariant observed and unobserved
characteristics at the beginning of the initial model period.
1.4.2 Lifecycle Model for Parents- and Child-Household
In each period of time, the parents-household pursues a goal to maximize its expected
utility over the remainder of lifetime by choosing the amount of consumption cpit,
46For example, ηk ≥ 1 implies that the parents who belong to type-k family put equal or higher
weight to their child’s marginal utility than their own. Although some people may give higher
values to their child’s satisfaction, it would be problematic in dynamic environments. Thus, this
study analyses the case that both parents’ and child’s intensity of altruism is limited, and thus
the extent of both altruism factors are less than one.
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hours of leisure lpit, savings Ait+1, and downstream IVFT TR
p
it toward their non-
cohabiting child for the duration of their life.47 All the remaining resources are
bequested to their child-household once male-parent dies, and parents also derive
utility from this accidental bequest θB × B(Ait+1), where θB is the intensity of
parents’ bequest motive.48
The child aims to maximize its expected utility over the remainder of lifetime
by choosing the amount of consumption ccit and upstream IVFT TRcit toward
their parents. Similar to parents, household dynamics are not considered, and it
is assumed that employment is exogenous for the male-child (i.e. for the child-
household, labour supply is not a choice variable). An unemployed male-child
receives a fixed job-offer at a rate 1 − Λun (arrival rate of job offers). Once a job
offer is given, he always accepts it and works full-time. Also, incumbent male-child
workers can be separated from the job exogenously at a rate of Λs (job separation
rate). If separation occurs, he receives a job offer with the probability of 1 − Λun in
the next period.
Preference and bequests: Let Upit(k) denote the parents-household’s period t
utility for type-k family i consisted of two parts. The parents derive utility from their
own consumption and leisure. Also, they derive utility from their child-household
(in this altruistic model framework, ũpit and ũcit correspond to instantaneous utility).
The per-period utility of parents-household is given by:
Upit(k) =ũ
p











1 − σ , (1.6)
lpit =L− (h
p
it + γP ) × I{LFP pit=1} − γFair × I{hsit=Fair} − γBad × I{hsit=Bad},
(1.7)
where ϵit denotes a vector of taste shock associated with the discrete labour force
choice and is assumed to follow iid extreme value distribution. α captures the
relative importance of consumption, and the coefficient of relative risk aversion is
given by σ (> 0). L is time-endowment, and hpit is hours of work. In the solution
of the model, a male-parent who participates in the labour force is assigned 2,500
working hours per year.49 Thus, the LFP choice of male-parent is equivalent to
choosing the amount of leisure lpit to enjoy given health status hsit. I{·} is an indicator
function, which has the value one if an individual’s current state corresponds to
47i.e. Household dynamics such as divorce, remarriage or living arrangement between parents
and children are disregarded.
48If a male-parent dies, the simulation is ended at that point, and parents’ left assets are all
transferred to their child.
49i.e. If LFP pit = 1 (LFP cit = 1), then h
p
it = 2, 500 (h
c
it = 2, 250).
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{·} and the value zero, otherwise. Employment status of male-parent is denoted by
LFP pit ∈ {0, 1}: employed LFP
p
it = 1 or retired LFP
p
it = 0. γP captures the time
cost that all people who participate in the labour force need to pay. γFair and γBad
are the additional time costs caused by having ’Fair’ and ’Bad’ health status (hsit),
respectively.
Similarly, as the parents directly derive utility from their child, the child is also
altruistic toward their parents. The child-household’s period t utility for type-k
family i is express by U cit(k):







1 − σ , (1.8)
lcit =L− (h
c
it + γP ) × I{LFP cit=1}, (1.9)
where hcit is assigned 2,250 hours per year if the male-child works (LFP cit = 1). This
implies that exogenous employment status of male-child directly decides lcit.
Following ?, I assume that parents-household’s asset holdings is bequeathed to
the child-household upon the death of male-parent, and both parents and child
derive utility from bequests. The bequest function Bit+1 has the following functional
form:
Bit+1 = B(Ait+1) =
(Ait+1 +K)(1−σ) − 1
1 − σ , (1.10)
where K determines the extent to which bequests are luxury goods, and thus K
decides the curvature of Bit+1. If K = 0, there is infinite dis-utility of leaving
non-positive bequest.
Wage equation: Following the standard ? earnings equation, the hourly wage




















0 + βp1agepit + β
p
2 (agepit)
2 + βp3 × I{hsit=Fair} + β
p
4 × I{hsit=Bad}


















where wp(Xpit) is the deterministic part of male-parent’s wage which is the function
of age, health status and his own educational attainment, and ξpit is an idiosyncratic
shock. Due to the threat of selection-bias which may occur when observed earnings
in the data are only used (i.e. earnings of people who choose to work are only
observable), the parameters determining earnings process βP need to be estimated
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together with preference parameters by structural model.
The logarithm of male-child wage is equal to the sum of a deterministic compo-
nent wc(Xcit) which is the function of age and his own educational attainment and
an idiosyncratic shock ξcit. The hourly wage rate of the male-child is expressed by:50





wc(Xcit) =βc0 + βc1age
p
it + βc2 (agecit)













Budget set: The budget constrain of the parents-household is given by:
cpit + TR
p




it × I{LFP pit=1} + Ait(1 + r) + TR
c
it (1.13)
+NPi × I{agepit≥age} × I{NP i=1} + nl
p
it × I{LFP p,wit =1} + TR
G
it ,
TRpit ≥ 0, c
p
it ≥ 0,
where parents can use their income to purchase consumption goods cpit, to provide
IVFT toward their child TRpit, to pay medical expenses for survival oopit, and to
invest (or savings) in risk-free assets Ait+1 which earn after-tax interest at a rate of r.
The parents-household is assumed to be unable to borrow for their own consumption
or providing inter-vivos transfers from the future. Also, they cannot force their
child to provide a particular amount of transfers (i.e. it is not allowed for the
parents-household to decide the negative amount of financial transfers and cannot
force the child’s household to provide a certain amount that they choose). However,
the household net worth at the beginning of each period can be negative if the
realization of health costs, and unexpected wage shock causes insufficiency of savings.
TRcit denotes the amount of upstream transfers chosen by their child-household. As
it will be explained by proposition 1 in subsection 1.4.4, it is optimal for at most one
party to provide IVFT under the pure strategy Markov Perfect Equilibrium.51,52
NPi is the amount of National Pension income.53 For simplicity, I assume that the
amount and right to claim the pension are given exogenously (NP i = 1 implies
that an individual has the right to draw a pension). All elderly people who are
50The parameters determining male-child’s earnings process βC is also estimated together with
preference parameters by the structural model.
51If the extent of each generation’s altruism is too high (i.e. ηk, κk ≥ 1), each party wants the
other party to have a large portion of family wealth. Thus, too strong altruism causes a conflict
in optimal allocation (?).
52If both households play Markov strategy, then the amount of expected transfers is the same
as IVFT that players actually choose.
53It also includes the national pension and other types of contributory public pension scheme
(special occupational pension) such as government employees pension, private school teacher’s
pension and military pension.
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eligible for claiming pension automatically begin to draw at the age of 61 (i.e.
agepit ≥ age = 61) and receive the same amount until death. This implicitly assumes
that the choice of the starting point of drawing pension is disregarded. nlpit denotes
non-labour income, LFP p,wit has the value one if the married woman works, and
TRGit denotes the government transfers.54
The budget constraint of the child is expressed by:
ccit + TRcit = wcit × h
c
it × I{LFP cit=1} + nl
c
it × I{LFP c,wit =1} + b× I{LFP cit=0} (1.14)
+ TRpit, TRcit ≥ 0, ccit ≥ 0,
where b denotes the amount of unemployment insurance benefits which is given to
unemployed young workers. Unlike parents-households, the model assumes that
child-households are not allowed to save. Although it is a strong assumption and
may not be innocuous, there are great theoretical and computational difficulties
if it is allowed for both parties to save (Kaplan 2012).55 With this assumption,
it is possible to focus more on elderly people’s work and retirement decision in
a tractable manner. Also, the empirical evidence from preliminary reduced from
analysis which is explained in section 1.3.3 justifies the model assumption; there is a
close relation between parents’ asset holdings and downstream transfers, however, a
child’s wealth is not an important determinant of making downstream and upstream
transfer choice. Based on this restriction, the child-household’s level of consumption
is fully determined by the couple’s labour force status, b given for unemployed
young male-workers, and provision of IVFT from or to their parents.
Health transition and medical expenses: It is assumed that the male-parent’s
health affects (1) the amount of medical expenditure, (2) leisure time, (3) pro-
ductivity, (4) survival probabilities, and (5) probability of elderly women’s LFP.56
However, unfortunately, it is impossible to directly observe the actual health sta-
tus, and only objective and subjective measures of health conditions are available.
Despite the growing research on the effect of health on labour force choice, it is
still debatable how to measure it. This study follows the method suggested by
?. I use Principal Components Analysis (PCA) and combine multiple subjective
54The functional forms of nlpit, LFP
p,w
it , and TRGit are explained below.
55? points out “the theoretical challenges to working with an imperfectly altruistic model
without commitment in which both parties can save are overwhelming. Such models generally
have a large set of Markov equilibrium and to date are only understood in very stylized settings”
?, page 474.
56It is assumed that female-parent’s health is not considered in this study. Also, the health
status of husband and wife in a child-household is implicitly assumed as always ’Good’, and young
households do not need to pay medical costs.
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measures of health status (self-evaluated health, physical constraint and activity of
daily living-summary) into one single index hsit. Although this method still has
a measurement error problem, it is a parsimonious way as well as mitigating the
problems. In each period, the living parent’s health is in one of the following three
categories: (1) Good (2) Fair or (3) Bad (i.e. hsit ∈ {0(Good), 1(Fair), 2(Bad)}).
hsit evolves stochastically to hsit+1 having values Good, Fair, Bad or Dead (i.e.
hsit+1 ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3(Dead)}). If a male-parent dies, the optimization process of the
family is ended at that point, and all the asset holdings of parents are bequeathed
to their child.
The probability of given health to the next period health state depends on the
individual’s age (including age-squared and -cubed), current health state and his
own educational attainment. It is assumed that transition probabilities from one
to another state of health are given exogenously, so individuals cannot affect the
probability through investment in health care or increase in hours of exercise.57 The
health status transition probabilities are estimated by ordered logistic regression:
p
hst+1
t+1 = pr(hsit+1|agepit, hsit, Edu
p





Medical expenses of parents-household mit are defined as out-of-pocket (oop)
costs in this model.58 It is assumed as a negative income shock, which should be
paid in order to survive, however, the cost has no impact on future medical expenses
or health status.59 Medical expenses are modelled as the function of an individual’s




ln oopit =ME(agepit, Ait, hsit) + uit = βM0 + βM1 age
p
it + βM2 (age
p
it)2 (1.16)
+ βM3 ln Ait + βM4 × I{hsit=Fair} + βM5 × I{hsit=Bad} + βM6 I{Edupi =H} + uit,
uit ∼ N(0, σ2u)
Non-labour income: The household has another possible source of income from
the spouse. Considering the fact that the spouse’s income can serve as insurance
against diverse kinds of shocks, the spouse’s earned income needs to be considered
in the model. However, introducing joint work and retirement choices between
57There are a bunch of research, such as ?, ?, ? and ?, which introduce similar exogeneity
assumption.
58Top 5% of oop costs are removed.
59I assume that individuals have to make the LFP and the likelihood as well as amount of
transfer decisions before observing uit for the period.
60Age and age-squared are used. It is assumed that there is a correlation between net-wealth
and the quality of care that individuals choose.
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the couple impose considerable computational burdens. Moreover, comparing it
with elderly men’s labour supply, a relatively less proportion of married women
participate in the labour force. On average, just 29.6% of married elderly women
whose husband’s age is between 55-75 participate in the labour force.61 The situation
is similar for child-household. Comparing it with young men’s labour supply, a
relatively less proportion of married women participates in the labour force. On
average, the LFP rate for men whose age is between 30-45 is 96.3% in the sample,
while below half (42.0%) of women with 30-45 years old husband are in the labour
force.
The income actually comes from the wife’s labour supply, however, it is regarded
as non-labour income nljit (j ∈ {p, c}) in this study because it occurs regardless of
the husband’s labour force status. In order to reflect the distinctive characteristics of
married women’s labour supply and reduce the computational burdens, parameters
of post-taxed non-labour income are estimated external to the structural model. It is
assumed that the wife’s decision on her given period LFP draw happens at the end of
each period (i.e. after her husband makes labour supply choice, and couples decide
the amount of IVFT and savings).62 The elderly wife’s participation is determined
by her husband’s age agepit, health condition hsit, educational attainment Edu
p
i ,
and the amount of household savings Ait.63,64 Also, for computational convenience,
it is additionally assumed that non-labour income nljit is a function of deterministic
characteristics (husband’s age and education).65 The expected earnings of the wife
who belongs to parents-household are derived by multiplying the probability of
61Elderly women’s LFP rate in the sample declines rapidly with their age. It decreases from
54.0% at the age of 50 to 7.9% at the age of 70.
62It is assumed that once she decides to work, she has a full-time job and works 2,000 hours per
year. In the sample, 82.1% of the elderly wife who is in the labour force work as a full-time worker
or self-employed and just 17.9% of them have a part-time job. Also, women who have full-time
job work 46.0 hours per week on average. Among young wives who have a job, 92.7% of them
works as a full-time worker or self-employed (just 7.3% of them have a part-time job), and women
having a full-time job in the sample work 42.7 hours per week on average. Therefore, the negative
effects of the 2,000 hours per year working full-time worker assumption would be limited.
63With the assumption that the age-difference between husband and wife is three years old, the
non-labour income function can be interpreted as a function of her age, not of her husband’s age
64In the sample, if the health status of the husband aged between 55 and 75 is good, fair, or
bad, the wife’s average LFP rate is 24.7%, 27.2%, and 42.7%, respectively.
65Studies of female labour supply usually include the husband’s educational attainment as an
important explanatory variable. ? find that women are more likely to switch to market work when
their husband has received higher education. Moreover, ? find that husband’s level of education
has a positive effect on his wife’s wages.
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2 + βnl,p3 × I{Edupi =H},
(1.19)
where LFP p,wit has the value one if a married woman who belongs to parents-
household participates in the labour force and has the value zero, otherwise.
In the case of child-household, her participation and the amount of non-labour
income are determined by her spouse’s age agecit and education level Educi . The
expected earnings of a wife who belongs to child-household Et(nlcit) are expressed
by:






i} × nlc(agecit, Educi ), (1.20)
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2 (agecit)2 + β
nl,c
3 × I{Educi =H} (1.22)
Government transfers and unemployment insurance programs: In order
to guarantee a minimum level of resources (ŷmin) for elderly people, many govern-
ments run transfer programs. For example, the Korea government was introduced
the Basic Old-Age Pension Scheme in 2008 and has reformed it as Basic Pension
Scheme since 2014. I describe the government transfer program in more detail in
Appendix A.1. When the sum of households’ disposable and savings income is lower
than a certain standard, the government fills the gap between ŷmin and converted
household’s income. Thus, it allows households to secure ŷmin amount of resources
each year. In this study, I follow ? and simplify the government transfer rules.66
The amount of government transfers TRGit that a parents-household receives is given
66In reality, the amount of government transfers also depends on many other factors such as the




TRGit = max{0, ŷmin − yincit − ypincit}, (1.23)




it −D1} +max{0, nl
p
it −D1} +NPi], (1.24)
ypincit = max{0, r × [Ait −D2]}, (1.25)
where yincit and ypincit are the assessed amount of income and the amount of income
converted from each household’s net-asset holdings. D1 and D2 denote the amount
of basic income and net-asset deduction, respectively. I use 2015-year deduction
points (D1 = 6, 000, 000 and D2 = 85, 000, 000 KRW)
The government also runs the unemployment insurance (UI) program. The UI
is characterized by the amount of benefits b which are eligible for unemployed young
workers (LFP cit = 0), and the eligibility of benefits is independent of the labour
force status of the spouse (i.e. The eligibility just depends on male-child’s labour
force status). The UI benefits are given by:
UIit =
 0 if LFP cit = 1
b if LFP cit = 0
 (1.26)
1.4.3 State Space
Given the survival of male-parent, the state of parents-child household pair in each
period is captured by six variables: (1) parents’ wealth determined in the previous
period Ait, (2) the amount of male-parent’s expected national pension income NPi,
(3) male-parent’s age agepit, (4) head of parents-household’s current period health
status hsit, (5) the type of family ski , and (6) child’s LFP status (work or not)
at the beginning of each period. The parents- and child-households enter every
period with a given state χit. At the beginning of time t, the state variable is
common knowledge for all members in the family i. Given χit, the set of preference
parameters θ, type assignment probability parameters λ1 & λ3, earnings process
βP & βC , and data generating process zit, each household seeks to maximize their
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Λit,MEit, E(nlpit), E(nlcit), TRGit , UIit, wp, wc,Λun,Λs
}
(1.31)
1.4.4 Dynamic Intergenerational Finite Horizon Game
In the model, an altruistic family consisted of one parents- and one child-households
plays a dynamic non-cooperative inter-generational finite horizon game. Two-way
altruism leads to bidirectional IVFT and strategic behaviours in consumption,
savings and labour supply. With regard to the information structure of the game,
both parents and child enter into each period game with the same state variables χit,
and the set of idiosyncratic independent shocks uit, ξpit , ξcit is common knowledge in
the same family once they are realized. Therefore, they play a complete information
game. In order to guarantee the uniqueness of the Markov Perfect Equilibrium
(MPE), I impose a particular extensive form of the stage game. Each household
optimally chooses its own choice variables at the same time, and the amount of
IVFT as well as other choice variables are chosen simultaneously. The optimization
results in the role of each household as a donor, recipient or neutral of IVFT
endogenously. The recipient takes the donor’s decision as given and sequentially
chooses his own choice except for transfers. In order to find the solution of the
game, I use a backwards induction algorithm which begins to solve the problem at
time T (age 90) and working backwards to time 1 (age 55).
As the IVFT provider leads the game, a fatal contradiction occurs if both parents
and child can make transfers in the same period. However, below proposition 1
guarantees that it is optimal for at most one party to provide IVFT under the
equilibrium path.
Proposition 1. Dis-allowance of simultaneous bidirectional transfers in
the same period: With the assumption of imperfect altruism (0 < ηk, κk < 1), at
most one party in a family provides financial transfers in the same period game t
Proof. The formal proof of the proposition is provided in Appendix A.2
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By Proposition 1, only one of the following three cases holds at time t: TRpit > 0
& TRcit = 0, TR
p
it = 0 & TRcit > 0, or TR
p
it = 0 & TRcit = 0.
Timing of the stages: Each period game is divided into six stages, and the
sequence of stages assumed in the model is as follows:
(1) Begins with χit and ϵit which are common knowledge for all members in the
family i
(2) Both households in the same family simultaneously choose the size of transfers
as well as other choice variables at the same time. As proposition 1 ensures that it is
impossible for both parties to be IVFT donors, each party makes their own decisions
assuming that the other party will not provide transfers. All the households in a
given family know which party becomes a donor, recipient or neutral of IVFT as
private information does not exist in the game
(3) Once each player’s role as an IVFT donor, recipient or neutral is determined
endogenously, the game is proceeded in two cases depending on the incidence of
IVFT:
Case1: If it is optimal for all members not to provide transfers, there is no
additional interaction between households (i.e. each household plays the action
which is chosen in stage (2)), and the game just moves to stage (4)
Case2: If it is optimal for a household in a family to provide transfers toward
the other party, the recipient takes the donor’s decision on the amount of IVFT
as given and makes her own choice sequentially. The donor’s (denoted j) optimal
simultaneous decision of TRj∗it , and other decision variables are already chosen in
stage (2). The recipient (denoted −j) takes TRj∗it as given. The recipient’s state
is now written as χ−jit = (χit, TR
j∗




it = 0, the recipient
optimally chooses the rest of choice variables67
(4) Nature draws an idiosyncratic out-of-pocket cost (uit) as well as independent
wage shocks (ξpit and ξcit) and determines whether each wife participates in the labour
force or not68
67For example, if it is optimal for the parents-household to provide IVFT, they optimally
chooses consumption cp∗it , labour supply LFP
p∗
it and the amount of transfers TR
p∗
it simultaneously.
The child-household takes TRp∗it as given, and thus child’s state is given as χcit = (χit, TR
p∗
it ).
Along with χcit, the expected level of the child’s consumption is automatically determined. If
the child-household becomes a donor, the child optimally chooses TRc∗it . The state vector of the




it = 0, parents optimally choose their
choice variables.
68As the random shocks are drawn by nature after each household makes their choice, the shocks
can be integrated out, and this allows for having an analytical solution. Although these shocks
are iid, and current period choices are not influenced by the realization of time t shocks in this
study, these affect the properties of future choice. ξpit and uit have a direct effect on next period
asset holdings and result in the changes of male-parent’s next period LFP and the direction of
30 Intrafamily Altruism and Inter-Vivos Financial Transfers
(5) In accordance with shocks and spousal income, parent’s savings Ait+1 and child’s
actual amount of consumption ccit are determined
(6) Nature draws updated value of parent’s health status hsit, and the child-
household head’s next period labour force status is determined; An unemployed
child receives a job offer at rate 1 − Λun, and an employed child loses his job with
probability Λs. In the case that head of the parents-household dies (hsit+1 = 3), the
child inherits Ait+1, and the game ends. If the head of parents-household survives
(hsit+1 ̸= 3), the family moves to the next period game.
Pure strategy equilibrium: This study limits the discussion to pure strategy
equilibrium. Under the assumption of complete information, the inter-generational
interaction can be categorized as a pure strategy finite horizon game. Thus, I
consider Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE) which can be regarded as subgame
perfect equilibrium of the dynamic game. The pure strategies in MPE is given by
the pair of Markov strategy; spit(χit) and scit(χit) where s
j
it(χit) denotes player j in
family i would choose in state χit. Given other player’s Markov strategy (s−jit ), it is
straightforward that player j’s Markov strategy sjit for each state (χit) provides her
the highest possible pay-off which player j can achieve from period game t.





scit : χit −→ (TRcit) (1.33)
Recursive form of each family’s problems: With regard to the recursive form
of each agent’s problems, the family index-i and type index-k are suppressed for
notational simplicity hereafter. At time T, the male-parent dies at the end of the
period with probability 1, so his value function takes the form as follows:
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T (χcT )) + βθBETB(AT+1)
(1.34)
IVFT. In this sense, transitory shocks also generate changes in behavioural dynamic response and
intrafamily interaction.
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If t < T , the Bellman equation of the parent’s problem V pt takes the form of:69
















































+ β(1 − Σhst+1=2hst+1=0 p
hst+1
t+1 )θBEtB(At+1),
where W pt and Rpt denote the value for parents-household which male-member
chooses to work and retire, respectively.
On the basis of household head’s time t labour force status, child’s problem V ct
takes the form of:

















(1 − Λs)V ct+1(χt+1|LFP ct+1 = 1) + ΛsV ct+1(χt+1|LFP ct+1 = 0)
]
+ β(1 − Σhst+1=2hst+1=0 p
hst+1
t+1 )EtB(At+1),

















(1 − Λun)V ct+1(χt+1|LFP ct+1 = 1) + ΛunV ct+1(χt+1|LFP ct+1 = 0)
]
+ β(1 − Σhst+1=2hst+1=0 p
hst+1
t+1 )EtB(At+1)
Considering the case TRpt = 0 and TRct > 0. The parents-household takes
cc∗t , LFP
c
t , and TRc∗t as given and optimally chooses their own c
p
t (χpt = (χt, TRc∗t ))
and LFP pt (χpt ) by solving the problem V pt (χpt ) = max{W pt (χpt ), Rpt (χpt )}.70 The
child-household knows what level of the consumption and labour supply the parents-
household will choose if they chooses a particular amount of transfers. The optimal
amount of upstream IVFT TRc∗t is derived by the equation (1.38) if male-child is
employed or by (1.39) if he is unemployed at period t. For TRpt > 0 and TRct = 0,
the parent’s decision process is similar to that of the child and is expressed by the
equation (1.35). If TRpt = TRct = 0, then each household independently chooses
their own action.
69This study assumes that male-parents are not allowed to work from the age 79, so the value
function of parents-household which the age of male-member is 79 or more can be expressed by
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t+1(χt+1) is shorthand ex-
pression to denote the expected future value conditional on health status transition, and the
mortality rate 1 − Σhst+1=2hst+1=0p
hst+1
t+1 is simplified to 1 − p
hst+1 ̸=3
t+1 hereafter.
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Euler equations: Euler equations can be derived through the combination of
the standard first order conditions (FOCs) of optimal level of decision variables and
envelope theorem (ET).
⟨Child− household⟩
Following the assumption that child-household is not allowed to save, a one-unit
increases in TRct always causes the same amount decrease in their consumption
(∂cct/∂TRct = −1). Given the child’s problems expressed by the Bellman equation


























In the case of the internal solution, the child chooses optimal transfers which
equalize the child’s marginal utility and the sum of the parent’s marginal utilities
of consumption evaluated from the child’s point of view and the discounted value
of bequests given when the male-parent dies. However, if a child has just a
limited amount of resources or has relatively rich parents, their optimal decision is






+ β(1 − phst+1 ̸=3t+1 )Et ∂B(At+1)∂At+1 ).
⟨Parents− household⟩
Given the parent’s problems expressed by the Bellman equation (1.35), FOCs of













































where the expectation in equation (1.42)-(1.44) is taken over idiosyncratic compo-
nents in the parent’s out-of-pocket medical costs ut and in the wage equation of the
parent ξpt+1 and child ξct+1, respectively.
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The optimum decision of parents is summarized by the system of two Euler
equations (1.45)-(1.46). The combination of FOCs and ET yields the optimal levels
of consumption between time t and t+1 (equation (1.45)), and the similar argument
leads to the Euler equation that characterizes the optimal level of IVFT (equation
(1.46)). Considering the fact that parents’ decision on TRpt just has an effect on the
amount of child’s consumption under the assumption that male-child always works
(if he receives a job offer), deriving TRp∗t which satisfies equation (1.46) determines
the amount of child’s consumption.71
Given the functional form of per-period utility and the existence of the govern-
ment transfer program, cp∗t > 0 always holds. In regard to choosing TRp∗t , there are
three possible corner solutions. The first corner solution in IVFT is the binding
credit condition (i.e. EtAt+1 = 0). In this case, equation (1.46) still yields the
optimal level of transfers. Another corner solution in IVFT is given by TRpt = 0.
Now, the relation in equation (1.46) no longer holds (however, the optimal condi-
tion of the other controls still holds by equations (1.45)). In order to satisfy the







needs to hold, and this implies
that the additional utility gains of the parents caused by the provision of one-unit
of resource to their child-household are lower than the utility loss caused by the
reduction of their own consumption. The final corner solution in financial transfers
is that both of the first and second corner solution conditions occur at the same
time. This leads to the result of hand-to-mouth, and equations (1.45) and (1.46)
do not hold. In this case, the level of parents’ consumption is determined by their
currently available resources.
1.5 Identification and Estimation Strategy
The model period begins from the age of 55 (model age 0), and death occurs at the
end of age 90 with the probability of one (agepit ∈ [55, 90]). I assume that a period
71The likelihood and level of parental transfers are determined by equating the marginal benefit
(MB) and cost (MC) to the parents along the equilibrium path. The MC and MB of downstream
transfers are marginal utility (MU) from parents-households’ current period consumption and MU
from child-household scaled by ηk.
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in the model corresponds to three years, so each male-parent has a lifecycle of up to
twelve model periods. In order to achieve the goal, the required sets of parameters
are divided into three categories. First, I take some parameters from outside. For
the purpose of compatibility with other empirical research, the discount factor β is
set to 0.96, and time endowment L is equal to 4,500 hours. The real annualized
post-tax interest rate r is considered to have a value of 4.0%.72 Also, considering
the maximum amount of BOAPS support for a two-person household (1.9 million
KRW in June 2014), the amount of yearly government transfer for elderly people
is set to 1.8 million KRW ŷmin = 1, 800, 000 (approximately U.S. $1,600). The
second set of parameters is estimated external to the model. The coefficients on
the LFP probabilities and non-labour income of female-family member in each
household, medical costs, and health transition matrix are included in this category
and estimated directly from data. Lastly, based on the first two sets of parameters,
the set of earnings βP & βC , exogenous job-separation Λs, and -arrival 1-Λun
rate, the set of unobserved type assignment probabilities λ1 & λ3, and preference
parameters θ is determined through matching moment conditions.
1.5.1 Identification of Model Parameters
Except for altruism factors, the identification of other preference parameters is
standard and depends mainly on male-household members’ LFP and savings choice.
I pin down relative risk aversion σ, bequest shifter θB, and bequest curvature K
mainly by matching the mean wealth of parents aged 55-81 because it is important
that the model generates the right amount around the time that elderly people decide
to leave the labour force. The parameters of the fixed cost of work γP , γFair, γBad
and consumption weight α are identified by targeting the LFP rate of male-parent.
The mean LFP rate of male-child is used to pin down exogenous job separation rate
Λs and arrival rate of job 1 − Λun.
The altruism ηk, κk, family type assignment λ1,&λ3, and amount of unem-
ployment insurance benefits b parameters are mainly identified by matching the
average proportion of parents- and child-household supplying IVFT toward the
other household in the family because the incidence of IVFT in this model is caused
by altruism toward the other party in the same family. For example, as parents
become more altruistic toward their child, they are more likely to sacrifice their
own leisure or asset holdings to increase child’s consumption today. Thus, more
parents-households become a donor of IVFT. Also, as the vector of covariates Xi
72The average long-term interest rate between 2006 and 2016 in Korea was 4.0% (OECD
Statistics: Key Short-Term Economic Indicators).
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includes educational attainment of both male-parent and -child, these reflect each
household’s economic ability closely related with the provision as well as the size of
IVFT. Also, the existence of siblings living together with parents I{Sibi≥1} may be
associated with the probability that a family belongs to a certain type and play a
role as an additional exclusion restriction.73
The earning process parameters for male-parent and -child is derived using
simulated workers. The OLS or fixed-effect estimators are identified directly from
observed wage profiles from data that only include observations for workers, so
potential wage rates of non-participants cannot be used to estimate parameters.
In particular, as the elderly leave the labour force with age, estimation methods
using actual wage profiles cannot properly control the selection bias. For example,
if an individual who experiences sudden negative productivity shock may be more
likely to choose retirement, then the estimated profiles which only use people in
the labour force overestimate the wage rate. On the contrary, if people who have
received continuous positive wage shocks can accumulate sufficient assets and leave
the labour force earlier to enjoy more leisure, then estimated profiles would be
under-stated.
Likewise, the observed wage growth rate can be either under- or over-estimate
actual wage profile, so a decomposition analysis that does not consider the sample
selection issue properly can be potentially biased if the estimation is performed on
the data collected from people in the labour force. Therefore, in order to control
the selection bias, βP & βC are estimated by the structural model. If the bias in
the actual wage profile occurs to the simulated profiles in the same manner, wage
profiles for all simulated individuals can be used to correct selection bias. To do
this, the average and standard deviation of male-parents’ and -children’s yearly
after-tax income in the data are used as moment conditions.
1.5.2 Solution Methodology and Initial Conditions
In order to estimate the vector of unknown preference, earnings and type assignment
probability parameters, the method of simulated moments (MSM) strategy is
employed. As moment conditions, I use the LFP rate of male-parent and -child,
net wealth, the proportion of each household providing downstream and upstream
net-transfers and average as well as the standard deviation of each male-household
7340.3% of parents-household whose male-member is assigned to low education group have
children who are living together, however, around 12%p more parents in high-education group
co-reside with one or more children.
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member’s yearly earnings. In total, 80-moment conditions are used.74 These moment
conditions are calculated from the final sample (these moment conditions are called
‘empirical moments’ henceforth.).
The parameters are estimated by the following procedure: (1) The solution of
the model in this study consists of policy functions for consumption, the LFP and
both households’ IVFT choices. As the model cannot be solved analytically, it must
be solved numerically from the last to the first model period iteratively at each
age group, (2) Initial conditions are drawn from the empirical joint distribution
for 20,000 simulated families, and the Gauss-Hermite quadrature method is used
to discretize the state space of out-of-pocket medical cost shocks and each male-
household member’s unexpected wage shocks. These discretized iid shocks are fed
into the model, (3) Based on the model solution and initial conditions, simulated
profiles corresponding to the data-moments are derived, and (4) The parameters are
chosen to minimize the distance between empirical moments and their simulated
counterparts as closely as possible.
In particular, the initial conditions are drawn from the empirical joint distribution
of net-asset holdings and national pension separately for the low- and high-education
groups. With regard to the household’s observed and unobserved characteristics,
male-child’s education level, and the existence of siblings living together with parents
are randomly drawn conditional on male-parent’s educational attainment. The
discretization used for the age difference between the male-parent and -child ∆i is
25, 28, and 31, and the proportion of each age-gap is set to be 25%, 50%, and 25%,
respectively. Also, there is no difference between high- and low-educated group in
the relative share of ∆i.75 Once the preference, type assignment probabilities and
earnings parameters are estimated, I then simulate the model family-by-family and
conduct counterfactual analysis.
1.6 Parameter Estimates and Model Fits
To quantify the relation between family resource sharing and elderly people’s
life-cycle choice, I structurally estimated the model from KLIPS. Considering
computational burden, relatively less crucial parameters such as health transition
74(1) 8-mean of male-parents’ LFP rate for age group 55-78, (2) 11-mean of male-child’s LFP
rate when their male-parent’s age is between 55-87, (3) 9-mean of net asset accumulation for
age group 55-81, (4) 9-share of each household which make net-transfers for age group 55-81, (5)
8-average and 8-standard deviation of each parents-household’s yearly after-tax income for age
group 55-78, (6) 9-average and 9-standard deviation of each child-household’s yearly after-tax
income when their male-parent’s age is between 55-81.
75The mean and standard deviation of the age-gap for the low (high) education group are 28.9
(28.6) and 4.42 (4.37), respectively.
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probabilities, medical costs, non-labour income are estimated outside of the model.76
As fixing these outside-model parameters, the model is numerically solved, and the
remaining parameters are structurally estimated using a set of moment conditions.
1.6.1 Preference, Type-Assignment and Earnings
The preference and type-assignment parameters are presented in the first panel
of table 1.5. There is noticeable heterogeneity in unobserved family types. The
estimated values of parents-households’ type-specific attribute ηk which parents in
type-k place weight on their child-household’s utility are 0.6658 for type-1, 0.6229
for type-2, and 0.5103 for type-3, respectively.77 Comparing it with their own
utilities, the result implies that parents-households place more than half of the value
on child-households’ utilities. The estimated extent of unobserved type-dependent
child’s altruism weights κk (from type-1 to -3) are 0.0114, 0.0152, and 0.0236 which
are comparable with 0.011-0.025 in ? and 0.012 in ?.78 Also, the gap between ηk and
κk corresponds to ?. The estimated proportion of families assigned to unobserved
heterogeneity type-1, -2, and -3 are 36.7%, 8.3%, and 55.0%, respectively.79
Turning next to the estimated relative risk aversion (RRA) for consumption is
4.7045 (σ = 6.7788), and the estimated value of preference on consumption relative
to leisure is 0.6411.80 The estimate of yearly unemployment benefit b is 21.69
million KRW which over-estimates the actual amount of UI payouts.81 However,
considering the fact that the mean duration of unemployment is 3.0 month, and the
proportion of unemployed whose unemployment duration is over a year was just
0.9% among the total unemployed in 2016, the difference would be acceptable. The
fixed cost of labour force participation γP is 459 hours per year. The estimates of
76The explanation of such parameters is summarized in Appendix A.3.
77Comparing it with families in type-2 µ2, parents in type-1 (type-3) put higher (less) weight
on their child’s utility. Thus, if all else is equal, type-1 (type-3) parents are more (less) likely to
provide downstream-IVFT than type-2 parents. Also, it is impossible to directly compare the
estimated ηk in this study with other studies using data from different countries. There is a wide
difference in the estimated value of the parameter in the literature, and it ranges from 0.04 in
? to 0.63 in ?. In recent studies, ?, ?, and ? show a value of 0.27, 0.69, and 0.49, respectively.
Relative to previous studies, the estimated ηk in this study is neither exceptionally high nor low.
78? uses the HRS and imposes the assumption that children cannot save. The estimated value
of a child’s altruism is 0.011 for male and 0.025 for female offspring.
79Comparing it with individuals belong to type-2 unobserved heterogeneity, a family consisting
of high-educated parent, low-educated child, and having no siblings co-residing with parents
is more likely to be assigned to type-1 family µ1 whose parents have relatively high altruism
toward their child, and child-household places relatively low weight on parents-household’s utility.
A family whose male-parent and -child is classified as a group L and H, and has siblings who
co-reside with parents tends to be assigned to µ3 unobserved heterogeneity group.
80The RRA for consumption can be approximated as − (∂
2U/∂C2)·C
∂U/∂C = 1 − α(1 − σ).
81A single unemployed person in 2018 is expected to receive 7.72 million KRW on average.
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time cost associated with ‘Fair’ γFair and ‘Bad’ γBad health state are 659 and 977
hours per year, respectively. Finally, the estimated bequest shifter θB is 0.000065,
and the curvature K is 20.51 million KRW.
The first panel of table 1.6 provides earnings process parameters estimated
for the male-parent and -child. As expected, elderly- and young-male workers’
earnings show opposite trends with age. The earnings of the elderly decrease with
age, while young people’s earnings increase. If a male-parent is categorized as the
high educational attainment group, his earnings are 44.4% higher than those of
the low-educated group. Although a male-child in the high-education group also
earns more (21.9%), earnings premium from education is reduced as more young
people receive higher-education. The parameters on health status I{hsit=·} show
that relatively poor health status has a huge negative effect on productivity. Having
‘Fair’ and ‘Bad’ health are associated with 17.5% and 37.4% reduction in yearly
after-tax earnings.
1.6.2 Model Fit
This subsection evaluates the model’s ability to generate family members’ major
choices over the life-cycle. Figure 1.6-1.8 show the overall fitness of the model
relative to the empirical moments. The simulated profiles for the male-parent’s
age 55-84 are the path of average changes in this paper. In general, it does a good
performance in generating family members’ patterns of life-cycle choices observed in
the latter part of their life. The model closely replicates the unconditional mean of
labour supply, wage process, savings and health status transitions.82 In particular,
the simulated likelihood of individuals providing IVFT are fairly close to the actual
data, however, the model overpredicts the average amount of upstream transfers.
Panel (a)-(f) of figure 1.6 compare the simulated LFP and wage profiles of
male-parent and -child with those of empirical counterparties by male-parent’s age.
It is particularly important to closely match the labour supply, wage and savings
profiles because the aim of this study is to evaluate the effect of within-family
two-way altruism on elderly people’s work and retirement choice. Although the
model slightly overpredicts the LFP rate of elderly workers (panel (a)), it closely
replicates the gradual transition from work to retirement with age. Comparing it
with other western countries which show a sudden drop in the LFP rate around
the time at which the earliest or full national pension application is eligible, the
weak social insurance program in Korea causes its people to rely more on their
earnings. Between the age-group 55-78, the model overstates elderly workers’ actual
82All the simulated profiles are conditional on the survivor of male-parents.
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labour supply choice by 0.9% (0.6%p) on average (data: 55.6% & model: 56.2%).
The over-prediction for older worker labour supply is partly caused by the under-
prediction of their earnings (panel(c)). Between the age of 58-69, it underpredicts
elderly people’s earned income by 6.5% (data: 25.9 & model: 24.2 million KRW).
As this study does not model child-household’s labour force choice, the job offer
arrival rate and job destruction rate completely govern their labour supply. The
model fits well in the male-child’s LFP rate (panel (b)) and their earned-income
(panel (e)). Panel (g) and (h) of figure 1.6 and figure 1.7 display the amount of
parents-household’s net-asset holdings, medical expenditures and changes in health
status, respectively. The model approximates very well the changes described in the
figures. In particular, it appropriately replicates the dynamics of asset accumulation;
asset holdings increase until a certain age and then decrease gradually. However,
the model understates the evolution of actual saving choice by 11.0% on average
(data 67.0 & model: 59.7 million KRW).
The model is able to predict the size as well as the timing of bidirectional IVFT
which are displayed in figure 1.8 and table 1.7. The figure shows the unconditional
average amount of downstream and upstream transfer provision and the propor-
tion of households, which provide transfers.83 The model captures the patterns of
intra-family financial transfer provision quite closely. Panel (a) of the figure shows
that on average, 16.6% of simulated parents make financial transfers that are equal
to the share in the empirical counterpart. As the model closely fits the likelihood
of parents’ IVFT provision, it also adequately generates the amount of downward
transfer provision. Panel (b) compares the average actual amount of downstream
transfers with the model predicted counterpart. On average, the model implied
amount of yearly transfer for age-group 55-84 is 0.47 million KRW which overstate
the empirical amount of downstream transfers by 12.1% (0.42 million KRW).
The model implied likelihood and unconditional amount of upstream transfer pro-
vision are displayed in panel (c)-(d). The model closely replicates child-households’
support over the life-cycle and well captures the empirical regularity; more children
provide more financial support for elderly households as their parents grow older.
The model implied an average share of child-households who make upstream trans-
fers is 63.7% which appropriately fits the pattern observed in the data (68.6%). On
average, the actual amount of transfers that child-households send to their parents
is 2.56 million, however, the model over-predicts the amount by 0.45 million KRW.
Table 1.7 reports each household’s changes in the decision between provision and
non-provision of IVFT generated by the model and ones observed in the actual data.






, where Nt denotes the
number of elderly-male survivors at the beginning of each period t.
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Neither transition of downstream nor upstream transfer incidence are not used as
the target of moment conditions, however, the model relatively well captures the
patterns of both households’ choice. Although the model overpredicts the share of
the child who does not provide IVFT at both times t and t+ 1, the model precisely
replicates parents’ transfer provision as well as non-provision choices at time t and
t + 1 and relatively well predicts the child’s incidence of IVFT provision choice.
These results can be partly interpreted as the evidence that the model assumptions,
such as simultaneous move non-cooperative game and the mode of competition
within a family, are appropriate to capture the process of choosing IVFT provision.
1.7 Counterfactual Analysis
This section revisits the structural model and its parameter estimates to perform
counterfactual experiments. The model specification explained in section 1.4 and
predicted life-cycle profiles provided in section 1.6 are regarded as the ‘Baseline’.
The simulated profiles under the baseline serve as the basis and are compared to the
corresponding profiles of counterfactual regimes. The next subsection analyses the
implications of two sets of counterfactual policies for elderly people’s labour force
choice, security in retirement and strategic behaviour between family members. After
then, the following two subsections evaluate how ignoring bidirectional transfers
have effects on the parameter estimates, model prediction and policy effects.
1.7.1 Policy Counterfactuals
Determining the impact of increasing public transfer and state pension on the
incidence as well as the amount of private transfer choices is an important issue for
researchers and policymakers. Although previous studies provide a rough prediction
of policy impacts on some important factors such as the LFP, asset accumulation
and intra-family resources allocation, most of them have focused on one or at most
few of them and rely on reduced-form approaches. However, as all these variables
interact with each other rather than acting independently, the welfare evaluation of
introducing policies can be misleading if dynamic interaction is ignored.
If the expansion of public transfers or state pension for elderly people induces a
great magnitude of reduction in private transfers, precautionary savings or labour
supply rather than increase in their consumption, the government’s anti-elderly
poverty programmes would just have limited effects. Put somewhat differently,
an increase in retirement income can be just offset by adverse effects such as the
decrease in the amount of intra-family resource allocation or early retirement. In
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such a case, it would be better for the government to focus more on different
policy alternatives such as improving employment opportunities for the elderly or
concentrating the support for people who have disabilities rather than increasing
general elderly support.
In this subsection, I evaluate the dynamics of bidirectional likelihood as well
as the amount of IVFT, asset accumulation and labour force choice under the two
different counterfactual regimes: an expansion of the maximum amount of Basic
Pension Scheme (BPS) and an increase in average National Pension Scheme (NPS)
benefits. The changes in BPS and NPS benefits are known (i.e common knowledge)
for all family members at the beginning of the model period. These policy analyses
aim to assess the effectiveness of expanding BPS and NPS benefits on changes in
elderly people’s life-cycle choices.
Reinforcement of Old Age Income Security through BPS: BPS is a sort
of guaranteed minimum income, which the government pays to its elderly citizens.84
In order to combat elderly poverty, the Korea government has raised the maximum
yearly amount of BPS benefit payments for a two-person household with lower 20%
of income from 1.90 to 5.76 million KRW since April 2019.85 Thus, I examine the
effect of higher yearly BPS benefits ŷmin from 1.80 to 5.50 million KRW.86 Also,
considering the fact that elderly people whose age is 65 or older are subject to the
benefit, the expansion of BPS begin to be fully applied from the model period-5
(age 67-69), and the guaranteed minimum level of resources for elderly people aged
64-66 is 4.30 million KRW.87 This counterfactual policy is referred to by ‘New-BPS’
henceforth.
In the literature, the estimated crowding-out effects of public transfers have a
wide range of values. One dollar increase in pension income is associated with the
reduction in the amount of transfers from children by 20-90 cents (?). For example,
? shows the effect of pension benefit expansion on the size of remittance payments
given to elderly people. Following his estimation results, a one-dollar increase
84The program is similar to Supplemental Security Income in the U.S.
85The maximum monthly amount of BPS support for a two-person household with lower 20%
(20%-70%) of income is 480,000 (406,000) KRW. The amount of BPS benefits is derived by
subtracting assessed income and converted property income from maximum BPS benefits.
865.76 million KRW is deflated by the yearly CPI of the year 2015 (ŷmin= 5.50 ≈ 5.76 · 100.00104.45
). The receipt of each household’s BPS amount follows the transfer provision rule expressed in
equation (1.23).
87As the eligible age of BPS is 65 years and one period in the model corresponds to three
years, the maximum amount of resources that government provides to secure a minimum level
of resources is 1.8 million KRW at age 64 and 5.5 million KRW from the age 65. Thus, the
maximum amount of government transfers in model period-4 (64-66) is set as 4.3 million KRW
(4.3 ≈ 1.8+5.5+5.53 ).
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in pension income is associated with the reduction in the amount of upstream
transfers by 25-30 cents. ? and ? find that the estimated crowding-out effect
of private transfers in response to the social assistance program is 25% and 88%,
respectively.88 However, most of these studies rely on static reduced-form analysis
and focus on the relation between the changes in public support and one or just
a few of them. Thus, such models may have difficulties in properly capturing the
dynamic interaction between government supports and individuals’ choices such as
labour supply, savings and IVFT.
The second column of the first panel in table 1.8 shows the effect of maximum
BPS benefit expansion on several selected variables under the model with IVFT.
The policy counterfactual suggests three important points. First, the expansion of
maximum BPS benefits causes sharp changes in the number of beneficiaries and
amount of average benefit receipt. As the government increases the maximum
amount of support, more older people meet the eligibility requirements. Relative to
the baseline, the average proportion of BPS beneficiaries and beneficiaries’ benefit
level for the age-group 64-84 increase by 11.3%p (from 57.0% to 68.3%) and 2.0
million KRW (from 1.55 to 3.54 million KRW), respectively.89 As a result, a one-unit
rise in the maximum BPS benefits increases the average yearly amount of benefit
payments each household can receive between ages 64-90 by 0.46 unit.90.
The second point is that the considerable effect of the rise in the guaranteed
income is crowded-out by the decrease in pre-existing private transfers. A unit
increase in mean-tested benefit is associated with more than a one-third unit re-
duction in the amount of family transfers. Although downstream and upstream
transfers move in the opposite direction, the absolute amount of upstream IVFT
reduction is greater than the rise in the level of downstream support. As a result,
the intervention crowds out the net- as well as gross-intrafamily resource allocations.
Under the New-BPS, survivors aged 55-90 additionally receive 1.22 million KRW
yearly benefits from the government on average, however, yearly upstream transfers
decrease by 0.63, and yearly downstream transfers increase by 0.19 million KRW.
As a result, when the government increases the BPS benefits by one-unit, just 0.33
units of government supports are used for elderly people, and intrafamily resource
88In addition, ? study about the effect of introducing the Basic Old-Age Pension Scheme which
is an elderly support program and has been replaced by BPS since July 2014. They show that a
one-dollar increase in pension income is associated with the reduction in the amount of upstream
transfers by 98.4 cents.
89As of December 2019 and November 2020, 66.3% and 66.5% of elderly people aged 65 or older
received BPS, respectively.
903.06 times rise in the maximum amount of BPS benefits causes 2.70 times (Baseline: 0.99M






Thus, 0.46 = 2.68−0.995.50−1.80 .
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allocation through IVFT decreases by 0.36 units.91
Finally, the overall welfare gain of BPS benefit expansion assessed by the value
of consumption compensation is equivalent to a 0.003% increase in consumption
overall.92 However, due to the increase in downstream support and savings and
the decrease in upstream transfers, there is just a limited difference between the
simulated average consumption under the New-BPS and baseline.93 Also, the policy
weakens elderly people’s labour force attachment (LFP rate under baseline: 56.2%
/ New-BPS: 55.7% on average), however, it has a limited effect on elderly people’s
work and retirement choice. This is because although the amount of government
supports is increased greatly under the New-BPS, it is still below 30% of the mini-
mum living cost in Korea.94 Thus, the policy effect is mainly reflected in the form of
a decrease in family insurance and an increase in consumption of child-households
rather than a great improvement in the well-being of the elderly.
In conclusion, the results of the government support expansion experiment
illustrate that the effectiveness of transfer programs could be hugely hampered
in countries where intergenerational transfers are widely observed. Rather than
increasing elderly people’s consumption, the expansion of non-contributory ben-
efit payment mainly results in crowding-out private insurance and (unintended)
redistribution of resources from government to child’s household.
Reinforcement of old age income security through NPS: The second coun-
terfactual policy analysis examines the effect of offering more generous state pension
benefits. I consider an 11%p increase in the proportion of people eligible for public
pension (from 60.9% to 71.6%) and a 15% increase in average pension benefits
(from 5.48 to 6.29 million KRW) at the same time.95,96 This experiment may not





where t is for model period, i is for individual, and N is for the average number of living parents
between the age 55 and 90. 0.33 = 1 − 187,000+629,0001,218,000 and 0.36 =
∣∣∣ 187,000−629,0001,218,000 ∣∣∣.
92Following ?, the value of consumption compensation can be derived by eq which is the solution
EVbase = Σ12t=1 1Nt Σ
Nt
i=1β
t−1Upit(k) × (1 + eq)α(1−σ) = (1 + eq)α(1−σ) ×EVNew−BP S . The equation






93The level of yearly average consumption under the baseline and New-BPS are 29.7 and 30.3
million KRW, respectively.
94In 2019, the minimum monthly cost of living for a two-person household is 1,795,188 KRW
which is 3.74 times greater than the maximum BPS benefit.
95It is assumed that all eligible individuals in the model begin to draw the benefit from age 61.
96As this study assumes that the initial condition of NPS benefits is drawn from the empirical
joint distribution, and the amount as well as the right to claim the pension are given exogenously
for reducing computational burdens, the counterfactual scheme is modelled as a 50% shift of the
mean national pension-income distribution to the right. This experiment only raises the mean
of national pension payments by 50%, and the covariance matrix of initial joint distribution has
44 Intrafamily Altruism and Inter-Vivos Financial Transfers
be absurd because if the government keeps the current pension rule, the number of
pensioners and its amount under the current state pension system will automatically
increase as the scheme becomes more matured.97 The counterfactual regime in this
subsection is referred to by ‘New-NPS’, and it examines the effect of the rise in
the contribution year of NPS under the current system and the response of family
members.
Several interesting results emerge from this experiment. The third column of
the first panel in table 1.8 summarizes the effect of changes in NPS benefits on
several selected variables. First, there is weak substitutability between pension
benefits and desirable level of asset holdings, and thus the rise in retirement income
does not discourage elderly people’s asset accumulation incentives. As individuals
have more retirement income, the forward-looking elderly have an incentive to
increase consumption before they begin to draw the national pension for smoothing
consumption. However, due to the uncertainty on survivor and health cost risks and
bequest motive, elderly people do not additionally reduce savings much to consume
more. The average yearly consumption is 1.1% (312,000KRW) higher than that of
the baseline, however, the increase in national pension does not encourage people
to reduce precautionary savings much (baseline: 59.66 / New-NPS: 59.38 million
KRW).
Second, the rise in contributory old-age pension benefit has a limited negative
effect on retirement behaviour as strategic behaviour between parents and children
is considered. The average effect of the increase in pension income on the elderly
workers’ labour supply is small in magnitude and negative (baseline: 56.2% &
New-NPS: 55.4%). However, there are relatively huge differences when divided
by age-groups. The inter-temporal substitution effect associated with the rise in
retirement income causes individuals to work more before the national pension age
and less when eligible for the NPS benefits. Because rational individuals are willing
to substitute their labour supply across periods, they work more at the period when
they can be rewarded more and leave the labour force earlier as they have more
retirement income from the pension. Comparing it with the baseline, the average
LFP rate is increased by 0.1%p between the age of 55-60 and decreased by 1.0%p
for the age-group 61-78.
remained the same. Also, due to the correlation between the initial assets and national pension
benefits, the mean of asset holdings is also adjusted to meet the initial asset holdings of the data.
97When the NPS was first introduced in 1988, only a fraction of employees in the private sector
were covered. Since 1999, the coverage was extended to all the paid-workers and self-employed.
Thus, between 2010 and 2018, the average contribution period has increased from 9.8 to 12.1
years and is expected to rise to 20.0 years by 2040 (National Pension Research Institute, 2013).
However, if the Korea government does not change the current system, the NPS fund will be fully
depleted by 2060 (Ministry of Health and Welfare, 2014).
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The third is that a large amount of intrafamily transfers could partly stem from
the high elderly poverty rate, and thus the amount of financial transfers between
family members would gradually decrease with the maturity of NPS and rise in
the number of people covered by the public pension. As parents-households have
more economic capacity (i,e, increase in NPS benefits), the necessity of supporting
parents decreases. Because the changes in NPS benefits have the opposite effect
on the incentives of downstream and upstream transfers, the overall effects on
pre-existing family supports would be priori undetermined, and thus the direction
will be determined by the relative size of coefficients involved. Row 3-6 of column
3 of the first panel show that comparing it with the baseline, both the fraction
of parents making downstream IVFT, and level of support increase when elderly
people have more retirement income. However, the fraction as well as the level
of support from child-households decrease.98 As a result, the proportion of family
making IVFT increases by 0.8%p (from 80.4% to 81.2%), however, the level of
support decreases by 2.4% (from 3.48 to 3.39 million KRW) under the counter-
factual regime.99 These imply that a one-unit increase in contributory benefits
causes a 0.26 unit decrease and a 0.04 unit increase in the amount of upstream
and downstream transfers on average, respectively. Also, as more older workers are
eligible for the national pension, the proportion of elderly-households who rely on
the public transfer programme and its average payments decrease by 7.6%p and
3.5%, respectively.
1.7.2 Dis-allowance of Inter-Vivos Financial Transfer
The baseline model described in section 1.4 shows that two-way altruism leads to
bidirectional IVFT and causes family members to engage in strategic interaction.
Since transfer decision is not made in a void, one family member’s transfer choice
affects not only the decisions of that member but also the other members’ optimal
choices. In order to answer the question, how important is the sharing resources
within families to understand elderly people’s labour supply and savings choices,
this subsection compares the parameter estimates and simulated profiles under
the baseline with those under the regime which does not allow all kinds of within-
family resources allocation except for bequest. The result from this counterfactual
experiment demonstrates the importance of inter-generational resource sharing
98Under the New-NPS, the proportion of parents making IVFT is 2.1%p higher, and the
unconditional average yearly parental transfer increases by 12% (54,000KRW). However, the
proportion of child making IVFT is 1.3%p lower, and the unconditional average yearly upstream
transfer decreases by 5% (138,000KRW).
99The money values denote the sum of the average downstream and upstream IVFT incidence
and amounts.
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which has not been much considered by previous works on this type of model. Also,
in the next subsection, the model excluding IVFT is used to show the importance
of the family insurance channel when examining policy effects.
In this subsection, transfers in both directions are not allowed (i.e. TRpit =
TRcit = 0 for all i and t), and thus elderly households now make the best possible
choices under the constraints that they directly face. This implies that the model
structure in this subsection corresponds to the typical life-cycle model, and each
household behaves in a self-interested fashion. Thus, I assume ηk = κk = 0 for all k,
and this simpler structure model is referred to by No-IVFT henceforth.100 As the
exclusion of bidirectional family transfers would result in significant economic as
well as behavioural changes, related preference parameters also need to be newly
estimated for capturing such changes. Also, individuals’ self-selection could be
reflected differently in earnings parameters. Thus, the set of preference parameters
θ′ and earning process βP ′ is estimated by repeating procedure 1.5.2 in the context
of a model excluding IVFT.




















Column 3 and 4 of table 1.5 and 1.6 show the list of parameter estimates and
their standard errors under the No-IVFT. The coefficient of RRA for consumption is
3.7203 which is lower than that of the baseline. A smaller estimate of the coefficient
of RRA for consumption implies that individuals save less given the level of assets
and uncertainty. However, the relatively small estimate does not imply that elderly
people under the No-IVFT are less risk-averse because the uncertainty that child
households face (income and labour force status) does not play a role in parents’
choices. The estimates of time cost associated with participation and fair-health
state are larger than those of the baseline. Also, as expected, the exclusion of
intrafamily strategic behaviour affects the patterns of elderly people’s selection
between work and retirement, and these changes are reflected in βP ′ .
Column 1 of the second panel in table 1.8 shows the selected average simulated
profiles under the No-IVFT regime, and figure 1.9 compares the simulated profiles
under the No-IVFT with those from the baseline and actual data. The model
without strategic interaction also reasonably accounts for elderly people’s patterns
of life-cycle choices. Panel (a) shows the LFP profiles. Although the alternative
specification also results in proper replication of elderly workers’ labour supply
choice, it understates the LFP choice between the age of 55-63 and overpredicts
100Parents still value bequests of assets when they die.
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thereafter.101 Thus, simulated individuals in the No-IVFT leave the labour force
more gradually than actual people in the data and simulated individuals under the
baseline. The gradual labour force exit under the No-IVFT is partly caused by
the fact that the elderly need to rely more on their earnings if there is no financial
support from their child. Such a change is also reflected in the simulated earnings
and asset-holdings profiles. Panel (b) displays that in order to capture the labour
force choice of elderly workers who cannot rely on family members, the productivity
under the No-IVFT needs to decrease more rapidly than that of the baseline. Also,
due to insufficient pension benefits and public spending for guaranteeing security
in retirement, simulated workers under the No-IVFT are less willing to use their
precautionary savings for consumption (panel (c)), so asset holdings decrease more
gradually.
1.7.3 Policy Effect Comparison between Full-Model and
No-IVFT
This subsection compares the effects of the increase in BPS and NPS benefit
payments on elderly households’ choices under the full-model (section 1.7.1) to
those under the No-IVFT (section 1.7.2). Through these comparisons, I illustrate
that the effects of government welfare policies can be misleading if the two-way
intra-family insurance channel is not considered adequately and demonstrate the
need for understanding policy effects based on the unified dynamic framework.
Column 2 of the second panel in table 1.8 provides the average life-cycle profiles
of selected variables under the No-IVFT & New-BPS. Although the signs of policy
effect on main variables correspond to the full-model (New-BPS with IVFT) except
for net-asset accumulation, the counterfactual regime under the restricted model
structure significantly overstates the magnitude of the changes. Comparing it with
the IVFT & New-BPS, the elderly under the No-IVFT & New-BPS are more likely
to rely on government supports, save less and consume more. The most obvious
indication of bias can be found in the relation between policy intervention and
labour force choice. While simulated individuals under the model excluding IVFT
significantly decrease labour supply, the model with IVFT predicts just a slight
drop in the LFP rate of elderly people as the government increases maximum BPS
benefits. However, the prediction under the model with IVFT is strongly supported
by actual data.102 Therefore, policymakers need to consider the role of IVFT as
101In total, the average LFP rate between the age 55-78 under the NO-IVFT overstates that of
the actual data by 2.7%p.
102Males’ yearly employment rate aged 55 or higher: 2018 62.0% → 2019 61.7% → 2020 61.6%
(the government has raised BPS benefits since April 2019, source: KOSIS).
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well as potential responses of extended family, and the effects of public transfer
policies can rely on the presence of additional support from their own children or
any other parties.
Column 3 of the second panel in table 1.8 shows the average life-cycle profiles
under the No-IVFT & New-NPS specification. The direction of change in selected
variables caused by reinforcement of retirement income generally corresponds to
the model with IVFT (IVFT & New-NPS). However, the counterfactual regime
under the restricted model structure hugely overstates the magnitude of changes in
general. Comparing it with the percentage change observed under the New-NPS
with IVFT, the elderly under the No-IVFT & New-NPS work less than those under
the No-IVFT.103 Also, as elderly people under No-IVFT cannot rely on family
insurance provided by child-household, they save a higher proportion of retirement
income. Under the No-IVFT & New-NPS, the level of asset-holdings increases by
2.3% relative to the No-IVFT, despite the drop in LFP. These results illustrate that
the policy effect would vary whether elderly people have access to family insurance
or not, so proper consideration on intrafamily interaction is required when reforming
the public pension scheme.
1.8 Conclusion
This paper contributes both to the study of family members’ life-cycle choice
patterns and the analysis of the relationship between strengthening security in
retirement and bidirectional IVFT. The innovation of this study is to synthesize
models from two series of literature that have evolved separately from one another
in various respects: one on elderly people’s work and retirement choice and the
other on private bidirectional insurance provided by extended family. I derive the
MPE of a family which is consisted of two altruistic decision-makers, parents- and
child-household pairs, who play a dynamic simultaneous move intergenerational fi-
nite horizon game without cooperation. Although the model simplifies many factors
which have effects on family members’ life-cycle choices, it adequately reproduces
elderly workers’ labour supply, asset holdings and health status transitions. In
particular, it is able to closely reproduce the incidence of bidirectional financial
transfers between parents- and child-households.
Recently, in response to the rapid ageing of the population, many governments
in the world has introduced a diverse kind of programmes, and various questions
103Comparing it with the baseline model, the average LFP rate decreases by 0.8%p under the
New-NPS with IVFT. However, the average LFP rate under No-IVFT & New-NPS is 55.6% which
is 2.7%p lower than the rate under the No-IVFT (58.3%).
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are being raised with respect to the direct or indirect effect of these policies on
individuals’ life-cycle choices. Two sets of policy counterfactuals experimented in
this study clearly hit the answer to these questions and evaluate the effectiveness of
different forms of strengthening security in retirement on elderly people’s labour
supply, asset holdings and intrafamily resource allocations. I find that the effec-
tiveness of government transfers for elderly people could be hugely dampened in
the countries where intergenerational family insurance is widely observed, and a
one-unit increase in mean-tested benefit causes a 0.36 unit reduction in pre-existing
family insurance. Also, the welfare evaluation of public transfer policy can be biased
if the strategic interaction between parents- and child-households is not accounted
for adequately. With regard to the changes in state pension income amount, it just
has a limited effect on elderly workers’ retirement behaviour and motivation for
savings. Moreover, the simulation results of the rise in retirement income show that
the huge amount of intrafamily resource sharing observed in Korea could be partly
explained by its relatively high poverty rate.
Future work needs to be conducted in a way that relaxes some of the assump-
tions made in this study and extends the forms of family insurance to non-financial
support such as living or care arrangement. Although this study introduces an
interaction between parent- and child-household, child-households are not allowed
to save, and women’s labour force choice is just treated as an event drawn in a
random manner. However, if children are allowed to hold assets, the decision on
upstream transfers does not just depend on current income, and they are able to
spread the cost of transfers across time. Also, as various statistics consistently
capture the emerging role of women in the labour force, the model needs to reflect
the coordination of a couple’s decision-making process more explicitly. Finally, there
is relatively large literature modelling other forms of family supports. Financial
support can be a good substitute for the time investment of care-giving for their
parents or grandchildren, so the choice between financial and informal time support
may play a relatively important role in accounting for observed intra-family transfers
and bequest choice. These issues remain for future work to consider.
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Figure 1.1 Incidence of Within Family Gross Inter-Vivos Financial Transfers
(a) Western Countries (b) Asian Countries
Sources: ?; HRS (2004); JSTAR(2010-2013); SHARE (2004); ?
Figure 1.2 Total Labour Force Participation Rate: Korea vs. OECD-Average
(a) Aged Between 55 and 64 (b) Aged 65 or More
Figure 1.3 Coresidence of Parents and child and IVFT Provision by Child’s Age
(a) Coresidence with Married Children (b) Incidence of Net-Upstream Transfers
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Figure 1.4 Share of Parents-Household Receiving and Providing IVFT
(a) The Proportion of IVFT
Provision by Age Group
(b) By LFP Status Both El-
derly Men and Women
(c) Downstream: By Age &
Wealth Quantile
(d) Upstream: By Age &
Wealth Quantile
(e) Downstream: By Age &
Earnings Quantile
(f) Upstream: By Age &
Earnings Quantile
Notes: The observations of transfers, which amount is below 300,000KRW are excluded. A
household is regarded as an IVFT provider if the household provides transfers at least once given
three year period given in the horizontal axis of panel (a). The observations of transfers, which
amount is below 300,000KRW are excluded. Monetary values are deflated by the yearly CPI of
the year 2015. The amount is shown in 10,000KRW. The amount of transfers is top coded at
above top 5% (applies to figure 1.5)
Figure 1.5 Amount of Parents-Households’ Bidirectional IVFT
(a) By Age (b) By Parent’s labour Force Status
(c) By Wealth Quantile (d) By Earnings Quantile
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Figure 1.6 Model Fits: Empirical vs. Simulated Profiles of the Labour Force Choice
(a) Parent: LFP Rate (b) Child: LFP Rate
(c) Parent Earnings: Mean (d) Parent Earnings: Standard Deviation
(e) Child Earnings: Mean (f) Child Earnings: Standard Deviation
(g) Parent: Net Asset (h) Parent: Out of Pocket Medical Costs
Note: Male-parent’s and child’s earnings show the average of post-tax yearly full-time or
self-employed earnings
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Figure 1.7 Model Fits: Empirical vs. Simulated profiles of Health Status
Note: Conditional on survivors at a given age group
Figure 1.8 Model Fits: Empirical vs. Simulated Profiles of Bidirectional IVFT
(a) Parent: Share of Providing IVFT (b) Parent: Average Amount of IVFT
(c) Child: Share of Providing IVFT (d) Child: Average Amount of IVFT
Notes: The amount of down- and up-stream transfer shows the unconditional mean of




N ). 10,000KRW is approximately equal to U.S $8.4
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Figure 1.9 Comparison: Baseline vs. No-IVFT Profiles of Selected Variables
(a) Parent: LFP Rate (b) Parent: Mean Earnings
(c) Parent: Net Asset
Note: 10,000KRW is approximately equal to U.S $8.4
Table 1.1 Sample Selection
Step Sample Exclusion Rules Number of Number of Obs.
Family HH Family HH
0: Raw Data 4,329 7,102 59,143
1: Delete Family Obs. Consisted of One Household (HH) or 1,525 3,910 25,380
Whose Parents Form Separated HHs
2: Exclude Family Obs. with More than One Independent Child HHs 1,367 2,734 13,704
3: Drop Family Obs. Whose Age Difference Between 1,358 2,716 6,796 13,592
the Oldest Parents and Child is less than 15
4: Exclude Family Obs. with Single Parent 942 1,884 4,265 8,530
5: Exclude Family Obs. with Non-Married Independent Child 637 1,274 2,787 5,574
6: Delete Family Obs.: Male Parent’s Age < 55 604 1,208 2,623 5,246
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Table 1.2 Summary Statistics by Household Type
Parents-HH Edupi = L Edu
p
i = H Child-HH Educi = L Educi = H
Prop. 48.0% 52.0% Prop. 25.5% 74.5%
Age 66.7 65.8 Age 37.4 37.2
(Std.) (6.62) (6.55) (Std.) (5.95) (5.15)
LFP Rate 58.8% 54.5% LFP Rate 96.3% 97.8%
SP Age 62.4 61.8 SP Age 37.7 35.1
SP LFP Rate 27.4% 24.0% SP LFP Rate 40.6% 45.3%
Net Asset 5,629 7,641 Net Asset 4,945 7,259
(Std.) (7193) (8024) (Std.) (6094) (8060)
Pension Amount 410 664 Earnings 3,422 4,161
(Std.) (358) (652) (Std.) (1952) (2442)
(Prop.) (51.1%) (48.4%) SP Earnings 1,831 2,590
Earnings 1,791 2,908 (Std.) (1019) (1909)
(Std.) (1482) (2337) Work hours 47.7 43.1
SP Earnings 1,244 1,680 SP Work Hours 41.8 40.6
(Std.) (969) (1441)
Work Hours 49.7 50.0
SP Work Hours 41.9 40.0
ADL 0.47 0.32
SEH 2.98 2.79
Physical Limit 0.15 0.12
OOP Health Costs 7.47 7.04
Downstream 13.9% 12.8% Downstream 11.9% 13.8%
Average Amt. 258 480 Avg. Amt. 348 375
Upstream 55.6% 49.4% Upstream 49.3% 53.5%
Average Amt. 343 488 Average Amt. 346 371
Notes: Monetary values (net assets, pension amount, earnings, OOP health costs) are deflated by
the yearly CPI of the year 2105 and expressed as 10,000KRW. The amount of down- and
up-stream transfers over top 5% of each is replaced by each 95th percentile, respectively. The
net-transfer amount are left-censored at 300,000KRW. ‘Average Amt.’ is derived by dividing the
net-amount of transfers by the number of donor households. ADL and SEH denote Activities of
Daily Living and Self-Evaluation of Health, respectively
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Table 1.3 Proportion and Amount of IVFT by Motivation
Downstream Upstream
Proportion Amount Proportion Amount
Anniversary Gift 35.4% 615 57.7% 169
No Particular Reason 45.7% 228 14.4% 186
Insufficient Living Cost 5.1% 648 23.5% 722
Supporting Grand Children 4.6% 444 2.3% 704
Purchase of House 2.9% 3,477 0.3% 734
Purchase Durable Goods 0.9% 290 0.2% 344
Supporting Running Business 0.9% 3,327 0.1% 83
Tuition Fee 1.2% 1,497 - -
Paying Debt 0.9% 3,246 0.2% 306
Paying Health Cost 0.7% 433 1.2% 435
Others 1.6% 895 0.1% 207
Notes: The numbers in the table show the proportion of parents who provide or receive
intergenerational financial supports and its amounts. The unit is 10,000KRW. Above Top 5%
amount of upstream transfers are excluded
Table 1.4 SUR Estimates of Downstream and Upstream IVFT Incidence
Downstream Upstream
Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.
P: Log Net Asset 0.021** (0.008) 0.004 (0.0133)
P: Log Pension 0.012 (0.016) - 0.0515* (0.026)
P: Participation 0.088*** (0.027) - 0.204*** (0.045)
P: SP Participation 0.069** (0.027) - 0.227*** (0.045)
P: H-Type -0.0096 (0.028) - 0.042 (0.046)
P: SP H-Type - 0.154*** (0.060) - 0.030 (0.099)
P & PSP: H-Type 0.163** (0.067) - 0.103 (0.111)
P:Health-Fair - 0.036 (0.029) 0.042 (0.048)
P: Health-Bad - 0.013 (0.042) 0.048 (0.070)
C: Log Net Asset - 0.0072 (0.0102) - 0.0008 (0.0170)
C: Participation 0.074 (0.088) 0.067 (0.146)
C: SP Participation - 0.065*** (0.024) 0.098** (0.040)
C: H-Type 0.023 (0.051) 0.009 (0.084)
C: SP H-Type 0.020 (0.049) 0.022 (0.081)




Notes: Standard errors are presented in parenthesis: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10.
Male-parents whose age is between 55 and 74 are used. Top and bottom 1% of net assets and
pension amounts are removed. Male (spouse) parents are categorized as the high education group
if he (she) has received high-school or higher degree. The variable starting with P: (C:) contains
the sociodemogrphic factors of parents (child) households. PSP denotes the spouse of
male-parent, and the P & PSP (C & CSP) H-Type variable is used to capture possible interaction
effect of parent’s (child’s) educational achievement. The transfers are left-censored at
300,000KRW. Estimated parameters for age- and time-dummies (2007-2016) are not presented in
the table. The baseline definition on industry group is service sector
1.8 Conclusion 57
Table 1.5 Estimates of the Preference and Type-Assignment Parameters
Para- Definition Baseline No IVFT
meter Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.
σ Relative Risk Aversion 6.779 (0.0164) 6.005 (0.0224)
α Consumption Weight 0.641 (0.0017) 0.544 (0.0019)
γP Fixed Cost of Work (hours) 458.557 (42.2053) 491.857 (24.31053)
γF air Fixed Cost of Fair Health (hours) 658.596 (41.7866) 819.429 (172.6253)
γBad Fixed Cost of Bad Health (hours) 977.278 (93.7302) 970.450 (60.6827)
θB Bequest Shifter 0.00007 (0.000006) 0.00049 (0.0001)
K Bequest Curvature 2,050.535 (14.6458) 947.821 (17.0622)
b Amount of UI Benefit 2,168.519 (19.0965)
Λs Job Separation Rate 0.026 (0.0021)
Λun 1 - Arrival Rate of Job 0.072 (0.0046)
η1 Coeff. of Type-1 Parent’s Altruism 0.666 (0.0382)
κ1 Coeff. of Type-1 Child’s Altruism 0.011 (0.0005)
η2 Coeff. of Type-2 Parent’s Altruism 0.623 (0.0424)
κ2 Coeff. of Type-2 Child’s Altruism 0.015 (0.0010)
η3 Coeff. of Type-3 Parent’s Altruism 0.510 (0.0424)
κ3 Coeff. of Type-3 Child’s Altruism 0.024 (0.0015)
λ10 Type-1 Intercept 0.752 (0.0452)
λ11 Type-1 Coef. on Edu
p
i 2.285 (0.1962)
λ12 Type-1 Coef. on Educi - 1.314 (0.0830)
λ13 Type-1 Coef. on I{Sibi≥1} - 0.649 (0.0474)
λ30 Type-3 Intercept 1.067 (0.0770)
λ31 Type-3 Coef. on Edu
p
i - 5.405 (0.4248)
λ32 Type-3 Coef. on Educi 2.436 (0.1751)
λ33 Type-3 Coef. on I{Sibi≥1} 3.306 (0.2768)
Table 1.6 Estimates of the Earnings Parameters
Para- Definition Baseline No IVFT
meter Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.
βp0 Parent: Constant 7.848 (0.0225) 7.746 (0.0118)
βp1 Parent: age
p
it -0.187 (0.0010) -0.214 (0.0075)
βp2 Parent: (age
p
it)2/100 0.469 (0.0032) 0.287 (0.1169)
βp3 Parent: hsit = Fair -0.175 (0.0001) -0.187 (0.1929)
βp4 Parent: hsit = Bad -0.374 (0.0019) -0.301 (0.1541)
βp5 Parent: Edu
p
i 0.444 (0.0033) 0.499 (0.0247)
σξp Parent: Standard Error 0.639 (0.0047) 0.767 (0.0802)
βc0 Child: Constant 7.700 (0.0086)
βc1 Child: agecit 0.066 (0.0002)
βc2 Child: (agecit)2/100 -0.194 (0.0012)
βc3 Child: Educi 0.219 (0.0011)
σξc Child: Standard Error 0.477 (0.0029)
Notes: agepit = 1 if male-parent’s age is between 55 and 57. Given age
p
it = 1, agecit is 1, 2 or 3 if
∆i is 25, 28 or 31. Afterwards agepit (Agecit) is increased by one-unit in every three years
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Table 1.7 Transition Probabilities Between Provision and Non-Provision of IVFT
Status in t+1
Downstream Upstream
Status in t Provision Non-Provision Provision Non-Provision
Empirical Provision 77.4% 22.6% 90.1% 9.9%
(A) Non-Provision 7.2% 92.8% 40.9% 59.1%
Simulation Provision 76.4% 23.6% 95.8% 4.2%
(B) (B-A) (-1.0%p) (1.0%p) (5.7%p) (-5.7%p)
Non-Provision 3.2% 96.8% 25.2% 74.8%
(B-A) (-3.9%p) (3.9%p) (-15.7%p) (15.7%p)
Notes: The empirical and simulated profiles for families whose male-member’s age is between
55-84. The figures in the table are derived by averaging the proportion of people included in
specific case. A household is counted as a donor of IVFT if providing transfers at least once during
three years corresponding to the given period t (a period in the model corresponds to 3 years)
Table 1.8 The Effect of Expansion of BPS and NPS on Major Lifecycle Profiles
IVFT No-IVFT
Baseline New-BPS New-NPS Baseline New-BPS New-NPS
LFP p (Proportion) 56.2% 55.7% 55.4% 58.3% 34.5% 55.6%
At+1 (Amount) 59.66 61.15 59.38 72.03 59.95 73.67
TRp (Likelihood) 16.6% 18.6% 18.7%
(Amount) 0.47 0.55 0.52
TRc (Likelihood) 63.7% 62.7% 62.4%
(Amount) 3.01 2.84 2.88
cp (Amount) 29.68 30.27 29.99 22.19 24.52 22.43
TRG (Proportion) 57.0% 68.3% 49.4% 47.0% 76.8% 39.9%
(Amount) 1.55 3.54 1.50 1.48 3.55 1.45
Notes: The figures in the table show the average of simulated profiles of family which male
parent’s age is between 55-84. The amounts are expressed in million KRW. The average of
simulated LFP rate profiles for male-parent is derived by individuals aged 55-78. The average of




A Long Journey Toward
Retirement: A Dynamic Model of
Labour Supply and Retirement
with Self-Employment
2.1 Introduction
The labour force participation (LFP) of elderly people has become a major social
issue. As the trend in population ageing puts more pressure on assuring financial
stability in retirement and sustainability of social security systems, most developed
countries have been introducing policies encouraging the delay of retirement. Re-
cently, the interest in senior self-employed has been rising as bridge employment,
and there has been emerging attention on the factors that affect the decision of
elderly people approaching near the end of their career to become their own boss.
Empirical evidence suggests that the self-employment rate in the U.S. increases
rapidly with age. Figure 2.1(a) presents that the self-employment rate among
elderly people is around four to eleven times higher than that of the youth. This
implies that becoming his own boss is more important for the elderly. However,
despite its importance on the well-being of older people and contribution toward
the economy as well as the stability of the social security system, entrepreneurship
by older people has received relatively little attention.1 In particular, retirement
literature using dynamic models usually excludes self-employed from the analysis or
treat self-employed in the same way as paid-counterparties.
1In much of the literature, the terms self-employment and entrepreneurship are used inter-
changeably (?). Thus, self-employment and entrepreneurship are interchangeable hereafter.
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Using the U.S. Health and Retirement Study (HRS), I document that self-
employment has several characteristics that distinguish it from paid-employment.
First, the median hourly wage rate of self-employed is less than that of full-time
workers, however, due to the high variance in their earnings, the average hourly
wage for self-employed exceeds that for paid-workers. Second, the nature of the
work involved is different. Self-employment is associated with work environment
such as flexibility in deciding their work schedule. Third, the average length
of self-employment spells is shorter than full-time workers as unsuccessful senior
self-employed persons quickly close their business down. Finally, those who have
experience in self-employment tend to maintain a relatively high level of life-time
savings. These features reveal that self-employment is different and cannot be
combined with paid-employment.2
I develop and estimate a discrete choice dynamic programming model of sector
choice and retirement to understand complex patterns of elderly people’s labour
force decision. The model captures all the characteristics of self-employment ex-
plained above. Two key features of the model are worthy to mention. First, the
model allows various mechanism which drives selection into self-employment. For
instance, due to the differences in sectoral characteristics and worker heterogeneity,
the selection issue naturally arises. In order to capture the self-selection, the model
introduces preference heterogeneity, sectoral differences in earnings and flexibility
in working hours, effective social security tax rates, and health condition. These
lead workers to choose a specific career and make a transition between paid-job,
self-employment, and retirement.3 The second feature is the introduction of the
learning process. Although becoming self-employed are generally associated with
greater uncertainty, agents can gradually learn about their own ability as an en-
trepreneur and partly reduce initial uncertainty by observing the performance of
their business (??).4
In the context of retirement, having a proper understanding of the underlying
mechanism of elderly people’s entry into and exit from the self-employment sector
is particularly important for policy-makers. Due to the importance of running their
own business as a source of innovation and bridge jobs in the retirement transition,
many governments have provided various kinds of programs to support older people
in business start-up activities. These policy interventions may have an influence
2? document that self-employment has some distinguishing features which motivate elderly
people to open their own business.
3In this study, ‘career’ implies the choice of sectors between paid-job, self-employment, and
retirement, and the words career and sector are interchangeable.
4The information structure in this study is assumed that individuals in the model observe their
own paid-sector productivity and just know the distribution of self-employment sector productivity.
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on the dynamics of retirement and serve a function in encouraging more elderly
people to work who would otherwise leave the labour force. Thus, it can not only
contribute to security in retirement but also mitigate the rise in social security
costs.
The model is estimated by the method of simulated moments. The constructed
model produces reasonable parameter estimates and properly generates the rich
patterns of entire elderly males’ life-cycle choices observed in the HRS between
1992-2014. Estimates reveal that around half of elderly men exhibit a stronger
preference for running their own business than working for someone else, and the
initial uncertainty about self-employment earnings decreases quickly as gaining more
entrepreneurial experience. In order to understand how elderly people in different
sector adjust their labour supply behaviour, the model is used to explore the effect
of temporary and permanent changes in before-tax wage rates on individuals’ labour
supply choice. First, I estimate the response to transitory changes in wages. The
results show that the economy-wide aggregate elasticities of labour supply rapidly
increase with age. In particular, the majority of labour supply changes caused by
transitory wage shocks is explained by the intensive margin, and self-employed
adjust their behaviour more flexibly than wage-earners. With regard to permanent
wage changes which occur from the age of 60, the estimated aggregate elasticity is
0.39 decomposed into 0.14 of intensive and 0.25 of extensive margin. Moreover, com-
paring the wage changes restrictive to paid-sector with those only for self-employed,
there is substantial heterogeneity in labour supply response across sectors.
The estimated model is used to perform two sets of policy counterfactuals; one is
examining elderly people’s response to the 25% reduction in social security tax rates,
and the other is self-employment subsidies offered as a form of one-time $30,000
lump-sum support.5 The policy counterfactual of tax-cuts suggests two important
findings. First, the policy contributes to strengthening elderly people’s security in
retirement, however, it has a limited effect on encouraging more people to delay
retirement if the tax-cut starts to be applied to too old people. Second is that due
to the difference in effective tax rates levied on paid-workers and self-employed, the
changes in payroll tax affect elderly workers’ sector choices, and people in each sector
respond to the tax-cut differently. With regard to the self-employment subsidy,
regardless of the intervention timing, it encourages more people to venture into a
business and has a positive effect on both security in retirement and entrepreneurial
5The tax is levied on both employees and self-employed at the same rate of 12.4%. In the case
of paid-employees, half of the taxes (6.2%) is shared by employees, so the effective social security
tax rate for employees is 6.2% of earnings. However, self-employed have to bear the whole tax on
their own.
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quality. Moreover, the earlier age the policy is implemented, the greater the positive
effects on security in retirement. However, the costs and benefits of the policy
significantly depend on the age when the intervention is made and rely on whether
the policy effect is evaluated in terms of short- or long-run perspective.
I also contrast the implication of my model relative to a model without the
self-employment sector. To do this, I newly derive another set of simulated profiles
from the model which does not allow self-employment as a career alternative to
paid-employment.6 As the self-employment sector is excluded from the model,
the results cannot represent the entire elderly people’s work and retirement choice
appropriately.7 Comparing it with the entire sample and full-model, the model
without self-employment sector underpredicts the LFP rate by 22.0% (8.4%p) and
21.8% (8.3%p) on average, respectively.8 One possible explanation for this under-
prediction is that the simpler-model cannot adequately capture the distinguishing
characteristics of self-employment and the motivation of elderly people who change
their career instead of choosing retirement. Under the model without entrepreneur-
ship, individuals on the margin of work and retirement are more likely to choose to
retire when marginal negative changes in working conditions occur. In this respect,
self-employment can play a role in delaying retirement. Moreover, it confirms the
presence of selection bias. Although models excluding self-employment seem to
perform well in matching the subsample, prediction under the models would be
biased and may not properly capture work and retirement choice for entire elderly
people.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In section 2.2, I review the
related literature. Section 2.3 describes the data. Section 2.4 explains the structure
of the model. Section 2.5 introduces the identification and estimation strategy.
Section 2.6 provides the parameter estimates and the overall model fits. Section
2.7 explains the labour supply response to temporary and permanent before-tax
wage changes. Section 8 focuses on several counterfactual regimes, and section 2.8
concludes.
6i.e. If an individual wants to participate in the labour force, he should have a salaried-job,
and becoming his own boss is not allowed.
7For instance, some studies define workers as people who are not self-employed. However,
individuals who participate in the labour force in the form of either working for someone else
or running their own business might not be a random sample from the population. Thus, the
use of individuals who have never run their own business would not well represent the work and
retirement choice of the entire population.
8In the sample, the male workers’ LFP rate for ages 57-79 is 38.0% on average, and the full-model
just underpredicts elderly people’s participation choice by 0.1%p (LFP rate: 37.9%). However,
the predicted average participation rate from the model which does not consider entrepreneurship
is 29.6%.
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2.2 Literature Review
The retirement literature has recognized that labour force transition toward the
latter parts of the worker’s career consists of various states. Before retiring from
the labour force completely, many people go through several stages which include
reverse flows of retirement (??). Considering such multidimensionality of retirement
decisions and the increasing role of uncertainties about earnings, health status,
survival, and medical expenses at older ages, a structural approach is particularly
suitable to account for complex incentives of individuals who are nearly approaching
the end of their careers.
Recent studies construct integrated models allowing for a transition between
the states of full-time work, partial retirement, and full-retirement (???). However,
comparing it with individuals’ career choice from paid-work to retirement, limited
progress has been made on the transition between paid-job, self-employment, and
retirement at older ages. I build on the model suggested by ? who analyses older
workers’ work and retirement choice. He allows that agents are heterogeneous in
their health and asset-holdings and choose consumption and hours of work. The
innovation of my model is that I allow for the selection into self-employment jointly
with paid-job and retirement and introduce various mechanisms to capture entry
into and exit from self-employment.
Most dynamic models of discrete career choice between paid- and self-employment
focus on young or early middle-aged people (???), and relatively scant studies have
been conducted on how the transition into self-employment is different at older ages.
This is an important gap in the literature. As the elderly are in their latter part of
life, comparing it with the youth, different forces such as planning for retirement,
health deterioration, putting higher values on flexibility or insufficient chances to
find profitable jobs lead them to enter into self-employment.
With regard to the information structure, this study is closely related to the
papers such as ?? which introduce the learning process and focus on the uncertainty
surrounding the career choice. The model structure suggested by ? is closest
to this study. They construct a structural model of career choice between paid-
job and self-employment, and risk-neutral agents in their model are allowed to
learn about their entrepreneurial ability through Bayesian learning. However, my
paper differs from their paper in three aspects. First, I include risk-aversion in
the model. Considering the higher variance of earnings in the self-employment
sector, the attitude towards risks plays an important role in the sectoral choice.
Second, I model savings, bequest motives, and SSB application. The analysis of
consumption-saving and timing of drawing SSB is particularly important to capture
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the transition from work to retirement. Finally, agents are allowed to choose working
hours including retirement choice. As the HRS shows that the majority of people
attribute the decision of changing career from paid- to self-employment to enjoying
more flexibility in deciding the working schedule, the model needs to properly reflect
such an incentive.
? builds a model of sectoral choice and introduces risk-aversion as well as savings
choice. He assumes that individuals need to learn about their ability in both paid-
and self-employment sectors. This would be more realistic and allows for avoiding
asymmetry of information structure. I adopt a partly observed and correlated
information structure. This would be more restrictive, however, comparing it with
his study which investigates the life-time career choice between the initial transition
to the labour force and exogenous retirement at the early 50s, I focus on elderly
male-workers whose age is 56 or older. Thus, through past experience, many older
workers get opportunities to have relatively precise information about their own
marketable wage. Also, as my model already includes many other mechanisms that
he does not consider such as retirement, drawing SSB and working hours choices, I
sustain the assumption on the information structure for reducing the computational
burden.
It is beyond the scope of this paper, however, a growing body of literature
has explored the relationship between personal-traits and entrepreneurship.9 ?
divides the patterns of self-employment into seven groups and shows systematic
differences among people in different groups. ? develop a structural model which
treats socio-emotional skills as major determinants of self-employment selection
and allows for the choice of asset investment for the business. Contrary to these
papers, however, I implicitly assume that diverse personal traits are absorbed by
sector-specific abilities and focus more on work and retirement choice.10
2.3 The Data
For the estimation of the model, the HRS for the years 1992-2014 is used. The
HRS is conducted by the Institute for Social Research at the University of Michigan
supported in large part by National Institute on Ageing. The data is a biennial
9Although age, experience, access to capital, heterogeneous non-pecuniary benefits from self-
employment, and having entrepreneurial parents are considered as having a close relation with
becoming self-employed, there is no consensus about which factors are the most important drivers
and little evidence on the underlying mechanism (?).
10With regard to the amount of fixed assets usually required to run a new business, the negative
effect of ignoring investment choice would be limited. For instance, ? shows that the median
amount of fixed assets employed by new business is lower than $10,000 in most industries.
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national longitudinal panel survey that contains 12,652 people in 7,702 households
in 1992-study. The sample is nationally representative of Americans aged 51 or
older since 1992. In addition to the respondents from eligible birth years, the survey
interviewed the spouses or the partner of a respondent, regardless of age. The
survey elicits one of the largest and comprehensive information on demographics,
income, assets, debts, health, job status, social security, and other transfers from
the government. The sample consists of households from 6 different cohort groups.11
The baseline survey is conducted in 1992, and the follow-up interviews have been
subsequently conducted every two years.
2.3.1 The Sample
I start with 33,736 individuals in the RAND HRS. Of those, 6,263 individuals who
have skipped the survey at least once after their baseline wave are dropped, and
2,988 individuals who do not report their work status information are excluded.
10,831 individuals who are never married or either married or divorced during the
period under study are additionally dropped.12 To sustain the homogeneity of the
sample, couples whose age difference is within 10 years are remained. This reduces
the number of individuals in the sample to 12,352. After then, I drop 461 couples
(922 individuals) whose real wages are less than $1 per hour or greater than $300
per hour and exclude additional 345 couples with over $1,500,000 in non-housing
net assets (the definition on the variable is explained in the next subsection).13 In
addition, 10 households in which both the household head and their spouse are the
same gender are dropped. Due to the structural differences from the rest of the
economy, 181 households in which at least one of the couple members is employed
in agriculture, forestry, or fishery industries are excluded. Finally, I drop additional
344 couples in which at least one of the household members has never worked in his
or her life. These procedures leave a final sample of 4,835 households and 47,344
couple-year observations.
11The initial HRS cohort, who was born between 1931 and 1941, was interviewed in 1992. The
AHEAD cohort born before 1924 was initially a separate study and interviewed in 1993. The
Children of Depression (CODA) cohort born 1924-1930 was first interviewed in 1998. The War
Baby (WB) cohort born 1942-1947 and the Early Baby Boomer (EBB) cohort born 1948-1953
were first interviewed in 2004-2010, respectively.
12In this paper, I do not account for family dynamics such as marriage or divorce. Couples are
only allowed to be separated by losing one’s spouse.
13All monetary amounts are adjusted for inflation and expressed in 2000 dollars.
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2.3.2 Identifying Major Variables
In this study, involuntary unemployment is not allowed. In order to avoid the
ambiguity that may arise in defining retirement, an agent is defined as a retiree
if he is not in the labour force.14 However, retirement is not an absorbing state,
and thus retired people can return to work whenever they want. If an individual is
working as a full-timer, he is regarded as a full-time worker. If he reports his mode
of participation as a part-timer or both part-timer and partly retiree (the agent is
working part-time and mentions retirement), he is defined as a part-time worker.
Full- and part-time workers are categorized as paid-workers. I define self-employed
as people who regard them as self-employed in their main job.15
In order to measure individuals’ net-wealth, total non-housing net-wealth is used.
The total non-housing net wealth is calculated as the sum of the appropriate wealth
components (IRA, Keogh accounts, stocks, mutual funds, CDs, government saving
bonds, T-bill, bond funds, money market accounts, investment trusts, checking
accounts, saving accounts, and the net-value of other savings) less debt. Thus, the
value of primary and second housing assets and related debts (such as mortgages
and home loans) are not included in the net assets. Individual’s net-assets is referred
to as assets here and elsewhere in this study. With regard to the earnings, hourly
real wage rates are used.
2.3.3 Summary Statistics
Table 2.1-2.2 and figure 2.1-2.4 show the descriptive statistics of individuals in
the sample. The statistics reveal that self-employment cannot be combined with
paid-employment, and thus running own business is needed to be treated differently
from paid-workers; broadening the choice of current paid-workers and potential
labour force entrants.
Table 2.1 provides several important characteristics of self-employment that
distinguishes it from paid-counterparty. First, the expected hourly wage of self-
employed is higher than those of salaried-workers. The hourly wage rate for
self-employed is around 26% higher than that of full-time workers. Second, indi-
viduals face more uncertainty on their earnings. Comparing it with paid-workers,
hourly wage rates in the self-employment sector are much more polarized, and larger
14i.e. if an individual chooses 0 working hour, he is regarded as a retiree. This definition is
similar to ?. They do not distinguish between unemployment and non-participation in the labour
force.
15The HRS asks "Do you work for someone else, or are you self-employed regarding the current
main job". If an agent replies that he is self-employed, he is regarded as self-employed.
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shares of wages are very high and low.16 The median hourly wage of self-employed
is $1.2 lower than that of full-timers, and the standard deviation of hourly wages in
self-employment is remarkably higher than that of full- and part-timers. Third, the
nature of work involved in the self-employment sector is different, so these allow
self-employed to stay in the labour force longer and enjoy more flexibility than
paid counterparties. Self-employed work 350 hours less per year than full-timers on
average, and its standard deviation is more than twice that of full- and part-time
workers. As a result, elderly people in the self-employment sector have a stronger
attachment to the labour market. For instance, the average age of self-employed is
3.6 years older than full-time workers.
These differences between paid- and self-employment are also reflected not only
in the earnings but also in the dynamics of asset holdings and job-spells. Figure
2.2 provides another reason for the need to separate the choice of becoming his
own boss from a having paid-job. Panel (a) shows that self-employment experience
impacts on asset holdings of people aged 56-79. Although the gap is shrinking with
age, having been running own business is associated with sustaining a relatively
high level of asset holdings and can play a role in strengthening financial security
in retirement. Looking at more closely, comparing it with individuals who change
their career frequently (newly opening a business two times or more during the
period under study), those who have been self-employed since the initial wave of the
HRS (i.e. individuals who have not changed their career to paid-employment are
categorized in this group, continue SE) and those who open their business just once
during the period under the study (once) have more assets (panel (b)). Figure 2.3
shows another distinctive feature of self-employment which are reflected in job-spells.
As the least successful entrepreneurs go out of business quickly, self-employed are
similar to part-timers. On the other hand, as profitable self-employed are more
likely to keep their business, they also have the characteristics of full-time workers.
Distinctive features between paid- and self-employment result in different pat-
terns of elderly workers’ career choice across sectors. Figure 2.1(b) shows the elderly
men’s LFP rate by age. As the number of paid-workers declines, the overall LFP
rate decreases from 81% at age 56 to 11% at age 79. In particular, the drop is
prominent between the ages 62-66 which correspond to the time at which the earliest
and full Social Security Retired Worker Benefit applications are eligible.17 However,
in the case of self-employed, such a large drop has not been observed over the
16See ??
17The age when individuals get the right to draw Social Security Retired Worker Benefits is the
age of 62 and is referred to as Early Eligibility Age (EEA). Full Retirement Age (FRA) is the age
that individuals can draw unreduced retirement benefits. FRA has been risen from age 65 in 2002
to 67 in 2027.
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same time period.18 The self-employment rate gradually decreases from 13% to
4% between the ages of 56-79. The relatively high self-employment rate is not just
caused by the reluctance of self-employed persons returning to paid-job or their
relatively strong labour force attachment but caused by frequent entry into and
exit from self-employment. Figure 2.4(a) describes the entry- and exit-patterns of
self-employed. It shows that moving into and exit from self-employment happen
frequently.
Table 2.2 summarizes the transition probabilities between paid-employment,
self-employment, and retirement for every other year. The table shows that the
probability of switching from paid-job to self-employment rises as people grow
older, and self-employed are more likely to stay in the labour force for a longer
period. Before the age of 67, 2.1% of workers switch their career from paid-job
to self-employment. However, this figure increases by 15.3%p (2.1% → 17.4%)
for the age group 67-79. Moreover, individuals in self-employment are more likely
to stay in the labour force than paid-workers. Before the age of 67, 6.8%p more
paid-workers leave the labour force than self-employed, and this trend is continued
for the age group 67-79.19 One possible explanation is that self-employment play a
role in delaying retirement and improving security in retirement. This is because
the self-employed can enjoy more flexibility in their hours of work decision, and
if successful, they can expect much higher compensation. Moreover, unsuccessful
self-employed can reverse their decision, and it does not cost them much (?).
2.3.4 Retirement and Career Transition Motivation
Defining the major determinants which lead people to change their career or choose
retirement is not straightforward, and there is a large gray area among diverse kinds
of factors. Therefore, before executing the structural analysis, this section provides
a preliminary understanding and some pieces of evidence on the major motivation
of people who switch their career rather than providing formal evidence. In order to
understand more about the reasons of workers who switch their career or leave the
labour force, the HRS survey questionnaires answered by workers who change their
employment status since the last interview are used.20 Because the questionnaires
request respondents to provide an objective reason for leaving their previous job,
comparing it with other survey results which contain a subjective evaluation on
18Between the age of 62 and 66, the proportion of paid-workers and self-employed decrease by
19.9%p (49.4% → 29.5%) and 1.0%p (10.0% → 9.0%), respectively.
19From paid-job to retirement 56.5% / From self-employment to retirement 50.2%.
20In order to retain a sufficient sample size, this subsection uses all the elderly workers aged 50
or over who answer the questions about the motivation of career transition or leave the labour
force between 2002 and 2014 surveys.
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leaving their job, the results are less susceptible to be contaminated by justification
bias.
The reasons for retirement and career transitions in this section are categorized
according to the classification suggested by ?. Three key insights can be derived
from the motivations of transition and retirement. First, the major factors which
incentivise people to change their career and leave the labour force are substantially
different across sectors. Second, individuals in the self-employment (SE) sector
tend to enjoy more flexibility in deciding their work schedule and have more control
over the working environment. Third, career changes between paid-job and self-
employment occur actively even among people who are approaching the end of their
working life.
Reason for retirement: Panel 1 of table 2.3 shows the reasons for male workers
in different sectors to decide retirement. Overall, one-third of full-time (FT) workers
and nearly half of self-employed perceive their retirement as “forced". Regardless of
sectors, a nearly similar portion of workers has left their job due to the deterioration
of employment constraint. However, there are considerable differences in detail.
Comparing it with FT-workers who answer that 14.6% of their retirement are
caused by the destruction of an existing job, 27.4% of self-employed and 23.0% of
part-time (PT) workers attribute decision of leaving the labour force to business
closure or being laid-off. 11.5% of FT-workers point the negative changes in working
condition out as the reason for retirement, while only 3.2% of PT-workers, and
1.1% of self-employed insist on the same reason for their transition. Most of the
differences in the relative proportion of involuntary retirement by sectors come from
deterioration of health status. Self-employed are three times as likely as workers in
the FT-sector and 1.5 times as high as PT-workers to have been forced to retire
due to deterioration of health.
On the other hand, nearly two-thirds of FT-workers perceive their retirement as
a voluntary transition, and most of them are initiated by an incentive to enjoy more
leisure.21 However, just around 40% of self-employed attribute their retirement as
voluntary. None of them points enjoying more leisure out as a retirement motivation,
and 90% of their voluntary retirement are due to spontaneous business closure. In
the case of voluntary transition from PT-job to retirement, it is mainly caused by
a desire to enjoy more leisure, however, the proportion is nearly 20%p less than
that of FT-workers. Regardless of the worker’s current career, other sources such as
21The result is similar to previous research. For example, ? uses males who do not report
self-employment (SE) spells during the period under study and shows that 61.4% of FT workers
perceived their retirement as "wanted" rather than "forced"
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financial incentives or changes in external circumstance do not play an important
role in deciding whether to retire voluntarily or not.
The results in this section clearly indicate that the major forces which motivate
workers to choose retirement are considerably different across sectors. Most FT-
workers voluntarily opt for retirement to enjoy more leisure, however, a much smaller
share of PT-workers consider it as a reason for their retirement and such a tendency
is more pronounced for self-employed. These partly reflect the fact that, in order
to maintain FT-job, individuals are required to work more than a certain amount
of time (usually at least 35 hours per week or more) and PT-workers are paid far
less amount of hourly wage than FT-workers.22 Therefore, if paid-workers want
to reduce their working hours by more than a certain amount of time and enjoy
more leisure, they need to accept a considerable amount of pay cut. In this respect,
becoming his own boss can be an alternative because they do not work under
someone’s instruction and enjoy more flexibility in deciding their own schedule, job
duties, location, or work intensities. However, the high uncertainty on the chances
of success in the SE-sector or relative preference for the paid-job prevents elderly
people from opening a business easily.
Career transition motivation: Panel 2 of table 2.3 summarizes the reasons
for changes in the mode of LFP. Around 30% and 37% of changes from self-
employment to paid-job (SE to PJ) and vice versa (PJ to SE) are perceived as
“forced", respectively. The contribution of business closure or lay-off is almost equally
likely to cause workers to switch their career, however, the negative changes in
working condition cause great differences in the portions of workers who have left
their previous career involuntarily. Although 6.1% of workers who left their PJ and
newly become entrepreneurs point negative changes in working condition out as
the reason for their career switch, none of SE to PJ transition is caused by the
same reason. These results reflect another important characteristic of becoming
self-employed: becoming his own boss allows for having more control over work.
Nearly two-thirds of the PJ to SE transition was due to voluntary reasons. One
of the remarkable differences is that no workers who make SE to PJ transition
answers leisure as the reason for their switching, however, 16% of PJ to SE transition
explained by enjoying more leisure. In addition, nearly a quarter (23.7%) of workers
who left their FT-job but still stay in the paid-sector as part-timers attribute a
desire of enjoying more leisure to their reason for transition. These results equally
show that one of the important motivations which cause people to change their
22? shows that workers who work 1,000 hours per year are paid 25% less per hour than workers
who work 2,000 hours per year.
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career is enjoying more leisure, and this encourages elderly people to open their
own business for having more flexibility in deciding their hours of work. Becoming
self-employed involve much more risk-taking, so 30%p more workers who make FT
to SE transition voluntarily quit their previous job and open their own business
than those who make FT to PT transition. Also, more than 90% of voluntary SE
to PJ transition is explained by spontaneous quit. These results correspond to the
gradual decrease in the proportion of self-employed with age. Although a relatively
high proportion of people opens their business, unprofitable self-employed go out of
business quickly. As a result, the SE rate remains stable and gradually decreases
with age.
2.3.5 Empirical Motivation of Learning
The learning process is first proposed by ?, and since then, the relationship between
ability and learning has been widely discussed in the literature (????). These studies
show that job mobility decreases with the accumulation of work experience, and a
correlation between the high wage and the tendency to stay in the same occupation
is evidence of learning. Table 2.2 and figure 2.3 support the evidence of learning;
the transition between paid-job and self-employment occurs quite frequently, and
profitable self-employed are more likely to stay in their business. Figure 2.4b
also illustrates that such a transition does not occur in a random manner. The
lines of the figure show the hourly wage rate of self-employed over consecutive
self-employment spells. In general, the hourly wage rate increases over job-spells,
and workers who run their own business longer period are more likely to receive
a higher wage. Moreover, self-employed who stay longer in their business receive
strictly higher wages in their first two years.
The fact that more than half of people who change their career from paid-job to
self-employment experience wage drop is also consistent with the importance of the
learning process. 52.4% of self-employed having paid-job in the previous wave earn
less than they did before. The median new self-employed persons receive $0.34 less
hourly wage than their most recent year of paid-job wage, and among people who
experienced a drop in wages in the process of change from paid- to self-employment,
their hourly wage rate is just 46.9% of that they received in the paid-job on average.
These suggest that elderly workers are willing to take on the possible transitory drop
in earnings related to career transition from paid-job to self-employment in order
to have a chance to learn about their potential. By learning through running their
own business and accumulating managerial experience, people who have relatively
high ability in the self-employment sector can recognize their ability. As a result,
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they are willing to endure temporal loss, and people with relatively high potential
are more likely to stay in their business for a longer period. On the other hand,
people who are lack of entrepreneurial talent close the business swiftly.
2.4 Model
This section describes a dynamic discrete finite-horizon model that captures utility
over earnings and preferences of people who are close to retirement. The model
structure of this study builds on the integrated model suggested by ?, however, in
order to capture distinctive characteristics of self-employment and to reflect self-
selection of heterogeneous individuals into different sectors, I allow for the selection
into self-employment jointly with paid-employment and introduce a learning process
which allows people to partly reduce initial uncertainty by observing the performance
of their own business. The unit of analysis is married elderly couples, however, they
are treated as a single decision-maker, and a female member’s labour force choice is
made in a random manner.
In each discrete period t, an individual i chooses between working either in the
paid- or self-employment sector and retirement and makes Social Security Retired
Worker Benefit (SSB) application, hours of work, asset holdings, and consumption
choices. When making these choices, individuals face three types of uncertainty:
health status, medical expenditures, and labour earnings. After individuals make
each period optimal choices, these shocks occur at the end of the period. An
individual who is not in the labour force is referred to as a retired person, however,
retirement is not an absorbing state. Thus, individuals can return to work whenever
they want. In each period, an individual’s health status is either good, fair, or
bad. Health status has effects on productivity, medical expenditure, the relative
importance of consumption and leisure, time endowment, survival probabilities, and
spouse’s labour supply outcomes. The constructed model is used to account for
sectoral mobility patterns and retirement choice over the life-cycle.
2.4.1 Choice Set
In each discrete period t, individuals make both discrete (the mode of LFP kjit and
collecting SSB Bit) and continuous (saving ait+1 and hours of work hit) choices. I
denote a variable including both discrete and continuous choices by djit:
djit ∈ {k
j
it, ait+1, hit, Bit}, (2.1)
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where djit refers to the set of choices made by an individual i who chooses a career j
at time t.
The decision process can be described as follows. First, each individual makes
a career choice. Then, they optimally choose savings, social security benefits
application, and hours of work conditional on chosen discrete career alternatives.
Discrete choices: The first discrete choice variable is the mode of LFP. Non-
participation is not an absorbing state, and thus they can always return to work
after a period of inactivity. Thus, the participation mode takes on the forms of
paid-job (PJ), self-employment (SE) or retirement (RE).23
kjit =

0 if individual i chooses a career j = RE at time t
1 if individual i chooses a career j = PJ at time t
2 if individual i chooses a career j = SE at time t
 , (2.2)
where j ∈ {RE,PJ, SE}
Before the age of 80, combinations of paid-job, self-employment, and retirement
career alternatives are available for all individuals in each period. The combination
of available career choice is K (K = {0, 1, 2}).24
The other discrete choice variable is SSB application (more detailed information
about SSB follows in subsection 2.4.5 and Appendix B.2).25 In general, workers
are eligible for applying the benefits from age 62. The eligible agent can choose
whether he will apply for the benefit or not. Bit ∈ {0, 1} denotes an index function,
which has the value one if an agent has applied to the benefit and has the value
zero otherwise. The benefits application is an absorbing state, and thus once the
application decision has been made, it cannot be reversed.
Continuous choices: In each period t, each person optimally chooses the amount
of savings (ait+1) and decides how many hours he will work (hit) conditional on
the discrete career choice (kjit). These variables are obtained via splines after using
discretizations.
23Involuntary unemployment is not considered in this paper, and in each period, every individual
receives wage offers explained in subsection 2.4.3 and has a chance to open his own business. With
regard to retirement, I define any individual who is not in the labour force as a retired person.
24Workers can exit the labour force voluntarily at any time, however, people aged 80 and over
are not allowed to work exogenously. Thus, everyone retires at age 80.
25It is allowed for individuals to get SSB and work at the same time. However, the amount will
be reduced if he begins to draw the benefit earlier than full retirement age or earns more than a
certain amount.
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2.4.2 Utility and Bequest Function
Individual’s within-period utility is defined as his utility from consumption cit,
leisure lit, and two unobserved component ϵit(kjit) & ηi, associated to the career
choice. Within-period utility function for each health status categories hsit (hsit ∈
{Good, Fair, Bad}) is given by:




1 − σ + θRV × 1{k
j
it−1=0}
× 1{kjit ̸=0} (2.3)
+ ηi × 1{kjit=2} + θB(ageit) × 1{Bit−1=0} × 1{Bit=1} + ϵit(k
j
it),
θB(ageit) = θB0 + θB1 × ageit + θB2 × age2it, θB = [θB0 , θB1 , θB2 ],
where θ = {αhsit , σ, θRV , ηi, θSE, θP , θPA, θB, θFair, θBad, θBE, K} is a set of preference
parameters, and zit is a set of state variables which will be explained in section
2.4.6. αhsit captures the relative importance of consumption under each health
status category hsit.26 The coefficient of relative risk aversion is given by σ (>
0). 1{.} is an indicator function, which has the value one if an individual’s current
state corresponds to {.} and value zero, otherwise.27 θRV captures fixed utility
costs caused by returning to the labour force from retirement. The coefficient
represents a psychic cost of returning to work and prevents people from excessive
entry into and exit from the labour force. ηi is a random parameter, which does
not vary over time and is fixed across individuals. The distribution of ηi is assumed
to be normal (ηi ∼ N(µη, σ2η)). It is assumed that this captures non-pecuniary
benefits (NPB) to self-employment, so it represents unobservable heterogeneity
across individuals. An individual with relatively high ηi, all else equal, is more likely
to become self-employed. For instance, if an agent does not want to work under
someone’s instructions or has a high preference for flexibility in managing time,
he is willing to give up some earnings to enter into or to stay in self-employment.
θB(ageit) captures one-time additional utility costs to draw SSB at ageit. It is
assumed that people need to pay costs to apply for SSB which include both physical
and psychological inconvenience, and the costs can vary with the applicant’s age.
In general, the older people become or the closer people are to retirement, the
smaller the uncertainty individuals will face. Thus, they can design their older age
with more confidence, so the costs, especially psychological, may decrease with age.
ϵit(kjit) is a taste shock associated with the discrete career choice. Following ?, it
26? point out that the introduction of health status in the life-cycle model is more realistic to
capture the changes in the valuation of consumption and leisure with the health condition. The
method of measuring individuals’ health status will be presented in section 2.4.4.
27For instance, if an individual has a paid-job at period t, 1{kj
it
=1} has the value one.
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is assumed that ϵit(m) and ϵit(n) (m ̸= n) are serially independent with Type-1
extreme value distribution. Also, ηi and ϵit(kjit) are known when the individual
makes his career choice, however, econometricians cannot observe them.
Individual leisure lit is given by:
lit =L− hit − θSE × 1{kjit−1 ̸=2} × 1{kjit=2} − θP × 1{kjit ̸=0} (2.4)
− θPA × (ageit − 55)2 × 1{kjit ̸=0} − θFair × 1{hsit=Fair} − θBad × 1{hsit=Bad},
where L is time-endowment, and hit is hours of work. θSE captures the additional
fixed cost of opening a new business measured in hours of work per year. This
parameter represents a diverse kind of constraints, including the cost of creating
a new business, ex-ante psychological costs about starting a business, and initial
additional efforts.28 I assume that even if an individual has had the experience
of running a business in the past, once he goes out of his business, he has to pay
this cost again for re-entry.29 This parameter plays a role in limiting excessively
frequent entry and exit decisions of the business they create. θP denotes fixed costs
of working. In order to participate in the labour force, all people pay this utility
cost regardless of age. θPA measures additional participation costs explained by
age. θFair and θBad are the additional participation costs caused by having ‘Fair’ or
‘Bad’ health, respectively.
Following ?, I assume that individuals derive utility from asset bequests, and
thus the bequest function has the following functional form:
bit = b(ait) = θBE
(ait +K)αhsit (1−σ)
1 − σ (2.5)
where ait is the amount of bequest, θBE is bequest shifter, and K determines the
curvature of the bequest function. If K = 0, there is an infinite dis-utility of leaving
non-positive bequest.
2.4.3 Wage Equation
The logarithm of the hourly wage in the paid- and self-employment sector is a
function of time-invariant sector-specific ability, age, health status, work experience
and error components.
28In this paper, I do not consider the amount of start-up capital. However, following the U.S.
Bureau of the Census (1997), 57% of small business require less than $5,000 of start-up capital.
29i.e. Except for the case that an individual already has run his business at time t-1, individuals
who want to enter into self-employment at time t should pay θSE .
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Sector-specific work experience: It is assumed that if an agent changes his
sector, regardless of his past experience in the sector, his sector-specific experience
is initialized, and thus he should newly build up work experience in the new sector.
However, if an individual does not change his sector, his experience in the sector
will be increased by one year at the end of each period.
xjit =
 xjit−1 + 1 if kjit = kjit−1






In particular, equation (2.6) implies that regardless of previous management
(paid-sector) experience, individuals who re-open their own business (return to
paid-job) should accumulate self-employment (paid-employment) experience again
from zero-year.30 Although it would be a very restrictive assumption, it may be
justified in two ways: (1) among individuals who entered self-employment in the
HRS, only a limited proportion of people (11.0%) opened their own business two
times or more, and (2) the actual hourly wage distribution of self-employed who
tried self-employment just once is similar to that of individuals who attempted it
twice or more (figure 2.5(b)). Therefore, the effect of the assumption on individuals’
career choice would be limited.
Paid-employment: If an individual chooses the paid-sector, his hourly wage rate
depends on the individual’s fixed earnings ability in the paid-sector fi, deterministic
productivity component GPJ(XPJit ), whether working less than 1,500 hours per year,





× (1 − ς × 1{hit≤1,500}) + vit (2.7)
fi ∼ N(µf , σ2f ), XPJit = {ageit, xPJit , hsit}, vit = ρARvit−1 + ξit, ξit ∼ N(0, σ2ξ ),
where GPJ(XPJit ) is the deterministic common part of paid-job wage which is the
function of paid-sector specific work experience (xPJit ), age, and health status. The
individual’s time-invariant earnings ability in the paid-sector is drawn from a normal
distribution, and through past experience of life, he has sufficient information to
know about his own ability without any uncertainty at the time he chooses a career
choice. The parameter ς captures wage penalty and represents a decrease in wages
30In particular, individuals who go out of business completely forget about the signal that
they receive through running their own business (This is explained in the self-employment wage
equation part).
31Appendix B.1 provides a detailed description of paid- and self-employment wage equations.
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associated with working as a part-timer.32 If an elderly worker having a full-time
job wants to enjoy more leisure (i.e. work less than 1,500 hours) and does not
choose self-employment, there exists trade-off between enjoying more leisure and a
relatively high expected wage.33 It is an important difference between paid- and
self-employment sector (this will be explained below). The persistent error shock
consisted of correlation component ρAR and innovation ξit also affects an individual’s
career choice. In reality, a relatively small proportion of people who retire from
the labour force or move to self-employment returns to the paid-sector again, so in
order to match the transition across sectors or move-in and -out of the labour force
properly, it is assumed that if he is not in paid-sector, vit is depreciated with the
rate of ρAR.
Self-employment: The hourly wage rate of self-employed is described by:
ln wSEit = φi +GSE(XSEit ) + ψit (2.8)
φi ∼ N(µφ, σ2φ), XSEit = {ageit, xSEit , hsit}, ψit ∼ N(0, σ2ψ), Corr(φi, fi) = ρ,
where GSE(XSEit ) is a deterministic function of age, self-employment sector-specific
work experience xSEit , and health status. Compared with the paid-sector, there are
two evident characteristics in self-employment earnings. One is that although fi
is known surely, people entering self-employment are assumed to just know the
distribution of their managerial ability φi. I assume that fi and φi are correlated ρ
and follow a bivariate normal distribution.34 Thus, before entering self-employment,
agents form a belief in their entrepreneurial ability based on known information.
Once an individual opens his own business and accumulates experience as self-
employed, it allows him to refine his belief in φi. However, even if self-employed
run their own business, they cannot directly observe φi but just can observe a
noise signal.35 The other is that self-employment wage does not have a persistent
stochastic element and just has idiosyncratic transitory shock ψit. The assumption
is partly for computational convenience. However, in some way, a persistent shock
32An individual is regarded as a full-time worker if he works more than 1,500 hours per-year.
An individual is categorized as a part-timer if he works equal to or less than 1,500 hours.
33i.e. In order to enjoy more leisure in the paid-sector, he faces a considerable amount of wage
loss.












, and this distributional information is common
knowledge for all individuals.
35Individuals cannot differentiate their managerial ability separately from productivity shock.
Thus, they cannot confirm how much of their earnings is due to their inborn ability in self-
employment. Put somewhat differently, individuals just can observe a signal (ln wSEit −
GSE(XSE,it)).
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reflects employment shocks in the paid-sector. For instance, a large productivity
shock can be observed in the paid-sector when an agent changes employer or
occupation voluntarily or involuntarily.
Bayesian learning: It is assumed that self-employed use Bayesian rules for
updating belief in their managerial ability with accumulating business experience.
If an individual newly ventures a business, his conditional initial (priori) belief on
the entrepreneurial ability φi0 is;
φi0 ∼ N(µφi0 , σ2φ0), µφi0 = µφ +
σφ
σf
ρ(fi − µf ), σ2φ0 = σ
2
φ(1 − ρ2) (2.9)
Equation (2.9) shows that ρ affects the expected returns to entering entrepreneur-
ship. As the correlation of earnings abilities in the two-sector increases, expected
earnings of entrepreneurs with relatively high paid-sector ability rise, and individu-
als have a higher degree of certainty about ex-ante entrepreneurial earnings. For
instance, if two abilities are perfectly independent (ρ = 0), the expected value
of ex-ante (zero-year) managerial skills and its uncertainty just depends on the
distribution of managerial ability in the economy (i.e. φi0 = φi ∼ N(µφ, σ2φ)).
However, if ρ approaches 1 (-1), workers who have outstanding abilities in the
paid-sector certainly can show their excellence (inferiority) in running their own
business, and at the same time uncertainty about their ability dissipates quickly.
As an individual accumulates consecutive years of management experience, he
can update his belief using Bayes’ rule and partly reduce initial uncertainty about
























where Rit is the mean of the residual log-earnings history in the self-employment
sector from zero-year experience level to xSEit , net of the deterministic profile in self-
employment.37 Thus, Equation (2.10) implies that the accumulation of management
experience allows self-employed to partially differentiate how much earnings change
is caused by transitory idiosyncratic shock with more confidence and to partly
36As he observes his realized earnings, he updates and changes a belief about the distribution of
his managerial ability. Following ?, the information updating structure in this study is ’partially
observed and correlated’.
37The residual log-earnings Rit is denoted by: Rit = ln wSEit −GSE(XSEit ) = φi + ψit
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reduce initial uncertainty about their entrepreneurial ability (having more precise
information and reducing uncertainty on their managerial ability).38
2.4.4 Health Status Transition and Medical Expenses
Health status affects (1) the amount of medical expenditure, (2) survival probabilities,
(3) productivity, (4) the relative importance between consumption and leisure,
(5) leisure time, and (6) spouse’s LFP. However, unfortunately, it is impossible
to directly observe the actual health status, and only objective and subjective
measures of health conditions are available. Despite the growing research on the
effect of health on labour force decisions, it is still debatable how to measure it.
This study follows the method suggested by ?. I use Principal Components Analysis
(PCA) and combine multiple subjective measures of health status (self-reported
health, health limits work, and activity of daily living-summary) into one single
index hsit. Although this method cannot rule out measurement errors completely,
it is not only a parsimonious method but also mitigating the problems. In any
given period, an individual’s current health status can be Good, Fair or Bad (i.e.
hsit ∈ {Good, Fair, Bad}). hsit evolves stochastically to hsit+1 having values Good,
Fair, Bad, or Dead (Henceforth, I assign the value 0 to an individual with ‘Good’
health, 1 to ‘Fair’, 2 to ‘Bad’, and 3 to a ‘Dead’ person (hsit+1 ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3})).
The probability of given health to next period health state depends on the
individual’s age (including squared age) and current health state. It is assumed
that transition probabilities from one to another state are given exogenously, so
individuals cannot affect the probability through investment in health or increase
in hours of exercise.39 The health transition probabilities are estimated by ordered
logistic regression.
pr(hsit+1|ageit, hsit) = Λ(hsit+1|ageit, hsit) (2.11)
Medical expenses mit are defined as out-of-pocket costs in this model. The costs
are assumed as a negative income shock which should be paid in order to survive to
the next period, however, the costs have no impact on future medical expenses or
health status.40 Medical expenses are modelled as the function of an individual’s
age ageit, asset holdings ait, obtaining a qualification in Medicare 1{Medicareit}, and
38i.e. As xSEit goes to infinity, µφi,xSE
it





39A bunch of research such as ??? introduces similar exogeneity assumption.
40It is assumed that individuals have to make career and labour supply decisions before observing
mit for the period. However, using known information, they form expectation on the costs (E(mit)).
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health state hsit as follows:41
ln mit = M(ageit, ait, 1{Medicareit}, hsit) + uit, uit ∼ N(0, σ2u), (2.12)
where 1{Medicareit} has the value one if the individual’s age is equal or over 66 and
has the value zero otherwise.
2.4.5 Budget Constraint
Each individual has five different sources of income: asset income rait, own labour
income withit, social security retired worker benefits ssbit, spouse’s income wsiit and
government transfer Trit. Resources are allocated between household consumption,
saving and medical expenditures mit. The budget set is written as:
cit + ait+1 = ait + Y (rait, wjithit, Bit−1 × ssbit, τ) + wsiit × 1{LFP sit=1} (2.13)
+ Trit −mit,
where r is the real interest rate, and τ denotes tax structure.
Spousal income: Considering the fact that the spouse’s expected income siit
can serve as insurance against diverse kinds of shocks, the spouse’s earned income
is required to be included in the model. However, the consideration of joint labour
supply and retirement choices between the couples would impose great computational
burdens. Also, on average, 37.4% of wives aged 51-79 participate in the labour
force, and their LFP rate rapidly decreases with age.42
Thus, in order to reflect distinctive characteristics of married women’s LFP and
minimize the complexity, it is assumed that the wife’s decision on her each period
LFP is randomly drawn at the end of the period (i.e. after her husband makes the
labour force and savings choices). In particular, considering the rapid decline in
the spouses’ LFP with age, the wife’s participation probability psit is determined
by her age agesit, husband’s health condition, and the expected amount of medical
expenses.43 In addition, for reducing computational burdens, I assume that her
earned income wsiit is a function of deterministic variables (her age and husband’s
41Age, squared and cubic age are used. It is assumed that there is a correlation between wealth
and the quality of care that individuals choose, and all individuals are qualified to Medicare at
age 66. Appendix B.1 provides a detailed description of the functional form of medical costs.
42Similar to husband, wife’s LFP rate in the sample declines rapidly with age. It decreases from
73.3% at age 51 to 4.7% at age 79.
43In the sample, if a husband’s health status is good, fair or bad, the wife’s average LFP rate is
44%, 33%, and 28%, respectively.
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health status as well as fixed ability in the paid-sector), and the related parameters
are estimated external to the structure model.44
Et(siit) =E(siit|agesit, hsit, fi) = psit (agesit, hsit, Et(ln mit)) × wsiit (agesit, fi) (2.14)
Social Security Retired Worker Benefit (SSB): Social Security generates a
potentially important effect on elderly people’s work and retirement choice, and
it usually causes a negative effect on work incentives after a certain age. Once a
worker has claimed SSB, he will receive the benefit for life. The amount of ssbit
depends on many factors such as a worker’s lifetime earnings, the choice of time for
first claiming benefit, and employment decisions.
To be eligible for SSB, an individual needs at least 10 years of Social Security
covered employment. If an individual has worked less than 35 years, an additional
year of work increases his SSB. However, if he already has worked 35 years or more,
SSB is adjusted only if his earnings from an additional year of work are higher
than the lowest earnings included in his current average indexed monthly earnings
(AIME). Considering the fact that only 5.6% of individuals in the sample have less
than 10 years of work history, and around 65% of individuals have worked more
than 35 years at age 62, it is assumed that every individual is eligible for SSB
and has already worked 35 years or more. Also, although the earliest age when
an agent can claim SSB is at age 62, the benefit will be permanently reduced if
she draws the benefits before the Full Retirement Age (FRA). The FRA has been
gradually increased from age 65 in 2002 to 67 in 2027, so I use age 66 as the FRA.
Workers who begin to draw the benefits after the FRA receive delayed benefits. If
an individual starts to draw the benefit before age 66, I assume that the benefit is
reduced by 6.7% every year. Also, delayed benefit claiming leads to an increase in
benefits by 7.0% every year. Detail of SSB structure is described in Appendix B.2.
Tax structure: The tax rates and exemption amounts used in this study are the
figures in 2000. The tax system τ is composed of payroll tax τP , federal tax τF
and taxes on SSB τSSB. Payroll tax is levied on the wages and net self-employment
income. The tax is levied at a rate of 15.3% which is divided into two components:
Social Security tax 12.4% and Medicare tax 2.9%. The only difference between
paid-workers and self-employed is that self-employed have to bear these taxes on
their own, however, half of the taxes on paid-job earnings are shared by employers.
Thus, the effective payroll tax rate for employees is 7.65% of earnings up to the
upper limit of $76,200. Since 1984, SSB have been subject to federal income tax. Up
44The detailed functional form of a spousal income is described in Appendix B.1.
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to 50% and 85% of SSB are taxable for single taxpayers whose provisional income
(PI) exceeds $25,000, and $34,000, respectively. With regard to Federal Income tax,
it is levied on labour and non-labour income. I use the Federal Income Tax tables
for “Single Tax Bracket". Appendix B.3 provides a detailed description of the U.S.
tax structure.
Transfer programs: The government runs transfer programs that guarantee a
minimum level of resources cmin for individuals in every period. For instance, in
the U.S., the Supplemental Security Income Programme provides income support.
When households’ disposable income is lower than cmin, the government provides
a certain amount of resources. Following ?, the government transfers that an
individual receives are given by:
Trit =min{cmin,max{0, cmin − [(1 + r)ait + (1 − τP )wjithit × 1{kjit ̸=0} + ssbit]}}
(2.15)
2.4.6 State Variables
The state space in period t consists of variables that are observed both by the agent
and econometricians and variables that are only observed by the agent, but not by
econometricians (ϵit(kjit) and ηi). Optimal decisions depend on the state variables
zt, determinants of each sectoral earnings process βPJ & βSE, preferences θ, and
the parameters that determine the data generating process χ for the state variables:
zit ={ait, AIMEit, kjit, xPJit , xSEit , ageit, vit−1, ln(Rit−1), Bit−1, fi, φi} (2.16)
βPJ ={βPJ0 , βPJ1 , βPJ2 , βPJ3 , βPJ4 , µf , σ2f , ρAR, σ2ξ} (2.17)
βSE ={βSE0 , βSE1 , βSE2 , βSE3 , βSE4 , µφ, σ2φ, σ2ψ, ρ} (2.18)
θ ={αGood, αFair, αBad, σ, β, ηi, θB, θP , θPA, θRV , θFair, θBad, K, θSE, θBE} (2.19)
χ ={GPJ(XPJit ), GSE(XSEit ),Mit,Λit, sit, cmin, τ} (2.20)
2.4.7 Model Solution
The problem is a finite-horizon discrete choice, the feasible set of individual choices
is compact, and the function is continuous, so the value function always exists and
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has a unique solution to the Bellman equation.
Vit(zit, ηi, ϵit, θ) = maxdjitU(d
j
it, zit, ϵit, ηi, θ) (2.21)
+ βEt
[
Vit+1(zit+1, ϵit+1, θ|zit, djit, ηi)
]
+ pr(hsit+1 = 3|hsit, ageit) × Et [b(Ait+1)]
EtVit+1 = Σ2m=0pr(hsit+1 = m|hsit, ageit) (2.22)
×
∫ ∫
Vit+1(zit+1, ϵit+1, θ)g(ϵit+1)f(zit+1|zit, djit, ηi)dϵit+1dzit+1,
where f(zit+1|zit, djit, ηi) is the transition density function which decides the evo-
lution of the observed state variables, and pr(hsit+1 = 3|hsit, ageit) is conditional
probability of death between age t and t+1.45 ϵit(kjit) is a vector of taste shock
associated to the discrete career alternative, and it is drawn from distribution g(ϵit).
It is assumed that the functional form of the g(ϵit) follows type-1 extreme value
which is independently identically distributed across individuals and over time, and
non-pecuniary benefit follows normal distribution (ηi ∼ N(µη, σ2η)).
Ex-ante value function is defined by Vit(zit, ηi, θ) as the continuation value of
being in state zit just before ϵit is revealed. Thus, Vit is given by integrating
Vit(zit, ηi, ϵit, θ) over ϵit:
Vit(zit, ηi, θ) ≡
∫
Vit(zit, ηi, ϵit, θ)g(ϵit)dϵit (2.23)
With the future value term and ηi in hand, the conditional value function is
defined by νit(zit, dj
′
it , ηi, θ) as the present discounted value of choosing specific career
j′ (dj
′
it = [j′, ait+1, hit, Bit]):
νit(zit, dj
′









An individual’s optimal decision rules (djit) can be computed in two stages:
Firstly, optimal savings, hours of work and SSB application decision are com-
puted conditional on each discrete career alternative (inner maximization, equation
(2.24)).46 dit(−j′) denotes a vector of choice variables given the LFP mode j = j′
(kjit = k
j′






it}). Second, the discrete option that yields the
45For the notational simplicity, f(zit+1|zit, djit, ηi)dzt+1 is denoted by F (zit+1) henceforth.
pr(hsit+1 = 3|hsit, ageit) = 1 − Σm=2m=0pr(hsit+1 = m|hsit, ageit). Individuals live at most until
age 100. Therefore, all agents surely die before they reach at age 101.
46For notational simplicity, the age-dependent cost of claiming the SSB (θB(ageit)) is excluded
in the equation.
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highest value given the draw of the unobservable state is chosen by the individual
(outer maximization, equation (2.25)).
δit(zit, ϵit, θ) = argmaxkjit [νit(zit, k
j
it, ηi, θ) + ϵit] (2.25)
Following the distributional assumption on ϵit, the probability of choosing an
arbitrary career (k∗it) and the ex-ante value function are given by:
p(k∗it|zit, ηi, θ) =
exp (νit(zit, d∗it, ηi, θ))
Σkjit∈Kexp
(
νit(zit, djit, ηi, θ)
) , (2.26)




it , ηi, θ)]
)
+ γ
= νit(zit, d∗it, ηi, θ) + γ − ln[p(k∗it|zit, ηi, θ)], (2.27)
where γ denotes Euler’s constant, and d∗it is arbitrarily selected choice (j = ∗).
The last equality in equation (2.27) has an intuitive interpretation: the ex-ante
value of being in the state zit can be expressed as a sum of the conditional value from
making an arbitrary choice k∗it, Euler’s constant, and a non-negative adjustment
term which adjusts for the fact that k∗it may not be the optimal choice.
2.5 Identification and Estimation Strategy
Given the model specification, the vector of parameters in this study is divided
into three categories. First, some parameters are taken from outside. For the
purpose of compatibility with other literature, the discount factor β is set to 0.96,
and the national wage growth rate gw is considered to have a value of 4.0%.47
Also, it is assumed that an annualized pre-tax real rate of return r is 4.0%.48 The
second set of parameters is estimated external to the structural model. The medical
costs, health status transition, and spousal income are included in this category
and estimated directly from the data. Finally, given the first and second sets of
parameters, the parameters of utility function along with consumption floor cmin
and earnings process are estimated by matching moment conditions.
2.5.1 Identification of Model Parameters
This study estimates preference and earnings parameters simultaneously. The
identification argument of θ is standard and depends on savings and sector choices
47In order to reflect the overall real wage growth rate in the economy, AIME is adjusted at the
rate of 4.0% before the age of 60.
48? find that the real rate of return for equity in the U.S. is around 4%, over the last 100 years.
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of individuals who face different constraints across sectors. With regard to the
earnings process, if βPJ and βSE are estimated on just the labour force participants,
these cause an important threat to estimate the work and retirement choice. The
data show the existence of strong selection issue with respect to the health status
and age, and if the earnings profiles are directly identified from actual wages just
including observations for workers, potential wage rates of retirees cannot be used to
estimate parameters. Thus, estimation methods using actual wage profiles cannot
properly control a selection-problem as the elderly leaves the labour force with age.
Moreover, additional difficulties arise on the consideration of sector choices.
Individuals who choose a different sector may not be a random sample from the
entire population, and thus the selection-problem may be plagued by the fact that
occupation changes may occur to a self-selected group with regard to unobservable
characteristics. Thus, the use of wages, which are already sorted into a particular
sector, potentially introduces the bias resulting from self-selection and causes an
important threat to analyse occupational choice.49 In order to control the selection
issue, the model explicitly considers selection across sectors conditional on preference,
the amount of asset holdings, sectoral differences in earnings and flexibility, and
health conditions. Also, entering into and exit from self-employment would be
correlated with the paid-sector ability, so the sectoral abilities are identified based on
the assumption that the paid- and self-employment sector abilities follow a bivariate
normal distribution with correlation. In addition, the difference in effective payroll
tax rates levied on paid-sector and self-employment earnings may play a role as an
additional exclusion restriction. Although the government levies the same tax rate
across sectors, half of the paid-workers’ payroll tax is shared by employers, so it
is correlated with sector choices and uncorrelated with earnings. Thus, these tax
incentives act as another exclusion restriction, which allows for controlling the bias
in earnings estimates.
2.5.2 Estimation Methodology and Initial Conditions
The parameters are estimated by the Method of Simulated Moments (MSM) strategy
which fits the life-cycle profiles derived from the HRS to the predictions of the
model for drawn typical 50,000 households aged 56-90. The estimated parameters
minimize the sum of squared differences between the selected moment conditions in
the data and their counterparts derived from simulated individuals. To do this, the
observed individuals’ career choice, hours of work, asset-holdings, SSB-application,
49i.e. Incomes are only observed in the sectors that individuals choose to work.
88 A Long Journey Toward Retirement
and earnings are used to derive the vector of unknown preference parameters. In
order to estimate these parameters, the following 211 empirical moments are used:
· By age, the relative fraction of individuals who have a paid-job and run their
own business for the age group 56-79 (48)
· By age, mean hours of work for the labour force participants for the age group
56-79 (24)
· By age, asset accumulation for age group 56-90 (35)
· By age, the relative portion of individuals who apply Social Security Retired
Worker Benefit for the age group 62-69 (8)
· By age, the paths of the average wage and its standard deviation profiles in
paid- and self-employment sectors for the age group 56-79 (96)
The initial conditions are drawn from the empirical joint distribution of assets,
life-time earnings history (AIME), and the mean of the residual log-earnings for
individuals aged 56-60. In particular, as the career change initializes sector-specific
work experience, individuals whose work experience in one-sector is greater than
zero need to have zero-experience in the other sector. However, in order to explain
career choice at the initial model period (at age 56), individuals are randomly
assigned work experience in both sectors as an initial condition of work experience.
Given their paid-job as well as self-employment experience at age 56, preference,
and other initial conditions, individuals choose their career. After they choose a
career in the initial model period, sector-specific work experience follows the given
work experience accumulation rule. Once the preference and earnings parameters
are estimated, I then solve the model household-by-household.
2.6 Parameter Estimates and Model Fits
2.6.1 Preference Parameter Estimates
The preference parameter estimates are presented in table 2.5. The first three rows
of the table show the utility weight on consumption that differs across health status.
Individuals with a high value of αhsit have a stronger preference for work. Due to
the additional fixed cost caused by having ‘Fair’ or ‘Bad’ health, people who are not
in ‘Good’ health need to have stronger labour force attachment to participate in the
labour force. The estimated relative risk aversion (RRA) for the consumption of
people with ‘Good’ health is 4.0428 (σ = 6.6907).50 Although the estimated RRA
50The relative risk aversion for consumption can be approximated as − (∂
2U/∂C2)C
∂U/∂C = 1 −
αhsit(1 − σ). The estimated RRA of people with "Fair" and "Bad" health is 4.1839 and 4.2710,
respectively
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in this study is larger than the reported values of 1.0-1.8 by ?, it falls within the
range 2.2-5.1 by ?.
The estimate of the minimum level of resources (cmin) is $8,996 which is equivalent
to the Federal SSI benefit for elderly couples aged 65 or over ($9,000, Committee on
Ways and Means 2000). The estimate of leisure endowment (L) is 5,805 hours and
the fixed cost of LFP (θP ) is 742 hours per year. Figure 2.6a shows the additional
participation cost associated with age (θPA × (ageit − 55)2). For instance, the fixed
additional cost of work at age 60 is 40 hours per year, and it becomes 358 hours at
age 70. The estimated time cost of opening a new business (θSE), fair (θFair) and
bad (θBad) health are 356, 552, and 1,029 hours per year, respectively. The bequest
parameters θBE and curvature K are 0.024 and $5,327, respectively.
Rows 14-19 of the table show estimates of utility parameters. These parameters
are not interpretable readily. The estimated fixed cost of returning to work from
retirement θRV is -0.0093. This implies that once an individual leaves the labour
force, considerable disutility should be endured to get back to work (entrance cost
to return to the labour force again). The estimated value of θB implies that the
cost of applying SSB is decreasing with age, and it adequately reflects the growing
number of people who decide to draw SSB as they get older.
Regarding the non-pecuniary benefits (NPB) parameters, the estimated mean
(µη) and variance (σ2η) are ηi ∼ N(−0.00010, 0.0094622). The estimated values imply
that 49.2% of elderly men receive a positive utility from self-employment. This
figure is higher than the reported value of 15% by ?. However, considering the fact
that their sample includes men between the ages 22-55, and the self-employment
rate of the elderly is 2.5 to 4.2 times higher than that of the youth (figure 2.1(a)),
the difference would be acceptable. NPB captures an individual’s preference for
self-employment relative to paid-employment. Thus, the negative sign of µη implies
that, in order for an individual to enter self-employment, their expected returns
should be higher than earnings, which can be earned if the person chooses a paid-
sector. However, if an individual has a strong preference for flexibility or puts great
importance on becoming his own boss, NPB has a positive sign, and he is willing
to give up some money to enter into self-employment.51
2.6.2 Earnings Process Parameter Estimates
The estimates of the earnings process in paid-job (full-time) and self-employment are
given in table 2.6. As an individual accumulates an additional one more year of paid-
51i.e. Some individuals with very high ηi run their own business not because they do well but
because they just love it.
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sector experience, earnings in the sector increase by 0.68% on average. Self-employed
earnings also rise in line with the accumulation of business experience. However,
they do not increase as rapidly as paid-earnings. As self-employed accumulate ten
years of consecutive entrepreneurial experience, their hourly wage rate is 3.7% higher
than that of new entrants in self-employment. The parameters on health status
1{hsit=·} show that relatively poor health status is associated with considerable
income loss. Having ‘Fair’ or ‘Bad’ health in the paid-sector are associated with
a 19.6% and 31.6% reduction in the paid-sector hourly wage. The reductions in
wages of self-employed with ‘Fair’ or ‘Bad’ health status equal to 10.0% and 15.2%,
respectively. In addition, if an individual works as a part-timer, his hourly wage
rate is 65.8% (ς = 0.342) of the potential wage which the individual can earn if he
has a full-time job.
Due to the high variance in self-employment earnings, the entrepreneurial ability
is more than 1.5 times as dispersed as paid-sector ability (σφ = 0.872 and σf = 0.572).
However, abilities in these two-sectors are closely related, so individuals’ belief in
the variance of managerial ability is smaller than that of the population variance.
The estimated correlation between paid- and self-employment ability is ρ = 0.524,





It means that, despite higher uncertainty in self-employment, the paid-sector ability
known for sure can be a good proxy of the chances of success in self-employment.
Also, once an agent enters, the uncertainty about his managerial ability declines
rapidly. For example, after observing one-year earnings in self-employment, the
variance of posterior belief on managerial ability becomes just 28% (0.152) of the
variance of prior belief. It drops to 0.020 after 10 years of consecutive accumulation
of work experience in self-employment (figure 2.6b).52
2.6.3 Model Fit
This subsection evaluates the model’s ability to replicate older workers’ patterns of
behaviour over the life-cycle. Figure 2.7 compares the simulated life-cycle profiles
with those of the actual data. The simulated profiles for the age group 57-79 are
the paths of average behaviour here and elsewhere in this study.53 On the whole,
the model does a good performance in generating the rich patterns of individuals’
52The derived results are compatible with estimates suggested by ?. They report that the
variance of prior belief on the individual’s managerial ability is 0.32. The variance of a worker’s
posterior belief on managerial ability drops to 0.07 after accumulating one year of self-employment
experience and 0.02 after five years.
53Although there is no compulsory retirement age in the U.S, this study assumes that every
agent is forced to stop working at the end of age 79. Moreover, due to the initial conditions on
sector-specific work experience at age 56, the age-group for the main analysis is set 57-79.
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behaviour over the life-cycle with reasonable parameter estimates. Panel (a) shows
that the model well captures individuals’ LFP choice. Although it underpredicts the
LFP rate between the ages 59 and 62 and the fraction of retired people at ages 75-79,
the model closely replicates labour force decisions observed in the entire sample.
Looking closer, the proportion of simulated workers in each sector (PJ:29.7% &
SE:8.2%) well captures those of the actual sectoral choices (PJ:29.7% & SE:8.3%)
on average. Also, although the model overstates asset holdings (panel (d)), it is
able to properly replicate other important features such as hourly wage rate (panel
(f) and Figure 2.8), SSB application (panel (g)), work hours (panel (e)) and changes
in health status (panel (h)).
The model particularly shows a good performance in capturing the distinctive
characteristics of self-employment; frequent entry into as well as exit from the
business and two prominent peaks on both sides of self-employment spells. Figure
2.9 shows that, on average, 1.4% of simulated individuals newly open their own
business, and 1.8% exit self-employment in each period.54 The actual entry (1.5%)
and exit rates (2.1%) are just 0.1%p and 0.3%p higher than those of the simulated
individuals, respectively. The entry and exit decisions are also reflected in self-
employment sector-specific tenure. Figure 2.10 shows that the model well replicates
the self-employment sector job spells skewed to both sides. The model explains
the cause of these job tenures as follows: several distinctive characteristics of
self-employment incentivise people to run their own business. However, the least
successful entrepreneurs who partly realize (or believe) that they do not have the
high managerial ability go out of business quickly. At the same time, successful
entrepreneurs generating relatively higher returns do not change their career easily
and keep their business for a longer period.
In this study, the major forces which lead paid-workers to change their sector are
the motivation of enjoying more leisure, having high NPB, relatively high expected
earnings, and paid-sector productivity shocks. Also, learning about their managerial
ability and transitory productivity shocks cause individuals to go out of business.
Comparing the actual transition probabilities with those of the baseline, panel 2 of
table 2.7 indicates that the model adequately captures the motivation for individuals
to switch their career and qualitatively well describes the transition probabilities.
Nevertheless, the factors in this study alone are insufficient to fully capture the
transitions observed in the data. The model overpredicts the transition between
54In these statistics, the simulated figures not only contain first entry self-employed in their life
but also include those who had run their own business in the past and then open it again after
they shut down.
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paid- and self-employment, however, it still well captures individuals’ tendency to
choose a specific career; once a path is chosen, people do not easily change it.
2.7 Estimated Life-Cycle Elasticities of Labour
Supply
Labour supply elasticities vary much over the life-cycle. As people grow older, wors-
ening health, accumulating more assets, access to SSB, and decrease in productivity
cause them to be more elastic on changes in wage. This section explores older
people’s response to temporary and permanent changes in before-tax wage rates.
2.7.1 Intertemporal Frisch Elasticity of Labour Supply (IFES)
IFES in this study captures both the changes in participation and how the number
of hours reacts to transitory changes in the wage rates conditional on holding the
marginal utility of wealth approximately unchanged intertemporally. Thus, it is
suitable for measuring the response of labour supply between adjacent periods
when the wage shock is temporary. Following ?, the extensive margin is derived by
percentage point change in participation when pre-tax wage rates are increased by



















where λt denotes the marginal utility of wealth in period t (i.e. the Lagrange
multiplier associated with the budget constraint). The derivation of equation (2.28)
assumes the constant marginal utility of wealth (dλt = 0).
The table 2.8 summarizes derived IFES under the assumption that the zero-
borrowing constraint does not bind. Column 1-3 provide intensive margin at each
age conditional on the participation in the labour force. Numbers in the columns are
derived by using the preference parameter estimates and simulated profiles under
the baseline. Column 4-6 report extensive elasticity, and the remaining columns
show the aggregate response of labour supply. Each row reports the elasticities
55This study simulates elderly people’s labour force response when hourly before-tax wage rates
in both paid- and self-employment sectors are temporally increased by 20% in a particular age
and compares it with the baseline. Thus, to convert it into extensive elasticity, the reported
participation response is divided by 20.
56When ϵIF ESh is derived, it is assumed that non-binding zero borrowing constraint holds.
57If the functional form of per-period utility function is separable in labour and consumption
(i.e. uch = ∂
2u
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when the transitory wage change occurs at age 60, 66, and 70, respectively. The
estimated aggregate IFES rapidly increases with age. At age 60, the aggregate
elasticity is around 1.06, increasing to 1.43 and 1.81 at age 66, and 70, respectively.
Also, comparing it with the extensive elasticity, most part of the labour supply
changes caused by an increase in transitory wages is explained by the intensive
margin. In other words, temporary changes in wages for people who are near the
end of their career mainly induce changes in the distribution of hours of work rather
than encouraging more people to participate in the labour force.
Looking closer, as self-employed enjoy more flexibility, the IFES in the self-
employment sector evaluated at age 60 has a value of 1.15 which is around 11%
higher than that of paid-workers (1.04). The estimated contribution of intensive
margin is broadly inline with previous studies which show that the estimated IFES
among the elderly is larger than that of prime-age male workers. For instance, ?
use survey evidence and suggest around 1 of IFES. ? document that it is difficult
to rationalize values, which are less than 0.75. ? show that for temporary wage
changes at age 60, the elasticity of hours at age 60 is 1.28. One of the caveats in
the estimated IFES is that although individuals in reality as well as in the model
face borrowing constraint, the extent of intertemporal hours choice summarized in
the table does not reflect it. Thus, the numbers in the table would understate the
actual quantities.58
2.7.2 Life-Cycle Marshallian Elasticity of Labour Supply
If the wage shocks cause entire changes in life-cycle earnings profiles, the assumption
of the constant λt would be no longer sustainable. Thus, in order to capture
the response of labour supply to permanent wage changes, I use the life-cycle
Marshallian elasticity of labour supply (it will be just referred to a Marshallian
elasticity henceforth).59 Table 2.9 reports estimated Marshallian elasticities derived
by the comparison between the life-cycle profiles under the baseline and newly
simulated labour supply profiles when the pre-tax wage rate is permanently increased
by 1% from the age of 60. The first three columns show the results as wages in
both sectors are increased at the same rate. Also, for the purpose of capturing
sectoral differences in labour supply responses and their interaction effects, column
58The binding constraint obstructs individuals’ intertemporal optimization which can be achieved
by reducing hours of work when they receive negative shocks and force them to work more than
desirable. However, without borrowing constraint, negative shocks incentivise people to reduce
labour supply and increase borrowing so as to achieve consumption smoothing.
59This study follows the Marshallian elasticity suggested by ?. They refer to the Marshal-
lian elasticities which are allowed for changes in intertemporal savings behaviour as “life-cycle
Marshallian elasticity".
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4-6 and 7-9 report the elasticities when the change in wages occurs just in paid-
and self-employment sector, respectively. Row 1 provides intensive margin which is
derived by using simulated individuals who participate in the labour force, and row
2 reports extensive margin derived similar to column 4-6 in table 2.8. The final row
reports aggregate elasticities which add both extensive and intensive margins.
The table suggests that both economy-wide average aggregate Marshallian
elasticity over the age between 57 and 79 is 0.39. The first column reports that the
intensive margin of labour supply for permanent shocks in both sectors is 0.14 which
is far lower than that for transitory changes in table 2.8.60 The result is mainly
caused by the fact that although the permanent rise in wages incentivises people to
increase their labour supply, the change reduces the motivation of intertemporal
reallocation, and the wealth effect from positive income shock would have a greater
negative impact on hours and retirement choice. With regard to extensive margin,
as people can get higher compensation through the permanent change in wages,
the average percentage-point response is 0.25 which implies that workers on the
margin of participation are more likely to stay in the labour force rather than
choosing retirement. Also, even if the wages in paid- and self-employment sectors
are increased at the same proportion, aggregate elasticity for self-employed is around
2.7 times higher than that for paid-one. The difference in elasticity is mainly caused
by the fact that an increase in compensation encourages relatively more people
who otherwise have a paid-job or remain as a retiree to become his own boss. Also,
the contribution of new business entrants’ working hours as well as hours choice of
incumbents lead to a relatively large increase in intensive margin.
Looking more closely at individuals’ responses to permanent wage changes
restrictive to a particular sector, there is substantial heterogeneity in the Marshallian
elasticity across sectors. Column 4-6 report that the change of compensation limited
to paid-sector incentivises more people to stay in paid-job and has a negative effect
on the transition between paid-job and self-employment. As fewer people newly
become their own boss, it has a relatively strong compositional effect between
sectors, and extensive margin in the self-employment sector decreases by 0.18%p.61
The effect of changes in paid-sector wage on intensive margin is also limited in the
paid-sector, and it has a very weak negative or neutral effect on hours of work in
the self-employment sector. As a result, the aggregate elasticity for paid-workers
is 0.56, and the economy-wide aggregate response is reduced to 0.35 due to the
60? show that the elasticity of hours for permanent wage changes at age 60 is 0.14 inline with
the figure for entire workers in this study.
61The rise in the paid-sector wage increase cumulatively increases the proportion of people
having paid-job by 8.4%p and decrease the share of self-employed by 3.7%p.
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decline in the relative attractiveness of running their own business. However, if
the wage increase occurs just in the self-employment sector, it just has a limited
effect on the sectoral composition of the mode of participation between paid- and
self-employment. Also, as less share of people reaps benefit from the change, the
economy-wide aggregate elasticity is 0.19 which is less than half of the response for
an increase in paid-sector wage.
2.8 Counterfactual Analysis
This section revisits the structural model and its parameter estimates to perform
an experiment and to examine the effectiveness of two sets of policy counterfactuals.
The model specification explained in section 2.4 is regarded as the ‘Baseline’, and its
simulation profiles serve as a basis for the comparison of counterfactual regimes. In
section 2.8.1, the effect of two counterfactual policies on individuals’ career choices
and security in retirement is examined; One is changes in payroll tax rates, and the
other is introducing self-employment subsidies. After then, section 2.8.2 answers the
question of why the LFP rate of the entire sample which includes a subsample of
the self-employed is higher than that of the sample which just includes paid-workers
and retirees.
2.8.1 Policy Counterfactuals
In order to respond to ageing problems, many governments have exerted efforts
to strengthen security in retirement through reforming social security rules and
introducing various programs. As the extension of such an effort, I perform two
sets of policy counterfactuals. One is changes in payroll tax rates, and the other is
self-employment subsidies. These experimental policy analyses suggest the following
findings. First, labour supply and sectoral choices sensitively respond to changes
caused by payroll tax-rates, and the age-targeted tax policy positively contributes to
strengthening financial security in retirement. However, if the tax benefit is just given
to very old people, it just has a limited effect. With regard to the self-employment
subsidy, although it has a moderate impact on individuals’ LFP and career choices,
the one-time lump-sum support effectively attracts individuals with the relatively
high entrepreneurial ability to the self-employment sector. Furthermore, the earlier
age the government provides subsidy, the more effective policy can contribute to
the improvement of financial security in retirement.
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Changes in payroll tax rates: First, I examine the response of elderly people
to the changes in payroll tax rates. The main approaches to encourage older workers
to extend their working life have been through social security reform, however,
the same goal can be achieved through revision of tax structure levied on labour
income near retirement. Also, comparing it with delaying normal retirement age or
reduction in SSB amount, tax-cuts would be politically more acceptable. If changes
in tax rates for elderly people effectively motivate many of them to stay in the
labour force for a longer period, it can contribute to the improvement in financial
security in retirement and stability of social security systems.
The policies, which affect the amount of SSB or the pension-eligible age, mainly
have an income effect and have a relatively small substitution effect. However,
changes in the tax rates have a direct effect on wage rates that a worker actually
receives, so it affects both extensive and intensive margins of labour supply.62
Moreover, when the selection into self-employment is allowed jointly with paid-
employment, the degree of impact on each sector would be different. This is because,
although the government levies the same tax rate across sectors, the effective social
security tax rate can be different; half of the paid worker’s payroll tax is shared by
employers, however, self-employed need to bear all these amounts on their own. As
a result, the effect of payroll tax-cut on business income is twice higher than that
of paid-counterparties.
In this subsection, I consider a 25% reduction in the Social Security portion of
the Federal Insurance Contribution Act (FICA) and Self-Employment Contribution
Act (SECA) tax, and the policy scheme is common knowledge for all individuals.63
Moreover, the policy effect would depend on the age to which it begins to be applied.
Thus, in order to understand the policy effects at different stages of life-cycle, an
age-targeted tax-cut applied from the age of 62 and 70 is examined, respectively.64
Panel (a) and (b) of figure 2.11 show the difference derived by subtracting the
simulated LFP rate under the baseline from those under the age-targeted policy
regimes, and panel (c) and (d) provide the cumulative policy effect on elderly
workers’ labour supply choice. Panel (e) and (f) decompose the policy effect (panel
62A series of studies demonstrate the close relation between the pension rules and the LFP of
older workers (???)
63The FICA and SECA taxes are levied for paid-workers and self-employed, respectively. The
half of tax for paid-workers is shared by the employer, however, self-employed have to bear the
entire tax on their own. The tax reduction is not applied to the Medicare tax (Paid-workers Social
Security tax rate: 6.20%→4.65%, Self-employed Social Security tax rate: 12.40%→9.30%).
64Some countries have introduced age-targeted tax credit similar to the policy counterfactual in
this study. For instance, in order to incentivise the elderly to stay in the labour force longer, the
payroll tax rate of all workers in Sweden (both paid-workers and self-employed) aged 65 or over
was reduced from 26.37% to 10.21% in 2007.
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(a) and (b)) across sectors. Table 2.10 decomposes the effect of age-targeted policy
by age group, and table 2.11 summarizes the average policy effect on major variables
relative to the baseline.
The figure and tables show that tax-cut has both income and substitution effect
on the extensive as well as intensive margin of elderly people’s labour supply choice.
The policy counterfactuals suggest three important points. First, the earlier age the
payroll tax reduction is applied, the more the participation decision is sensitive to
the changes in the tax rate. The first panel of table 2.10 provides that the average
LFP rate increases by 0.25%p between the age group 57-79 if the taxes are reduced
from the age of 62.65 However, if the tax benefit is applied to people aged 70 or
over, just 0.11%p more people additionally work on average. Looking closer, the
participation response on the extensive margin is concentrated after the age when
people are subject to the age-targeted tax credit. Panel (c)-(d) of figure 2.11 show
that the cumulative LFP rate before implementing the policy subject to the age
from 62 (ages 57-61) and 70 (ages 57-69) increases by just 0.3%p and decreases by
0.8%p relative to the baseline. However, after the implementation of the policy, the
participation rate increases by 5.4%p under the policy regime targeted from the
age of 62 and 3.4%p under the policy from 70. As a result, the overall cumulative
LFP rate (between the age 57-79) increases by 5.7%p and 2.6%p under the policy
from age of 62 and 70, respectively.
Second, the age-targeted payroll tax-cut contributes to strengthening elderly
workers’ financial security in retirement. The first column of table 2.11 shows that
each policy increases the average amount of asset holdings by 3.5% and 3.3% relative
to the baseline, respectively. With respect to the intensive margin, the policy has a
slight negative effect. The third column provides the average total hours of work
relative to the baseline. A decrease in payroll taxes directly increases the after-tax
hourly wage rate, however, individuals reduce hours of work regardless of the policy
counterfactuals. As each of the payroll tax-cut subject to the age of 62 and 70 is
executed, individuals’ yearly average hours of work decrease by 1 and 3 hours per
year relative to the baseline, respectively. However, the negative effect of changes
65? studies the effect of 25% FICA tax reduction applied to people aged 58 or over and reports
that the estimated increase in the average LFP rate between 8 and 12 years after the tax-cut
introduction is 4.8% which is 3.1%p higher than the corresponding figure under the tax-cut policy
applied to people aged 62 or over in this study. Two factors may bring out the differences. First,
the tax reduction in Yavuzoglu is applied to elderly people earlier than in this study. Second, the
tax reduction in his study is applied not only to Social Security but also to the Medicare portion
of FICA tax. Also, when he derives the amount of tax credit, he includes FICA tax shared by
employers. Thus, the payroll tax-cut has a 1.550% (6.20% × 0.25) wage increase effect in this
study, while his study increases the hourly wage rate by 3.825% ((6.20% + 1.45%) × 0.25 × 2).
Put somewhat differently, the amount of tax reduction in Yavuzoglu is equivalent to the 61.7%
payroll tax-cut in this study.
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at the intensive margin is limited, and considering positive changes at the extensive
margin as well as a rise in wage rate (pre-tax wage rate (the fourth column)), the
positive labour supply effect overrides the negative one. Moreover, the earlier age
the policy is eligible, the more the financial stability in retirement will be improved.
Third, the policy causes changes in the sectoral composition of the mode of
participation between paid-job and self-employment, and individuals who choose
different sectors respond to the changes in payroll tax rates differently. Between the
age 57-79, the policy applied from the age of 62 or over cumulatively increases the
proportion of both paid-workers and self-employed by 0.4%p and 5.3%p, respectively.
Thus, the relative fraction of self-employed among labour force participants increases
by 0.5%p (21.71% → 22.17%). In the case of payroll tax-cut which begins to be
applied for people aged 70 or over, it has a greater sectoral substitution effect.
The policy reduces the number of wage-earners while encouraging more people to
become self-employed. Thus, the cumulative fraction of paid-workers decreases by
2.4%p, however, 5.0%p more people work as self-employed.66
One of the important caveats in this analysis is that the model cannot take
into account the substitution or complementary effects between younger and older
workers. The tax-cut reduces the labour cost of hiring elderly workers, so it
would raise the relative competitiveness and stimulate the demand of firms to hire
more elderly workers. However, a partial equilibrium model just can reflect workers’
additional work incentives caused by higher wages, and thus considering the increase
in the demand for the elderly, the results presented in this study may underestimate
the actual tax policy effects. Moreover, the benefits of elderly people could partially
come at the expense of relatively young workers, so in order to evaluate the actual
social costs and benefits, the general equilibrium approach is needed. However,
the positive effects on security in retirement are still valid and can be greater
than the results presented in this study. The other point is financial stability for
public spending. Although introducing a tax-cut policy would be politically more
acceptable, the fiscal soundness of government can be worsened if the policy fails
to encourage a sufficient number of people to stay in the labour force for a longer
period. Following the simulation results from the counterfactual payroll tax-cut
policy applied from the age of 62, despite the increase of the LFP rate, government
revenue from FICA and SECA tax is approximately reduced by 7.6.%67 Therefore,
in order to introduce such a tax policy and to maintain fiscal soundness at the same
time, the government needs measures for financing additional resources.
66The relative fraction of self-employed among labour force participants increases by 0.51%p
(21.71% → 22.22%).
67Under the policy regime subject to the age of 70 or over, the amount of tax losses is 2.3%.
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Self-employment subsidies: The second policy experiment is examining the
effect of introducing a one-time subsidy for individuals who plan to enter self-
employment. One of the reasons why governments provide various programs to
support people in business start-up activities is that even potentially successful
ideas can be of no use if they are not developed into products or services, and thus
society loses out not only on the present growth but also on future innovation. The
subsidies for self-employed can foster participation by reducing entry costs and
risks for a sudden drop in income. Although there is concern that the subsidy just
induces individuals with relatively low managerial quality to open a business for
the purpose of collecting benefits from the government (?), it may be worthwhile
if the policy attracts people with high managerial quality who may not choose
self-employment without intervention. Actually, some countries, such as Germany,
Spain, and Italy, have policies that encourage people to venture into a business.68
Also, these kinds of policies, once introduced, usually last for an extended period
rather than implemented temporarily.
I assume that the government subsidy is offered in the form of a one-time $30,000
lump-sum support.69 With regard to the subsidy provision, not only the amount
but also the timing at which policies are introduced may cause large changes in the
effectiveness of the intervention. Thus, it is additionally considered that the subsidy
is given to new self-employment entrants at ages 58, 62, and 66, respectively.
In the perspective of encouraging people to open their own business, the timing
of the intervention brings relatively limited changes. The second row of table 2.12
summarizes the long-run effect of the policy intervention on labour supply and
career choice. Comparing it with the baseline, if the subsidy is given at age 58, it
cumulatively increases the fraction of self-employed by 3.6%p. When the policy
is implemented at ages 62-66, 4.2%p and 4.5%p more people cumulatively have
self-employment job than in the baseline.70 However, as the decrease in the number
of paid-workers exceeds the increase in self-employed, the average LFP rate slightly
drops by 0.23%p and 0.24%p for the case of policy introduction at ages 62-66,
respectively. The results show that financial supports introduced near the end of
68For instance, in order to guarantee the social security and subsistence of the person setting
up the business during the start-up phase, the German government operates “Bridging Allowance
(Überbrückungsgeld, §57 Social Code III)" program.
69This assumption implies that only those who newly open a business can receive the subsidy.
Therefore, self-employed who are currently in business cannot receive such support, however,
individuals who enter into self-employment again after shutting down in the past can apply for the
benefit. When an individual newly opens his business at a predetermined age, $30,000 is added to
his asset holdings.
70The average effect of 58-, 62-, and 66-year-targeted subsidy policy increases the proportion of
self-employed by 0.17%p, 0.20%p, and 0.21%p, respectively.
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lifetime have a moderate impact, and the later age the government intervenes, the
more the policy has an effect on elderly workers’ career choice. These would be
caused by the fact that $30,000 is not sufficiently attractive for relatively young
elderly workers. However, the number of people incentivised to open their own
business and the relative value of subsidy rise with health deterioration, decrease in
productivity, or both in later life. Also, the relative value of flexibility in deciding
working hours and having more control of the working environment rises with age.
In the short-run, relative to the baseline, figure 2.12 shows that the number
of self-employed increases by between 0.21%p and 0.33%p in the first year of the
intervention. However, the positive effect has disappeared rapidly, so it returns
to the rate of the baseline within 1-3 years. Moreover, the intervention causes an
immediate drop in the quality of entrepreneurs. For instance, comparing the quality
in the first year of the intervention with the quality in the previous year, the mean
ability decreases by between 0.5%-1.5%. This is caused by the fact that financial
support reduces the entry cost for attempting self-employment and motivates more
people to open their own business. However, some of them having relatively poor
entrepreneurial ability are just attracted by the subsidy, and thus once they receive
the benefit, many of them go out of business quickly (refer to these individuals as
‘Cherry Picker’). For example, in the first year of the intervention at age 66 (58),
due to the entry of Cherry Pickers, 50th and 75th percentile managerial ability of
incumbent self-employed decreases by 3.3% (2.8%) and 24.3% (5.8%), respectively.
Despite the rapid dissipation of positive effects and immediate reduction in
entrepreneurial quality, the subsidy may be worth sustaining if its long-run benefits
outweigh short-run side effects and the amount of tax expenses required to carry-out.
Because expected earnings in the self-employment sector are higher than those in
the paid-job on average, flattening entry costs encourage more individuals who have
not attempted self-employment. Considering the influential contribution of good
entrepreneurs to the growth and innovation, if the intervention can attract more
people with the exceptional ability (these type of individuals is referred to ‘Actual
Entrepreneur’ henceforth) to self-employment, the policy could be worth sustaining.
Moreover, as improving security in retirement is one of the important objectives,
the impact of the intervention on asset holdings should be regarded as a crucial
evaluation criterion in the long-run perspective.
In the long-run, the one-time lump-sum support has a positive impact on the
economy, and thus it could be worthy of consideration.71 The intervention attracts
71? document that a subsidy for entrepreneurship encourages entrepreneurs with low quality
more than those of high ability. Thus, in order to justify intervention, the subsidy policy requires
a different justification. In their paper, the government provides a subsidy regardless of age. The
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more ’Actual Entrepreneurs’, so the policy contributes positively to the economy
by increasing the overall quality of self-employed. Regardless of intervention timing,
the managerial ability evaluated by the dollar amount increases by $0.36 - $0.52 per
hour on average.72 Moreover, the policy improves financial security in retirement.
The first column of table 2.13 shows that, as the policy encourages more people to
have chances of attempting their possibility of success as an entrepreneur, people
receive higher wages on average (the fourth column). Also, the earlier stage of life
the subsidy is given, the longer period individuals can enjoy higher earnings. For
instance, if the intervention is made at age 58, the average level of asset holdings is
1.6% higher than that of the baseline. However, the amount of savings is just 0.9%
higher than that of the baseline if the subsidy is given at age 66.
Meanwhile, the amount of additional resources required to implement the policy
is another important determinant in assessing the effectiveness of the policy. If
the subsidy programme is financed through the per-capita tax at a time, each
person has to pay an additional $379 to $569 in taxes.73 However, taking into
account the rise in average asset holdings for the age-group 56-79 caused by the
intervention, a one-unit of tax increases results in from 3.8 to 4.2 units increase in
savings on average. Therefore, the self-employment subsidy policy would be worth
implementing; it contributes to the economy by driving innovation and improving
the financial stability in retirement, and its long-term benefits outweigh short-term
shortcomings.
2.8.2 No Self-Employment Sector
This subsection investigates the extent to which the allowance of transition into
self-employment causes people to prolong working lives. Some studies show that
self-employment plays a role in extending working lives (??). In order to assess
the validity of this argument, I compare the simulated life-cycle profiles under the
baseline with a profile under the model which does not consider the self-employment
sector. This implies that under this new model framework, all people need to
work under someone’s instruction if they want to work. Thus, the model structure
under this counterfactual regime is similar to the standard dynamic life-cycle model
short-term policy effects in this study are similar to them, however, I find that the long-term
benefits outweigh the short-term side-effects.
72The hourly wage rate, which is evaluated at the mean of self-employment sector-specific
experience and managerial ability between the age of 56-79.
73For instance, if the intervention is made at age 58, 949 out of 48,968 (the number of survivors)
individuals receive the benefits. Therefore, if the government imposes a poll-tax, each individual
should pay $569 in tax. However, if it is made at age 66 (62), 632 (721) out of 44,3675 (46,895)
individuals newly become entrepreneurs, and each person needs to pay $379 ($433).
102 A Long Journey Toward Retirement
suggested by (??). Accordingly, all individuals face the paid-sector wage profiles
given by equation (2.7), and there is no uncertainty on their ability. This simpler
structure model is referred to as ‘No-SE’ henceforth.
Figure 2.13 compares the simulated profiles under the No-SE with those from
the baseline and actual data. Panel (a) provides the LFP profiles from the data
and simulations for the age group 57-79. The green square (solid yellow line) shows
the participation rate of individuals in the entire sample, and the solid blue-line
describes the same statistics from the subsample which just use individuals who have
never run their own business during the period under this study. The dotted line is
the simulated profiles for the No-SE. Although the alternative specification properly
replicates the LFP choice of individuals in the selected subsample (individuals who
have never run their own business), the restricted model considerably underpredicts
labour supply choice when compared with the entire sample. On average, the LFP
rate under the No-SE underpredicts that of the restricted sample by 8.5% (2.8%p),
however, it greatly underpredicts the participation rate of individuals in the entire
sample by 21.8% (8.3%p).
Panel (b) shows the LFP rate gap under the baseline and No-SE. As the LFP
rate of the entire sample is always higher than that of the subsample excluding
self-employed, the LFP rate under the baseline is always higher than that of the
counterfactual regime. Between the age of 57-79, the participation rate predicted by
the No-SE is between 3.5%p and 9.9%p lower than that of the baseline. As a result,
relative to the baseline, the restricted model greatly underpredicts the average
LFP rate. Moreover, when comparing only the paid workers from each model,
the fraction of individuals who choose a paid-job under the baseline (29.7%) is
equivalent to the entire LFP rate under the No-SE (29.7%). Moreover, the number
of living people choosing the paid-sector in the baseline is consistently higher than
in the No-SE from the age of 65. The under-prediction of the LFP rate could be
mainly caused by the fact that the restricted model cannot adequately capture the
distinguishing characteristics of self-employment which incentivise people to open
their own business rather than fully leaving the labour force in the latter part of their
career. Due to the flexibility and relatively high expected earnings, self-employment
can be an ideal bridge job and can play a role in delaying retirement. However, as
the self-employment sector is not considered properly, individuals on the margin of
LFP are more likely to choose retirement when marginal negative changes occur.
According to panel (d), the simulated individuals under the No-SE (1,777 hours)
work around 66 and 63 hours more per year on average than those under the baseline
(1,711 hours) and the actual data (1,714 hours). Once becoming self-employed
is disabled, it is not allowed to reduce hours of work by a certain level without
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experiencing wage penalty. Despite working longer hours, as average hourly wage
rates of self-employed are higher than those of full-time workers, individuals under
the No-SE receive a lower average wage (panel (e)) and have less assets (panel (c)).
The differences of simulated profiles under the baseline and No-SE demonstrate that
the career choice between paid- and self-employment sector delay older workers’
retirement and allows them to work fewer hours and to enhance financial security
in retirement.
2.9 Conclusion
In this paper, I build a dynamic programming model of elderly people’s joint
determination of career choice, labour supply, consumption, and social security
application. The model allows for the selection into self-employment jointly with
paid-employment and retirement. Although the model simplifies many factors, it
properly generates the rich patterns of the work and retirement choices observed
in the HRS. In particular, the model is doing a good performance in replicating
elderly workers’ career choice, entry as well as exit decisions of the business they
create and suggests reasonable explanation about the cause of these phenomena.
I perform two sets of counterfactual analysis and derives the following findings.
In regard to the policy counterfactual, both a 25% reduction in payroll tax rates
and the subsidy offered as a form of one-time $30,000 lump-sum support have a
relatively small effect on delaying retirement. However, both policies cause large
changes in sectoral composition between paid- and self-employment and contribute
to strengthening security in retirement. The second counterfactual experiment
shows the importance of controlling the self-employment sector. If self-employed are
not separated from paid-workers, prediction results would be biased and could not
represent the entire elderly people’s work and retirement choice adequately. These
confirm the importance of controlling selection properly.
Future work which will be added to this study may reflect spouses’ labour force
decision more explicitly and include a knock-on effect on job creation created by new
entrepreneurs. Although this paper studies couples’ work and retirement decision,
for computational simplicity, the spouses’ labour supply choices are treated as an
event drawn in a random manner. However, empirical regularity observed in many
datasets reveals that an emerging role of women in the labour force requires a better
understanding of the coordination of couples’ decision-making and its effect on
husbands’ and wives’ behaviour. Also, considering the pivotal role of entrepreneurs
in the economy, a better understanding of the chain effect of new and incumbent
self-employed persons on job creation and innovation is particularly essential.
104 A Long Journey Toward Retirement
Figure 2.1 Males’ labour Force Participation Rate
(a) SE Rate in 2015 (BLS) (b) LFP Rate by Age (HRS)
Notes: Figure (a) shows the percentage of workforce in self-employment sector by age-group.
Figure (b) is derived by dividing people in the labour force and each sector into survivors by age
Figure 2.2 Impact of Self-Employment Spells on Net-Asset Holdings for Age 56-79
(a) Having SE Experience or Not (b) # of Newly Opening a Business
Figure 2.3 Duration of Job Spells by Work Status for Age Group 57-75
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Figure 2.4 Frequency of Entry Into and Exit From SE and Mean of SE Hourly
Wage Rate
(a) Entry and Exit (b) By Job-Spells
Figure 2.5 Hourly Wage Rate
(a) Mean Hourly Wage Rate By Sector (b) 1st Vs. Having Busi. Exp.
Notes: The wage rates are adjusted for inflation and expressed in 2000 dollars. The blue-line in
the right figure describes empirical hourly wage rate distribution of people who tried
self-employment just once, and red-line shows that of people who run their own business twice or
more during the period under this study
Figure 2.6 Additional LFP Cost and Variance of Posterior Belief about SE Ability
(a) Additional LFP Cost by Age (b) Variance of Posterior Belief
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Figure 2.7 Model Fits-Empirical Profiles vs. Simulated Profiles
(a) labour Force Participation Rate (b) LFP Rate - Paid-Employment
(c) LFP Rate - Self-Employment (d) Mean Non-Housing Net Assets
(e) Mean Hours Worked for Participants (f) Mean Hourly Wages for Participants
(g) Claiming of Social Security Benefits (h) Proportion of Health Status
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Figure 2.8 Model Fits - Empirical vs. Simulated Profiles: Hourly Real Wage Rates
by Sectors
(a) Full-Time: Mean (b) Full-Time: Standard Deviation
(c) Self-Employment: Mean (d) Self-Employment: Standard Dev.
Figure 2.9 Model Fits - Empirical vs. Simulated Profiles: Entry Into and Exit From
Self-Employment Sector
(a) Entry Into Self-Employment (b) Exit From Self-Employment
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Figure 2.10 Empirical vs. Simulated Profiles: Duration of Self-Employment Spells
Figure 2.11 Effect of Cutting Payroll Taxes by 25% on LFP1
(a) From 62: LFP Rate (b) From 70: LFP Rate
(c) From 62: Cumul. Sum of LFP
Rate
(d) From 70: Cumul. Sum of LFP
Rate
(e) From 62: PJ and SE Rate (f) From 70: PJ and SE Rate
Notes: Values in the pictures are expressed as percent point (%p). The numbers in the panel (c)
and (d) are summing up the LFP rates under each policy counterfactuals minus the
corresponding rates under the baseline. The numbers in panel (a), (b), (e) and (f) are derived by
subtracting the LFP rates under the baseline from those under the policy counterfactual
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Figure 2.12 Changes in the Self-Employment Rate under Age-Targeted Subsidy
(a) Subsidy at Age 58
(b) Subsidy at Age 62
(c) Subsidy at Age 66
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Figure 2.13 Comparison: Baseline Profiles vs. No-SE Profiles
(a) No-SE vs. Actual Data (b) labour Force Participation Rate
(c) Mean Non-Housing Net Assets (d) Mean Hours Worked for Participants
(e) Mean Hourly Wages for Participants
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Table 2.1 Summary Statistics
FT PT SE RE Total
Proportion (%) 25.4 9.1 8.9 56.6 100.0
Age (Year) 60.8 67.1 64.4 69.1 66.4
(4.3) (6.0) (6.3) (6.2) (6.8)
Educational High-School or Below 49.6 51.7 42.0 63.2 56.6
Attainment College 23.1 21.9 22.3 18.8 20.5
(Proportion (%)) B.A. or Higher 27.3 26.4 35.6 18.1 22.8
Hourly Real Average 19.7 14.5 24.9 19.5
Wage ($) (13.2) (19.2) (30.1) (18.6)
1st Quartile 11.7 6.9 8.5 9.5
Median 17.0 9.0 15.8 15.1
3rd Quartile 24.4 14.0 28.2 23.2
Hours of Work Average 2,344 1,020 1,994 2,031
(Hours) (477) (409) (967) (776)
1st Quartile 2,080 720 1,300 1,600
Median 2,080 1,040 2,080 2,080
3rd Quartile 2,600 1,300 2,600 2,496
Notes: The numbers in the table show average profiles for the age group 56-79. Monetary values
are expressed by year-2000 U.S. dollars. Standard deviation is presented in parenthesis
Table 2.2 Career Transition Probabilities by Age Group
Status in t+2
Status in t Paid-Job Self-Emp. Retirement
Age: 56-66 Paid-Job 77.9% 2.1% 20.0%
Self-Employment 11.1% 75.7% 13.2%
Age: 67-79 Paid-Job 26.1% 17.4% 56.5%
Self-Employment 35.0% 14.7% 50.2%
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Table 2.3 Reasons for Retirement and Career Transition Across Sectors1
From Status at t-2 to Status at t PJ to RE FT to RE PT to RE SE to RE
Involuntary Retirement 37.1% 33.8% 44.0% 54.7%
- Business Closure or Lay-off 17.3% 14.6% 23.0% 27.4%
- Retired, Negative Change in Working Cond. 8.8% 11.5% 3.2% 1.1%
- Poor Health 11.0% 7.8% 17.7% 26.3%
Voluntary Retirement 61.7% 65.0% 54.8% 41.1%
- Leisure 46.5% 53.0% 33.1% 0.0%
- Voluntary Quits 10.7% 7.2% 18.1% 38.9%
- Financial Incentives 3.0% 4.5% 0.0% 0.0%
- Changes in External Circumstance 1.4% 0.4% 3.6% 2.1%
Others 1.2% 1.2% 1.2% 4.2%
From Status at t-2 to Status at t PJ to SE FT to SE FT to PT SE to PJ
Involuntary Career Transition 36.7% 34.8% 44.7% 29.7%
- Business Closure or Lay-off 26.5% 26.1% 36.8% 27.0%
- Retired, Negative Change in Working Cond. 6.1% 6.5% 2.6% 0.0%
- Poor Health 4.1% 2.2% 5.3% 2.7%
Voluntary Career Transition 63.3% 65.2% 47.4% 70.3%
- Leisure 16.3% 17.4% 23.7% 0.0%
- Voluntary Quits 42.9% 43.5% 13.2% 64.9%
- Financial Incentives 4.1% 4.3% 2.6% 5.4%
- Changes in External Circumstance 0.0% 0.0% 7.9% 0.0%
Others 0.0% 0.0% 7.9% 0.0%
Notes: The numbers in the table combine answers to the two questions: a) "Why did you leave
your previous employer [stop at working at your previous business]" and b) "Did your employment
[business] situation change in some way that encouraged you to leave". "Retired, negative change
in working condition" includes workers who choose retirement as the reason they left their
previous sector and, with regard to the change in their working conditions, report that a)
departure was encouraged by supervisor or co-workers, b) their wages or hours had or would have
been cut if they had stayed, c) they would have been laid off, d) they had new job duties, e) they
had to move to a new job location, f) their health insurance or work schedule had changed by
their employer or g) other working conditions had negatively changed. "Leisure" includes workers
a) who report that they left their employer because of enjoying travels, spending more time at
home or distance to work or b) who answer that they have retired without changes in working
conditions. "Voluntary Quits" includes workers who left their employer because of a) starting own
business, b) finding a better job, c) burned-out, d) the sale of their business or hand-over
responsibilities to other family, or e) wanting to changes. "Financial Incentives" includes workers
who a) receive an early retirement incentive, b) think that stop working is financially
advantageous or c) become eligible for pension, social security or special early retirement offer or
receive better job offers. "Changes in External Circumstance" includes divorce, spouse’s transfer
or family moving
Source: HRS (2002-2014 survey)
2.9 Conclusion 113







Fair −Healthit 0.270∗∗∗ (0.018)
Bad−Healthit 0.488∗∗∗ (0.033)
Eligibility for Medicareit −0.059 (0.071)
constant 2.759 (3.827)
σ2u 1.429
Note: Robust standard errors are presented in parenthesis: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10
Table 2.5 The Estimates of Preference Parameters
Params. Definition Coef. S.E.
αGood Consumption Weight: Good health 0.535 (0.012)
αFair Consumption Weight: Fair health 0.560 (0.080)
αBad Consumption Weight: Bad health 0.575 (0.084)
σ Relative Risk Aversion 6.691 (0.641)
cmin A Minimum Level of Resources ($1,000) 8.996 (0.113)
L Time Endowment (hours) 5,805 (7.771)
θP Fixed Cost of Work (hours) 742.0 (9.713)
θPA Coeff. of Fixed Cost of Participation by Age (hours) 1.617 (0.026)
θSE Fixed Cost of Becoming Self-Employed (hours) 356.3 (7.995)
θFair Fixed Cost of Work -Fair Health (hours) 552.1 (7.997)
θBad Fixed Cost of Work -Bad Health (hours) 1029.0 (14.361)
θBE Bequest Shifter 0.024 (0.000)
K Bequest Curvature ($1,000) 5.327 (0.362)
θRV Fixed Utility Cost of Returning to Work -0.0093 (0.0002)
θB0 1st Coeff. of Mean SSB Application Costs -0.074 (0.0020)
θB1 2nd Coeff. of Mean SSB Application Costs 0.002 (0.0000)
θB2 3rd Coeff. of Mean SSB Application Costs 0.002 (0.00000)
µη Mean of Non-Pecuniary Benefits -0.0001 (0.000003)
ση Std. of Non-Pecuniary Benefits 0.0095 (0.000002)
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Table 2.6 The Estimates of Earnings Process Parameters
Paid-Job Self-Employment
Params. Description Coeff. S.E. Params. Description Coeff. S.E.
βPJ0 Age 0.0774 (0.0009) βSE0 Age 0.0897 (0.0013)
βPJ1 Age Squared - 0.0009 (0.0000) βSE1 Age Squared -0.0006 (0.0000)
βPJ2 Sector Experience 0.0068 (0.0001) βSE2 Sector Experience 0.0037 (0.0001)
βPJ3 Fair Health - 0.1957 (0.0027) βSE3 Fair Health -0.0995 (0.0015)
βPJ4 Bad Health - 0.3158 (0.0042) βSE4 Bad Health -0.1521 (0.0026)
µf Constant 1.3007 (0.0026) µφ Constant -0.4950 (0.0081)
ρAR Autoregressive 0.3904 (0.0050) ρ Corr.: PJ & SE 0.5239 (0.0069)
σf Std. of FE 0.5716 (0.0074) σφ Std. of SE 0.8725 (0.0129)
σξ Std. of Innovation 0.2007 (0.0026) σψ Std. of Innovation 0.4588 (0.0073)
ς PT-Job Penalty 0.3415 (0.0044)
Table 2.7 Transition Probabilities Between Paid-Job and Self-Employment
56 ≤ Age ≤ 79 Status in t+2
Status in t Full-Time Part-Time Self-Emp.
Data Full-Time 87.8% 9.5% 2.7%
Part-Time 14.4% 82.0% 3.5%
Self-Employment 5.3% 5.8% 88.8%
Baseline Full-Time 89.0% 7.4% 3.6%
Part-Time 22.8% 67.8% 9.3%
Self-Employment 13.4% 6.2% 80.4%
Note: Each column presents the simulated or the actual probability of choosing each sector at
period t and choosing the same or different sector at period t+2 conditional on the labour force
participants at period t
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Table 2.8 Frisch Elasticity of Labour Supply
Intensive Elasticity (A) Extensive Elasticity (B) Agg. Elasticity (A+B)
All PJ SE All PJ SE All PJ SE
At Age 60 1.055 1.039 1.152 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.055 1.038 1.152
At Age 66 1.416 1.395 1.492 0.015 0.009 0.006 1.430 1.404 1.497
At Age 70 1.770 1.708 2.009 0.035 0.011 0.024 1.806 1.719 2.033
Note: The extensive margin shows the percentage point changes in LFP in response to 1%
increase in hourly wage
Table 2.9 20% Increase in Hourly Wage Rate and Labour Supply Responses
All Sectors Paid-Job Self-Employment
All PJ SE All PJ SE All PJ SE
Intensive Elasticity (A) 0.14 0.11 0.25 0.11 0.14 0.00 0.03 -0.02 0.19
Extensive Elasticity (B) 0.25 0.06 0.19 0.24 0.42 -0.18 0.16 -0.00 0.17
Aggregate Elasticity (A+B) 0.39 0.17 0.44 0.35 0.56 -0.19 0.19 -0.02 0.36
Notes: The permanent increase in hourly wage occurs from the age of 60. The average of labour
supply profiles for the age group 57-79. The extensive elasticity shows the percentage points
changes in LFP in response to 1% increase in hourly wage during the period under study
Table 2.10 Payroll Tax Change and Career Choice
Paid-Job Self-Employment LFP
Total (57 ≤ Age ≤ 79)
Baseline 29.68% 8.23% 37.92%
From the age at 62 29.70% 8.46% 38.17%
From the age at 70 29.58% 8.45% 38.03%
57 ≤ Age ≤ 61
Baseline 58.09% 11.98% 70.07%
From the age at 62 58.06% 12.06% 70.12%
From the age at 70 57.85% 12.08% 69.92%
62 ≤ Age ≤ 79
Baseline 21.79% 7.19% 28.98%
From the age at 62 21.82% 7.46% 29.39%
From the age at 70 21.73% 7.44% 29.17%
57 ≤ Age ≤ 69
Baseline 41.59% 10.30% 51.89%
From the age at 62 41.59% 10.44% 52.03%
From the age at 70 41.41% 10.42% 51.83%
70 ≤ Age ≤ 79
Baseline 14.21% 5.54% 19.75%
From the age at 62 14.25% 5.89% 20.15%
From the age at 70 14.20% 5.89% 20.09%
Notes: The average of career choice profiles for the age group 57-79. The share of paid-workers
and self-employed in entire population ( Each−CareerT otal number of individuals in the sample )
116 A Long Journey Toward Retirement
Table 2.11 Payroll Tax Change and Major Lifecycle Profiles
Counterfactual Regime ait+1 Payroll-Tax hit wit SSB φi
From the Age of 62 103.53 92.38 99.96 102.11 -0.05%p 107.65
From the Age of 70 103.26 97.66 99.82 101.48 -0.07%p 106.93
Notes: The average of simulated profiles for the age group 57-79 under each counterfactual
regimes. The simulated average figures under the baseline set at 100. The figures in the column 3
shows government’s payroll tax revenue which is used to finance OSADI and Medicare Hospital
Insurance programmes (FICA and SECA). The figures in the column 5 are derived as follows: (1)
For each counterfactual regimes and the baseline, deriving the average share of people who drawn
Social Security Retired Worker Benefit at the ages 63-69 and (2) subtracting the average share
under the baseline from that of each counterfactual regime
Table 2.12 Self-Employment Subsidy and Career Choice
Counterfactual Regime Paid-Job Self-Employment LFP Rate
Baseline 29.69% 8.22% 37.92%
SE Subsidy at Age 58 29.54% 8.39% 37.93%
SE Subsidy at Age 62 29.26% 8.42% 37.68%
SE Subsidy at Age 66 29.25% 8.43% 37.68%
Notes: The average of career choice profiles for the age group 57-79. The share of paid-workers
and self-employed in entire population ( CareerT otal number of individuals in the sample )
Table 2.13 The Effect of Providing Self-Employment Subsidies
Counterfactual Regime ait+1 Payroll-Tax hit wit SSB φi
Subsidy at Age 58 101.59 100.08 99.86 101.59 -0.09%p 104.09
Subsidy at Age 62 100.89 99.59 99.87 103.07 -0.15%p 105.89
Subsidy at Age 66 100.87 99.54 99.86 103.10 -0.15%p 105.40
Notes: The average of simulated profiles for the age group 57-79 under each counterfactual
regimes. The simulated average figures under the baseline set at 100. The figures in the column 3
shows government’s payroll tax revenue which is used to finance OSADI and Medicare Hospital
Insurance programmes (FICA and SECA). The figures in the column 5 are derived as follows: (1)
For each counterfactual regimes and the baseline, deriving the average share of people who drawn
Social Security Retired Worker Benefit at the ages 63-69 and (2) subtracting the average share




Wealth Shocks, Income Shocks,
and Consumption Insurance
3.1 Introduction
A voluminous literature estimates how changes in wealth affect household consump-
tion.1 The literature sheds lights on the magnitude of the wealth effect as well as
the channels through which changes in wealth affect household consumption. For
instance, an increase in wealth may raise consumption by expanding the budget
(spendable cash in hand) or through relaxing borrowing constraints by raising
households’ creditworthiness. These channels may work differently.
An extensive literature exploits a representative agent model and estimates
the wealth effects using aggregate data (???).2 However, the estimated wealth
effect using aggregate data may not capture the potential individual or household
heterogeneity in an appropriate manner, so the disaggregated micro-data would
be desirable to yield a consistent estimate of the wealth effect (?).3 For instance,
? estimate the effect of shocks in unemployment, housing, and financial wealth
on consumption using two waves of internet survey on U.S. households. ? and ?
estimate the response of household consumption to house prices using Danish and
UK micro-data, respectively. ? decompose the wealth effect into endogenous and
1Unless specified otherwise, by wealth we mean nonhuman wealth of households, such as
financial or housing wealth.
2A related literature uses time-variation in aggregate data across countries to estimate the effect
of wealth shock on consumption (?????). For instance, ? find consumption is more responsive to
housing gains based on estimate of aggregate data in 14 countries and U.S. states.
3Estimates of housing wealth effect on average consumption may differ in microdata and in
aggregate data. However, ? illustrate that if individual heterogeneity does not vary over time
and is not correlated with the variables of interest, the use of aggregated data does not cause
aggregation bias.
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exogenous components and focus on the impact of anticipated and unanticipated
changes in the exogenous component of wealth on consumption using Italian micro-
data.4
Parallel to this literature, a growing literature has focused on how idiosyncratic
permanent and transitory income shocks are transmitted to innovations in household
consumption (?????). The parameters that quantify the passthrough of permanent
and transitory income shocks to consumption are typically referred to as insurance
parameters (a perfect passthrough means zero insurance). One insight from the
literature is to understand the evolution of consumption inequality relative to that
of income inequality, where insurability of income shocks play a key role. However,
the literature still has not investigated the relationship between household wealth
and consumption inequality. Optimal consumption response to shocks in human
wealth (i.e. income shocks) depends on the households’ holding of financial and
housing wealth. If a household chooses holdings of different types of assets in a
joint decision, its financial, housing, and human wealth should be correlated.5
This paper bridges the gap between these two literature. We extend the analysis
of the wealth effect from the first moment of consumption (average) to the second
moments (inequality and covariance with the income shocks). Given that housing
wealth was a dominant component of a household’s balance sheet in the data we
use, we focus on the wealth held in the form of a house and the housing price
changes. Our empirical analysis of the wealth effect on consumption growth and
inequality takes two steps. First, we obtain consistent estimates of the wealth
effect on the mean of consumption growth, exploiting the differential effect of the
housing price change on households with a different fraction of remaining lifetime
wealth held in the form of a house. Second, we decompose the residual consumption
growth (deviation from the mean) from the first step estimation to identify the
component of income shocks and consumption insurance parameters. We follow ?
and connect consumption insurance with income shocks. However, we introduce
more heterogeneity and allow for differential consumption response varying on time,
household wealth, and exogenous housing market-driven wealth shocks. Thus, our
4One focus of studies on both aggregate and micro data is the marginal propensity to consume
of gains in different assets. ? find PSID households are more responsive to gains in stocks than
housing. Another focus of the wealth effect literature is the heterogeneity of marginal propensity
to consume for different household groups, e.g., ? find UK old households are more responsive to
wealth shocks. A third focus is on how consumption is related to predicted future wealth (??).
5For instance, homeownership may indicate creditworthiness that makes homeowners less
responsive to income shocks, which means wealth is positively correlated with consumption
insurance through the credit channel. On the other hand, homeowners may have more committed
expenditures and have to make more adjustments to non-committed expenditures (?).
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approach allows us to quantify the relative importance of household wealth in
explaining changes in consumption inequality.
There are three challenges to identify the effect of the changes in wealth on
consumption. First, changes in wealth reflect not only the price changes driven by
the asset markets but also the household’s endogenous portfolio choices. Given that
the households make portfolio choices and consumption jointly, the regression of
consumption growth on changes in assets may not yield causal effects (?). Second,
a single or multiple common factors can drive both consumption and asset prices
in the same direction. For instance, the asset prices may be correlated with the
expectation of future productivity growth, and households would adjust their
consumption taking into account their expectation of future growth (?). If it
is the case, then the observed synchronization between the house price change
and consumption change just indicates a spurious association. Finally, errors in
measuring wealth impose additional difficulties to consistently estimate the wealth
effect.
To tackle these challenges, we construct a housing wealth shock by exploiting the
exogenous variation of housing price changes and the lagged fraction of remaining
lifetime wealth held in housing asset.6 Essentially, we are comparing household
consumption changes with respect to housing price changes for households who have
a large housing wealth (as a fraction of remaining lifetime wealth) relative to those
who have a small-housing wealth. Our identification strategy allows for controlling
endogeneity and reducing attenuation bias caused by measurement errors in wealth
observations.
We estimate our empirical model using household-level panel data of consump-
tion, income, and wealth for Korean households. Our data set is the Family Income
and Expenditure Survey in urban areas of Korea from 1994 to 2002. The survey
covers monthly observations of around 5,000 households and is collected by di-
ary. Thus, it provides detailed high-frequency information and tracks changes in
wealth, income, and consumption.7 Moreover, as the sample period covered the
Asian financial crisis, it allows us to examine the relation between the changes in
6We define lifetime wealth as the sum of the current amount of asset holdings and the present
value of expected future income. The detail of our way to measure lifetime wealth is explained in
Appendix C.1.
7The Korean household data have two important advantages over other household survey
data such as the CEX or PSID. First, contrary to other data sets which collect information on
a yearly basis, our data set has long monthly panels (each household are covered over 12 to
60 months). Thus, it is less likely to suffer from aggregation bias and provides detailed high-
frequency information. The other is that our data is a representative real panel of households with
comprehensive information on consumption, income, and wealth. Households directly fill in the
family account book with daily income and expenditure. Also, the data contain rich detail of the
information of account-level data on a diverse kind of asset holdings and their transactions. Thus,
122 Wealth Shocks, Income Shocks, and Consumption Insurance
household wealth and consumption growth and households’ consumption response
to income-driven shocks.
The main empirical findings are as follows. First, our constructed wealth shock
has a high predictive power to explain the changes in the amount of household
wealth and a large positive effect on consumption. A 10% changes in the constructed
wealth shock is associated with the changes in household wealth by 9.3% and causes
18.6% increase in consumption. The estimated coefficient of the wealth effect
implies that a 1% increase in the nationwide house price index leads to a rise in
monthly consumption by 0.45% on average. The estimated wealth effect is neither
exceptionally high nor low and comparable with other studies (??) and qualitatively
robust to various changes in the model specifications.
Second, the estimated consumption insurance with respect to the permanent
and transitory income fluctuation is smaller than one (partial insurance), and the
effect of transitory shocks on consumption is smoothed more than that of the
permanent one. The results are equivalent to previous studies.8 The estimated
average consumption insurance against permanent and transitory income shocks is
0.633 and 0.136, respectively. These imply that 86.4% of transitory income shock
can be insurable, however, 63.3% of permanent income shock is transmitted to the
consumption growth.
Finally, there is a large degree of differences in the ability to smooth consumption,
and these are caused by the heterogeneity of the household wealth held in the form of
the house. A 1% increase in house price inflation is associated with the improvement
in the ability to insure consumption against permanent income shock by 0.013%.
However, the constructed wealth shock just has a limited effect on the transmission of
the transitory income shock. Also, the decrease in consumption inequality after the
crisis is partly captured by the improvement in the ability to insure consumption
against permanent income shock. 21% more permanent shock to consumption
becomes insurable after the crisis. This partly reflects the institutional changes that
occur after the crisis; the mortgage markets become more competitive, and people
are more accessible to the housing financial market.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents institutional
background on housing market in Korea. Section 3 explains our empirical models.
First, we estimate the casual effect of the constructed wealth shock on consumption
growth. Then, we decompose the residual from the first step estimation to identify
it is suitable for examining relation between the changes in household wealth and consumption
growth and households’ consumption response to income driven shocks.
8??? show that the estimated ability to insure consumptions against permanent and transitory
income shocks supports the argument of partial insurance.
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the degree of consumption insurance with respect to the income shocks. Section 4
describes the data and key variables. Section 5 explains about estimation results.
Section 6 concludes.
3.2 Institutional Background
As housing assets take a significant proportion of total household wealth, changes
in house price can have a substantial impact on households’ choice of consumption.
In Korea, around 60% of household observations in our sample were house owners
at some period between 1994 and 2002. Comparing it with other western countries
which housing assets account for half to two-thirds of wealth, home-ownership is
particularly important for Korean households because around 90% of the total
wealth was held in the form of house or housing deposit, and holding other forms
of assets was much uncommon. Thus, housing wealth is a particularly important
component of the household portfolio in Korea, and there would be ample room for
the changes in housing wealth to play an important role through the impact on the
financial situation of households before and after the crisis.
Our sample covers the period of the Asian Financial Crisis which appears to
have had a huge impact on Korea economy and housing market. National level
house price in Korea remained stable between 1994 and 1997, and the national
house price index just increased by 3.1% during the given four-year period (from
60.4 to 62.3). However, as the economic crisis hit hard Korea in late 1997, the
Korean won devalued sharply, the stock price declined, and the unemployment
rate jumped. In late 1998, there were indications that the crisis was over and the
Korean economy staged a dramatic recovery through 1999. The Korea housing
market also underwent a drastic change during and after the crisis. The housing
price began to fall sharply after the onset of the crisis, and this decreasing trend
continued until early 1999. The index recorded its trough in January 1999 and fell
by 11.8% compared to its peak in October 1997. After undergoing a sharp drop,
house price rebounded since early 1999 and had recorded a rapid increase since late
2000. In early 2002, the housing price index exceeded its previous highest level, and
it increased by 27.9% between December 2000 and December 2002.
Along with the economic recovery, a series of changes in housing policy led to
a rapid rebound of the housing market. Before the crisis, the supply of capital to
the households was limited, and thus the lending between non-institutional private
citizens prevailed (?). However, as the Korea government asked the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) for stand-by loans, it agreed to implement drastic measures to
reform its economy and financial (including housing) policies. One of the noticeable
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changes is the housing finance market. The government privatised the Korea
Housing Bank (KHB), which had accounted for over 70% of new housing loans in
1995 and enacted new laws including the Asset-Backed Securitization Act in 1998
and laws for creating secondary mortgage cooperation in 1999 (Mortgage-Backed
Securitization Company Act).9 As a result, the mortgage markets become more
competitive, more diverse housing loan products have introduced, and housing loan
increased rapidly as a series of changes has enabled more people to access financial
markets (?).10
3.3 Empirical Strategy
3.3.1 An Empirical Model of Consumption Wealth and In-
come
In the literature on the causal effect of wealth on household consumption, a common
approach is regressing consumption growth on changes in wealth, with household
income as a control variable. For instance, ? regress the growth rate of total
household consumption expenditure on a vector of variables that include anticipated
and unanticipated growth in income and housing price, along with county-year
dummies and measurement errors. The focus is on the housing price on the average
household consumption.
In the consumption inequality literature, a common practice is to follow a two-
step procedure. The first step is to remove predictable components of consumption.
The second step is to estimate a model of components of the residual consumption
from the first step. For instance, in their first-step, ? (call it as BPP henceforth)
regress growth of household consumption on household demographic variables and
year dummies. The first-step removes the effect of the variables that affect the
average household consumption. The main object of the study is the variance of
residuals of consumption growth. In their second step, BPP decompose the residuals
of consumption growth into responses to permanent and transitory income shocks.
The two-steps of BPP can be reconciled with a lifecycle model of consumption
optimization. The first-step removes predictable preference shifters, and the second
step links innovations of consumption attributable to permanent and transitory
shocks in income. In the lifecycle model innovations in consumption depend on
9After introducing ABS laws, the securitization of mortgages has been permitted first in Korea.
10The total in loans outstanding of commercial and small banks to the household sector in
Korea was 29% in 1997 which recorded 47% in 2002.
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wealth shocks as well as income shocks. In the BPP second-step model wealth
shocks is implicitly included in an i.i.d. error term.
We follow the two-step approach of the consumption inequality literature. Our
first-step model divides consumption growth into three parts: predicted components,
wealth shocks and income shocks. The second-step model estimates innovations of
consumption attributable to income shocks. Our approach differs from the common
practice of the consumption inequality literature in that we focus on how proxies of
wealth correlate with the size of household income shocks and on how they affect
consumption responses to income shocks; and that we explicitly account for the
effect of wealth shocks in the first-step on consumption inequality.
∆Cit = α + γ∆ait︸ ︷︷ ︸
Wealth Changes
+δXit + τt + ϕitζit + ψitεit + ξit︸ ︷︷ ︸
Income Shocks: ∆cit
(3.1)
where Cit denotes log monthly consumption of household i at time t, and ait is
net-wealth which will be referred to “wealth" henceforth. γ captures the effect of
wealth change ∆ait on consumption growth. Xit is a set of observable demographic
covariates, which includes age, age-squared, occupation, size of household, number
of children, and educational attainment. τt denotes a full-set of year-month dummies
capturing all the unobserved factors that change aggregate consumption growth.
Following BPP, the residual of consumption growth ∆cit is decomposed into the
income shocks and the degree of transmission of income shocks to consumption. ζit
and εit are permanent and transitory income shocks, respectively. ϕit and ψit are
parameters measuring the transmission of permanent and transitory income shocks
to consumption growth, which are allowed to potentially vary over both i and t.
This implies that the magnitude of transmission of ζit and εit to consumption growth
can differ. In general, the closer the parameters to zero, the higher is the degree
of self-insurance against income risks.11 In models with self-insurance through
precautionary savings, ψit is typically smaller than ϕit because precautionary saving
can provide better self-insurance against transitory shocks. ξit is interpreted as the
innovation to higher moments of the income process and captures the innovation to
the consumption component that generates precautionary savings and is independent
to income.
11In the extreme cases of full insurance of income shocks, ϕit = 0 and ψit = 0, income shocks
do not cause any changes in consumption growth. Also, under the case of no insurance (i.e.
ϕit = ψit = 1 ), income shocks have a one-to-one effect on consumption growth.
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We assume that the permanent and transitory components of stochastic income
evolve by the following processes:
yit = Pit + vit (3.2)
Pit = Pit−1 + ζit, E(ζit) = 0, var(ζit) = σ2ζit (3.3)
vit = εit + θεit−1, E(εit) = 0, var(εit) = σ2εit , (3.4)
where yit is the stochastic component of income and is assumed to be decomposed
into two components that differ in terms of statistical and stochastic properties: a
permanent component Pit and a transitory component vit.12 Pit and vit evolve as a
random walk and MA(1) process, respectively. We assume that ζit and εit are i.i.d.,
and the variance of permanent and transitory shock in each period is potentially
allowed to vary over both i and t.
We proceed by estimating equation (3.1) in two steps. The first step is to obtain
consistent estimates of γ. As the equation is specified in the first differences, it
cancels out any unobserved heterogeneity that is constant over time. However,
empirical challenges still remain in the estimation of equation (3.1), and thus
the interpretation of γ as wealth effect which captures the causal effect of exoge-
nous wealth changes on the changes in consumption would be problematic. First,
changes in wealth are driven by both markets induced price changes and households’
consumption-portfolio choices. Because the portfolio selection reflects endogenous
optimization of households, γ obtained by regressing ∆Cit on ∆ait would be incon-
sistent if we do not hold portfolio selection fixed.13 Second, there is a possibility
that common macro-factors can cause changes in household consumption and asset
prices at the same time (??), so γ would not indicate the causal effect of wealth
changes on consumption growth but simply reflect spurious associations. Finally,
measurement errors for wealth are commonly found and result in attenuation bias.
Moreover, in the presence of measurement error, biases would be more severe in the
case of first difference estimates. In order to handle these empirical challenges, we
construct the market-driven housing wealth shock which exploits the differential
impact of housing price changes on the household with different amount of wealth
held in the form of a house.
12yit is derived by running a regression of the log household income for a household i in period t
on a set of covariates which include age, squared-age, education, interactions of age and education,
household size, number of children, and a full set of month-year dummies and get residuals. Thus,
yit, log of real income net of its predictable components,is affected by idiosyncratic shocks.
13? point out that changes in wealth are divided into two parts: changes in the price of assets
and portfolio selection. The asset price changes are exogenous, however, portfolio choices are
endogenous.
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In the second step, we follow BPP and connect consumption insurance with
income shocks. BPP use the predicted residual from the first step estimation and
decompose it to identify the differential degree of consumption insurance with respect
to the permanent and transitory income shocks. Thus, two different coefficients
of consumption insurance can be interpreted as the factor loading measuring the
sensitivity of income shocks to consumption growth. However, we allow more
heterogeneity than BPP. As many studies address that household assets and savings
can be used to manage shocks and insure themselves against shocks (???), we allow
the households’ ability to smooth consumption over income fluctuation to vary with
lagged wealth shocks, house ownership and time.
3.3.2 Estimating the Effect of Housing Wealth Shocks on
Consumption
This subsection introduces our empirical specification of estimating the wealth effect
and explains how to control the potential threat associated with the use of ∆ait.
The wealth effect that most of the literature attempt to capture is the changes in
consumption with respect to the exogenous changes in wealth. However, some parts
of ∆ait are driven by exogenous market price changes, holding portfolio constant,
and the remainders are caused by endogenous portfolio changes, holding the price
of assets fixed. Thus, the use of coefficient on ∆ait in equation (3.1) does not imply
the effect of exogenous wealth changes on consumption growth and would be biased.
In order to attack the challenges mentioned above, we construct the market-induced
wealth shock. In particular, we focus on households’ assets held in the form of
house and housing price changes. Because housing assets take a dominant position
in households’ wealth, the changes in house price can cause important differential
effects on homeowners and non-homeowners.
One concern is that the changes in house price not only just have an effect on
housing wealth but also have a similar magnitude of effects on other forms of assets.
For instance, house market collapse may have negative effects on the economy,
and therefore, it affects not only consumption but also both non-homeowners’ and
homeowners’ overall asset holdings. However, the comparison of changes in asset
holdings between homeowner and non-homeowner households with respect to house
price show the differential effects. Figure 3.2 compares the nationwide house price
index with average changes in net-wealth for homeowners and non-homeowners. The
homeowners’ asset holdings followed up the changes in house price. In particular,
their wealth continued to fall for a period of time after the beginning of the crisis.
However, non-homeowner households’ wealth continued to recover shortly after the
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huge decline caused by the crisis. Also, the increase in their asset holdings after
the crisis was relatively limited. This supports that although some parts of the
variation might be driven by macro factors, the wealth dynamics hugely depends
on whether she owns a house or not, and thus housing wealth is suitable to capture
the differential effect of changes in house price.
Constructed wealth shock: The constructed wealth shock ZHit is expressed











× ∆pHt , (3.5)
where aHit−1 is lagged value of total housing wealth held by household i, and ∆HPtHPt−1 is
the percentage change in the Nationwide Housing Price index between the current
and previous month approximated by the log difference of the index ∆pHt .14 Wit−1
is a household i’s time t− 1 amount of lifetime wealth which is consisted of period
t − 1 net-asset holdings and the present value of expected future income. The
detailed information on Wit is explained in Appendix C.1.
The use of ZHit instead of ∆ait has several advantages. First, as the wealth change
driven by housing markets holds the amount of housing asset fixed at t−1, this allows
to separate out the response of consumption caused by households’ endogenous
portfolio choice and exclude possible correlation with unobserved factors such as
changes in borrowing conditions that also affect consumption growth between the
corresponding two periods. Second, the nationwide housing market fluctuation is
exogenous for each household, and thus the multiplication of ∆pHt by aHit−1 alleviates
the concern about endogeneity between consumption growth and wealth changes.
Third, as aHit−1 × ∆pHt is scaled by Wit−1, this rescaling makes it possible to consider
the heterogeneity of initial wealth level across households.15 Thus, the constructed
wealth shock depends not only on the absolute magnitude of the impact itself
but also on the relative size of the wealth level that an individual holds. Fourth,
errors in measuring wealth can be an important source of bias and may lead to
underestimation of the true impact of changes in asset holdings (??). In this respect,
14Our measure of wealth shock is inline with ?. In order to estimate the causal effect of wealth
on health, he suggests stock market driven wealth shock constructed by multiplying the lagged
fraction of lifetime wealth held in stocks by percent changes in the S&P 500 stock market index.
15For instance, a $10,000 loss might be extremely painful for the poor, however, it has a negligible
effect on the choice of the very rich. Moreover, what matter is the expectation that she can earn
in the future rather than the amount that she currently possesses at the time of the incident. If
she earns a high income and is expected to stay in the labor force for many years in the future,
current wealth loss can be sufficiently offset by the expected flow of income (?).
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the use of constructed housing wealth shock alleviates the problem. ZHit does not
rely on reported wealth changes but uses the level and average price changes, so
it alleviates the bias toward zero. Finally, an additional advantage of rescaling by
lifetime wealth instead of current wealth is that lifetime wealth has fewer zeros or
negative values, which have to be excluded from the analysis.
Because the magnitude of wealth changes depends on not just the amount of
asset holdings but lifetime wealth level, if an individual holds 50% of lifetime wealth
in the form of housing wealth at period t− 1, 10% increase in the house price index
results in the incidence of 5% positive constructed wealth shock at period t. Figure
3.1 shows the monthly average size of the constructed wealth shock conditional on
home-ownership.
Estimating the wealth effect: In order to estimate the causal response of
consumption to exogenous wealth changes, we propose and investigate an empirical
specification, which regresses consumption growth on the housing market driven
wealth shock:
∆Cit = α + γZHit + λDHit−1 + δXit + τt + ∆cit, (3.6)
where γ measures the effect of the constructed wealth shock on consumption growth.
DHit−1 denotes lagged home-ownership dummy, which has the value one if a household
i owns a house in time t − 1 and the value zero, otherwise. τ is a year-month
dummy, which controls for possible variations driven by macro-factors.16
Our empirical model controls for DHit−1. Although households take the changes in
housing price as random shocks, home-ownership depends on a series of demographic
and economic factors (?). As households with higher wealth, larger family members,
and a higher level of education are more likely to own a house, factors related to
house ownership might be correlated not only with the amount of consumption
but also with consumption profile over the life-cycle. Therefore, the use of first
difference log-transformed consumption can separate out unobserved heterogeneity
which does not vary over time, however, it would be insufficient to cancel out
potential endogeneity. Thus, we control DHit−1, and this allows for estimating the
effect of housing market shocks on consumption growth controlling for the factors
associated with home-ownership.
The estimation of the effect of housing price shocks on consumption growth is
implemented mainly by Ordinary Least Square (OLS). We cluster the standard
16? show that the correlation between consumption and house price is mainly driven by common
factors which have an influence on these two variables at the same time.
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errors at the level of the household which allows having standard errors that
are asymptotically robust to both heteroscedasticity and serial-correlation within
households and over time.
Robustness check: We have performed a large number of sensitivity analyses.
Our results are robust to various changes in the model specifications.
First, we even specify the model in first differences and newly construct the wealth
shock, however, we may be concerned that there remains unobserved household-level
heterogeneity that affects both ∆Cit and ZHit simultaneously. Thus, equation (3.6)
is estimated by fixed-effects estimation. Second, for capturing possible heterogeneity
in consumption response to changes in house price for households with different
amount of lifetime wealth in the form of housing wealth, Dit−1 is replaced by
aHit−1/Wit−1. Third, we examine the potential changes in the relation between ∆Cit
and ZHit if ZHit is not scaled by lifetime wealth. Fourth, households can expect
capital gains not only from owning a house but also from stock holdings. Thus,
we additionally construct the wealth shock driven by the stock market ZEit and
run equation (3.6) together with ZEit . Finally, we include leads and lags of ZHit and
check the significance of coefficients on these additional variables. The idea is that
households do not respond to future shocks if the wealth shocks are unanticipated.
Also, if the coefficient on the past wealth shocks is highly significant, these support
the possibility that the wealth shocks have an effect on consumption growth through
diverse channels.
The first two robustness checks are provided with main estimation results. The
other three results are summarized in Appendix C.2. Also, we investigate the
changes in wealth effects caused by the use of different frequency of data sets.
One of the advantages of our data set is that it provides households’ detailed
high-frequency information. If households’ consumption and portfolio choices are
made at higher-frequency, the estimation results would suffer from aggregation bias
when the data are aggregated into different intervals. Thus, we use quarterly and
semi-annually data aggregation intervals and estimate causal effects, respectively.
The results are also summarized in Appendix C.2.
Anticipated and unanticipated wealth shocks: The nationwide housing mar-
ket fluctuation is exogenous for each household and would be largely unanticipated.
However, the housing market is closely connected with various factors such as
business cycle, supply of housing, relative returns of other assets, and real-estate
policy, so house price would not be determined in a random manner but partly
anticipated using available information. As it is pointed out by ?, the underlying
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mechanism of how housing price changes affect the consumption path is different
for anticipated and unanticipated ones.17 Thus, in order to examine the possible
differential response of consumption, we decompose the house price changes into
anticipated ZH−expit and unanticipated Z
H−unexp
it changes.
If households are forward-looking, consumption would not be adjusted at the
time of changes in house price and is responding to the time when such a change
is anticipated. Thus, they only adjust their consumption if the changes in house
price are unanticipated. On the other hand, even if people are forward-looking, the
anticipated changes in house price affect consumption if they are facing binding
borrowing constraint or capital markets are imperfect. This is because, under the
binding credit constraint, the rise in house price causes changes in individuals’
behavior only if the capital gains are realized or can be used as collateral to increase
borrowing capacity. Also, the response of anticipated house price changes on
consumption can be explained by various channels such as a precautionary motive
for savings or myopic rather than forward-looking behavior.
In order to distinguish the differential effects of anticipated and unanticipated
changes in house price on consumption growth, it is assumed that households form
expectations about their housing wealth using the patterns of growth and decline of
past changes in the Nationwide House Price Index. Thus, we use the Autoregressive
Integrated Moving Average (ARIMA) model for the house price index.18 An
ARIMA model is a statistical model applied to estimate the temporal dynamics
of single times series and is consisted of three components: an autoregressive
(AR), an integration (I), and a moving average (MA) component. Based on
diagnostic tests of autocorrelation (AC) and partial-autocorrelation (PAC) graphs,
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and Schwarz Criterion (SC), we specify that
ARIMA(1,1,1) is the appropriate model to break down the overall house price into
expected Et−1(∆pHt ) and unexpected θHt changes.19 Households’ expectation on the
house price change is formed by the differences between fitted and previous period
log price (Et−1(∆pHt ) = p̂Ht − pHt−1), and the unexpected innovation is expressed by
the differences between the realised house price changes in period t and expected
changes formed at t− 1 (θ̂Ht = ∆pHt − Et−1(∆pHt )).
17? document that if individuals are forward-looking and do not face credit constraints,
consumption just responds to unanticipated wealth changes. If households react to anticipated
house price changes, they would be myopic or facing binding credit constraints.
18? also distinguish between expected and unexpected changes in house price. However, they use
the housing prices at the municipal level and choose AR(1) model with average house characteristics
observed in the municipality.
19The augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test with drift shows that the null hypothesis of unit-root
in house price index cannot be rejected even at 10% significance level, however, the ADF test
result of its first-order difference reject the hypothesis.
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The results from the ARIMA model are summarized in table 3.1. Using the
estimates of anticipated and unanticipated house price changes, the constructed
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3.3.3 Estimating the Transmission of Income Shocks to
Consumption
In this second step, we use the predicted residuals from the first step and investigate
the role of housing wealth and the link between income and consumption inequality.
We extend BPP by introducing more flexible specification. We allow household
heterogeneity driven by wealth held in the form of housing wealth to have an
effect on consumption inequality. It is assumed that the evolution of the degree
of consumption insurance and the variance of income shocks can vary over the
previous period house-ownership, lagged wealth shock, and time. Thus, households,
which have different exposure to house price shock, respond to the changes driven
by the housing market differently.
Our parametric specification of the variance of income shocks, degree of trans-
mission of income shocks to consumption and innovation driven by intrinsic factors
of consumption is expressed by:
σ2ζit =π
ζ











it−1 + πε3DHit−1 + πε4t̃+ πε5I{t≥Jan.1998} + πε6t̃× I{t≥Jan.1998} (3.9)






4 t̃+ πϕ5 I{t≥Jan.1998} + πϕ6 t̃× I{t≥Jan.1998}
(3.10)














× ∆pHt−1 denotes the lagged constructed wealth shock.
In order to reflect possible structural changes caused by the financial crisis, the
Regression Discontinuity (RD) design is used for our empirical specification.20 One
20? documents that causal inferences from RD designs are potentially more credible than those
from typical Difference-In-Difference or instrument variable approaches.
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of the advantages of using RD design is that it allows for pooling the separate
regression on the cut-off point period, so it is simple and parsimonious (?). We
set a cut-off point as of January 1998 (i.e. t = 49). The cut-off point is chosen to
reflect the characteristics of our data set consisted of two panels (before-crisis and
after-crisis periods) and possible structural changes caused by the crisis. t̃ is a linear
time trend, which is normalized by subtracting 49 and dividing 10 (t̃ = t−4910 , where
t = 1 if the period of time is January 1994, t = 49 if the period of time is January
1998, and t = 108 if t=December 2002). I{t≥Jan.1998} is an indicator function, which
has the value one for the observations collected after the crisis period (i.e. in or
after January 1998) and has the value zero for the before-crisis observations. We
also introduce the interaction term between I{t≥Jan.1998} and normalized time trend
term t̃ for capturing differences in regression intercept and slope.
Identification of model parameters: The model is identified by imposing
covariance restrictions on the process of income and consumption growth. The
identification of the idiosyncratic income components and their impacts on con-
sumption follows the discussion in BPP. However, as we introduce more flexibility in
the model structure and reflect heterogeneity across households, we use additional
moment conditions for getting more precise parameters.
With the assumption on the transitory income shock process (MA(q)) and degree
of insurance which just differ between permanent and transitory income shocks,
BPP show that income data alone are able to identify the variance of permanent
and transitory income shocks. Also, although consumption growth consists of
income shocks and consumption insurance, the joint use of household income and
consumption data allows for identifying the ability to insure against income shocks.
However, as our model allows the income shocks and consumption insurance to
depend on variables varying over both i and t, these impose difficulties in empirically
estimating the parameters, which govern the ability to insure consumption as well as
income shocks precisely. Because the variance and covariances of consumption and
income growth just provide the average of income shock variance, these averaging
out procedure would result in significant loss of household heterogeneity, and the
interaction between the income shocks and degree of insurance causes additional
difficulties for parameter identification. Thus, we add the average marginal effects
of each time-varying individual covariates in the income shocks and consumption
insurance as additional moment conditions. The detail of the moment conditions
that we use is presented in Appendix C.3.
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Estimation methodology: In order to estimate the vector of unknown data-
generating parameters of income shocks and the magnitude of self-insurance in
equation (3.8)-(3.12), the Method of Simulated Moment (MSM) strategy is employed.
We first stack on the moment conditions explained in Appendix C.3 for the first





























j ∈ {e, c} (3.13)
where Xmit−s is a vector of household specific variables which govern the income
process and consumption insurance. me and mc denote empirical and model based
constructed moment conditions, respectively. l = 1 (l = 2) if the data come from
the first (second) panel.
After then, we choose a vector of parameters β, which minimizes the weighted
distance between me and mc:
minβ [me −mc(β)]′ Λ [me −mc(β)] , (3.14)
where Λ is a weighting matrix, and the elements in the main diagonal of inverse of
V are used as Λ (Λ = diag(V −1)). V denotes the variance-covariance matrix of me.
In order to get standard errors of MSM estimator, we compute standard errors
by:
v̂ar(β̂) = (M ′ΛM)−1 M ′ΛV ΛM (M ′ΛM)−1 , (3.15)
where M measures the sensitivity of the moments to small changes of unknown
parameter values (M = ∂mc/∂β|β=β̂).
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3.4 Data
3.4.1 Family Income and Expenditure Survey
Our data set is the Family Income and Expenditure Survey in urban areas of
Korea from 1994 to 2002. The survey is the representative consumption survey in
Korea which is continuously conducted by Statistics Korea since 1963.21 Although
the survey began in 1963, household-level data have been available only since
1982. It adopts a stratified multi-stage sampling method and surveys around 5,000
households. The data represent Korean households, however, it does not collects
household information which resides in rural areas and excludes fishermen, farmers,
and one-person household. Households are requested to fill in the family account
book with daily income and expenditures, and this information is input directly by
the households. Each household’s recorded daily diary is complied on a monthly
basis.
The Korean household data have a number of useful features and allow us to
overcome several empirical challenges facing other household survey data such as
the CEX or PSID. Each household is covered over 12 to 60 months, so our sample
consists of two panels, which cover before the crisis (January 1994 - December 1997)
and after the crisis (January 1998 - December 2002) periods. Also, the data set
has long monthly panels, so it provides detailed high-frequency information.22 The
high-frequency nature of the panel is important in our context because data at
annual frequency are likely to suffer from aggregation bias if consumption decisions
are made at a higher frequency.
In particular, it contains rich information on household consumption and income
of main household members. The consumption expenditure data contain detailed
categories, not just food consumption, and durable consumption expenditure is
also available. For instance, the data used in BPP are synthetic panel data by
combing the PSID that contains income and food expenditure, and CEX that
contains expenditures on non-durables but lack of reliable income variables. They
impute household consumption of the PSID households from their expenditure
on food and the pattern of household non-durable expenditures from CEX. The
imputation errors can cause bias in the estimation of the variance of transitory
components. And if the imputation errors are correlated with the income growth of
the past, current, and future, then they also lead to bias in the estimation of partial
21The data have been widely used by researchers and policy-makers which result in a diverse
range of publications (??????).
22Between 1968 and 1997, PSID conducted an interview every year. Since then, interviews have
been biennial.
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insurance parameters. Moreover, as the sample period covered the Asian financial
crisis, it allows us to examine the relation between the changes in household wealth
and consumption growth and households’ consumption response to income driven
shocks.
Sample selection: The head of household is defined as a person who represents
the household substantially and is responsible for the living. Based on the definition,
we start with 10,481 households and 301,692 household-month observations. In
order to avoid abrupt drastic changes in the composition of households, a household
and its entire observations are dropped from the sample if it cannot satisfy any of
the following two criteria: (1) a household (HH) experiences changes in the head of
household across the period, and (2) a HH head’s age is under 25 or older than 60.
These reduce the number of households and observations in the sample to 8,087
and 215,895, respectively.23 After then, we do not use 4,193 monthly observations
(4 households) whose income is higher than the top 1% and lower than the bottom
1%. Finally, we additionally exclude income outliers’ 6,007 monthly observations
whose monthly real income growth rate is greater than 500% or less than -80%.
The final sample is composed of 209,888 monthly observations and 8,083 households
(see table 3.2).24
Definition of consumption and income: We use categories to construct con-
sumption and income measures as close as possible to the ones used by ?. This study
defines consumption as non-durable expenditure which is collected by households
recording a diary of expenditure. Our measure of consumption spending includes
the sum of food (both at home and out of home), alcohol, tobacco, public and
private transportation, personal care, entertainment and expenditure on housing
and utilities such as water, sewage, service, and heating fuels. With regard to
income, we first derive taxable family income, which is composed of household
labor income (include salary and bonus), business income, income from financial
assets (the sum of interest, dividend, rent, and other property earnings), and public
transfer excluding tax refund.25 In order to derive the measure of income used in
23As the data do not provide information about identifying each member in the family if a
household head’s age does not increase by up to one year in each month (i.e. ∆Ageit < 0 or
∆Ageit > 1) or a HH head’s gender varies across time, the household is regarded as experiencing
changes in the head of household and excluded from the sample.
2497,424 monthly observations and 4,022 households belong to the period before 1998, and
112,464 observations and 4,061 households belong to the period after-crisis.
25In Korea, transfer income in the data includes yearly tax refund. Considering the fact that
97% of transfer occurs in February, March, or April., and these correspond to the period when
government pay income tax refund. Many people in Korea regard this tax refund as a kind of
3.4 Data 137
this study, we exclude both incomes from financial assets and taxes on labor and
business income. Also, all the monetary variables are deflated by the monthly CPI
of December 2000.
3.4.2 Measuring Household Wealth
Family Income and Expenditure Survey provides rich detail of information on
financial flows of households, however, one of the limitations is that we cannot
observe the amount of wealth directly. Thus, we follow ? and construct the
household wealth using the information of account-level data on a diverse kind of
asset holdings as well as its transactions. The following equation decomposes the
changes in wealth into two parts: portfolio selection and price changes (or capital
gains).


















Akit−1(pkt − pkt−1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Price Changes
where Ait and pt denote a vector of household i’s period t net-assets and their
prices consisted of k different types of assets. The first term in the second line of
equation (3.16) is changes in wealth due to portfolio selection, and the second term
is wealth changes caused by price change, holding portfolio constant. These imply
that we directly use the financial instrument and real-estate transactions to derive
household wealth, and its changes come from investment choice and asset price
movements. For notational simplicity, let akit = pktAkit and ait = ptAit henceforth.
Portfolio selection: The portfolio selection records all types of household-level
asset transactions, inflows as well as outflows and is measured by the sum of new
asset purchases and loan repayments less sales of assets and new-loans. Purchase of
assets consists of the increase in bank deposits, paying deposits into the instalment
savings plan, payment of saving insurance plan premium, mutual fund purchase,
purchasing securities, real-estate, or precious metal, deposit payment, and all other
purchases of assets. Loan repayments include all types of principal repayment in
bonus, so even public service broadcasts and news-papers call this tax refund as the 13th income
(because individuals receive salary every month (12 months), the regular tax refund is regarded as
one kind of income). In order to relieve the distortion caused by the tax refund, it is assumed
that an equal amount of tax refund is given every month.
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addition to the refund of the housing deposit. Sales of assets record the withdrawal
of savings, amount of insurance claim, private or retirement pension payments, sales
of equity, deposit reclaim, real-estate sales, and sales of all other forms of assets.
Finally, the new loans include all forms of loans regardless of their purpose.26
Capital gain: We divide household wealth ait into five main categories: housing
wealth aHit , housing deposits aHDit , savings aSit, equity aEit , and all other k− 4 types of
assets ∑k ̸=H,HD,S,E akit. If all components in equation (3.16) are observed, the capital
gains can be computed directly from data. However, due to the data limitation on
the availability of variables, the following assumptions are imposed to measure the
amount of assets held by each household: 1. House owners and equity holders expect
capital gains from living at their own house AHit−1(pHt − pHit−1) and equity holdings
AEit−1(pEt − pEit−1), however, the other types of asset holders cannot expect benefits
from changes in the price of their asset holdings (i.e. ∑k ̸=H,E Akit−1(pkt − pkt−1) = 0),
and 2. Price changes are approximated using aggregated index growth (Nationwide
House Price Index and Korea Composite Stock Price Index (KOSPI)).27 Following




pkt (Akit − Akit−1) + AHit−1(pHt − pHt−1) + AEit−1(pEt − pEt−1) =
∑
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Level of initial wealth: Although we need to capture the exposure to financial
and real-estate market fluctuations, the data set does not provide the amount of
asset holdings and liabilities except for the housing deposit. Once we get the initial
level of wealth and its components, however, it is possible to derive the amount
of wealth after the initial period consecutively. Following the categorization of
26For instance, if an individual took out a loan of one million dollars from a bank and used it to
buy a house at period t. At time t+ 1, his real-estate price had risen by 100%, and he paid 0.1M
in mortgage interest by selling his equity. These transactions are recorded as follows: In time t,
the new loans and asset purchases increased by $1.0M, respectively, so these transactions did not
cause the changes in the amount of net-assets but caused the changes in the composition of asset
holdings. In time t+ 1, the sales of assets increased by 0.1M, and capital gain was 1.0M. This
implies that interest payments are not directly recorded as a transaction of assets but indirectly
captured by a decrease in asset holdings to finance mortgage interest. In the end, his net-asset
holdings eventually increased by $0.9M at the end of time t+ 1.
27As the money value of debts remains unchanged across two adjacent periods, capital gains on
housing wealth and equity result not from net-assets, but from the corresponding total amount



















where the bold A{·}it and D
{·}
it denote total amount of asset holdings and corresponding debts,
respectively).
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In order to construct the initial period wealth, we use each household’s first
observation of monthly income from corresponding assets as well as interest payments
on liabilities and divide these variables by pre-crisis period monthly real interest
rates r set as 0.693%.28,29 In particular, the initial period housing total wealth aHi0
is approximated by dividing the imputed real monthly rent which a house owner
needs to pay for living in his own house or similar property by monthly r. With
regard to the initial period total housing deposit aHDi0 , South Korea has a unique
housing rent system called ‘Jeonse’. Instead of paying monthly rent, a renter using
the Jeonse system makes a lump-sum deposit to the house owner, and the amount is
usually 50%-90% of the market value of the house. Also, the renter gets the housing
deposit back at the contract termination date. Thus, if a household is living in a
Jeonse rented house, its housing deposit is needed to be regarded as a component of
the renter’s wealth, and we regard the initial observation of Jeonse renter’s housing
deposit as the amount of housing deposit.30,31
Validity of household wealth construction results: Figure 3.3 and table 3.3
show the wealth construction results. The figure compares the constructed total
housing wealth with the Nationwide House Price Index. The constructed housing
wealth appropriately captures changes in the actual house price. With regard to
28The nominal interest rate is set by using 3-month or 90-day rates of Certificates of Deposit
for the Republic of Korea" provided by FRB of St. Louis (FRED) and adjusted by the consumer
price index. After then, monthly r is derived by averaging it between 1994-1997.
29As interest from savings and dividends are usually paid based on a specific time period, we use
the average of each household’s observed first-year interest income and dividends scaled by monthly





measured using asset income excluding interest income and dividend.
3059% and 28% of observations in our sample are their own house and use ‘Jeonse’, respectively.
10% are paying monthly rent. The remainder of the households is living in either a company
house (1%) or a free house (2%).
31It could be possible that a person owns a house and rents out his house at the same time.
This case implies that she rents a house from another person and puts down a housing deposit.
However, just 0.02% of observations in the sample have a positive housing deposit and own house
simultaneously. Moreover, if a house owner rents out a house and uses the housing deposit that
she receives from the renter as the deposit for renting another house to live in, it would be difficult
to separate out the individual’s actual amount of wealth. Thus, it is assumed that a household’s
housing wealth is equal to imputed housing rent divided by r if it owns a house, and aHit has the
value zero, otherwise. In the case of a housing deposit, the reported housing deposit is regarded
as aHDit only if the household reports that it rents a house using Jeonse system.
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the table, the first column summarizes the composition of household total asset
holdings in our sample, and the second column shows the share of corresponding
asset components from the Korean Household Panel Study (KHPS).32 Although
households in the sample hold a relatively higher proportion of their assets in the
form of housing wealth and have a relatively smaller share of financial assets, our
sample well reflects overall patterns in asset holdings of Korean households.
3.5 Estimation Results
3.5.1 Predictive Power of Constructed Wealth Shock
Before we estimate the effect of the constructed wealth shock on consumption
growth, we first explore whether our constructed wealth shock is an appropriate
measure to predict the changes in actual scaled wealth. Thus, this subsection
examines the relationship between the constructed wealth shock and actual scaled
wealth change expressed by equation (3.19):
∆ait
Wit−1
= β0 + β1ZHit + β2
ait−1
Wit−1
+ πXit + νit (3.19)
where Xit includes the same control variables used in our main empirical strategy
and a full set of month-year dummies.
Table 3.4 summarizes the predictive power of our constructed wealth shock.
All specifications control the same Xit. The results show that regardless of model
specification, the constructed wealth shock has a high predictive power to explain
the changes in the amount of net-asset holdings. Column 1 shows that the regression
yields a strongly positive effect of constructed wealth shock on the changes in the
actual amount of net-asset holding, and the coefficient is statistically significant at
1% level. The estimated coefficient implies that the constructed positive wealth
shock of 10% is associated with changes in ∆ait
Wit−1
by 9.3%. Looking more closely,
because the average value of representative owner-occupiers’ housing wealth accounts
for 23.7% of their lifetime wealth, a 10% increase in the nationwide house price
inflation is associated with 2.2% increase in their scaled wealth.33 The results in
column 2 use the same covariates as column 1, however, the coefficients are gained
from fixed effect estimation. The regression also yields a highly significant coefficient
of about 0.945.
32Although the major interest of this section is focused on the construction of net-assets, table
3.3 reports the total amount of asset-holdings for the purpose of examining the validity of the
method that we adopt.
332.20% = 23.74% × 10% × 0.925
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In column 3, the constructed wealth shock is substituted by a lagged dummy for
house ownership multiplied by the growth of the house price index, DHit−1 ×∆pHt .
Also, in order to control for the effect of changes in housing wealth through a more
flexible way, the house price index growth rate ∆pHt is additionally controlled. The
estimated coefficient on DHit−1 ×∆pHt is 0.224, and thus the magnitude of the effect of
housing price change under specification (3) is equivalent to that under specification
(1). Also, the coefficient on ∆pHt is small in magnitude and statistically insignificant.
This implies that if a household does not own a house, the nationwide housing
price change just has a limited effect on the wealth of non-homeowners. Column
4 introduces two dummies for capturing the possible changes in the magnitude
of the wealth shock on ∆ait/Wit−1 before and after the crisis periods. Before the
crisis, the positive effect of constructed wealth shock on net-wealth is 0.880, and
the magnitude of the effect becomes 0.927 after the crisis. Also, the explanatory
power of the scaled amount of lagged wealth is small and insignificant in all four
specifications.
3.5.2 Effect of Housing Market Shocks on Consumption
One of the major interests in this study is how sensitive consumption growth is to
the market-induced wealth shock, and whether the anticipated and unanticipated
wealth shock have a different consumption impact when we control for standard
control variables. The estimation result is summarized in table 3.5. The first
column regresses consumption growth on constructed wealth shock via OLS. Due
to the possible endogeneity, we also control for DHit−1. Instead of controlling DHit−1,





. In order to reflect potential heterogeneity across households, column
3 estimate the parameters by the fixed-effect method. Column 4 divides ZHit into
ZH−expit and Z
H−unexp
it , and these effects are estimated by OLS.
The housing wealth effect in empirical literature has a wide range of values. In
this study, regardless of specifications, the regressions in column 1-3 of the table
yield a positive wealth effect. The estimated coefficients are ranging between 1.886
and 2.453 and all statistically significant at 1% level. In column 1, the estimated
effect of constructed wealth shock on consumption growth is 1.886. Column 2
shows that replacing DHit−1 with
ait−1
Wit−1
does not cause large changes in the estimated
magnitude of wealth effects. A positive 1% wealth shock is associated with 1.95%
consumption growth. The fixed effect regression results are reported in column 3
and show that the magnitude of the effect of ZHit on consumption growth is greater
than that of OLS estimation.
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because the constructed wealth shock depends not only on changes
in the house price but also on scaled housing wealth. During the sample period,
the average of scaled housing wealth and non-durable monthly consumption was
0.24 and $848 (0.93 million KRW), respectively.34 Thus, a 1% increase in the
nationwide house price index leads to a rise in monthly consumption by $3.80,
which is equivalent to 0.45% of the non-durable consumption.35 In particular, the
average of conditional constructed lagged wealth shock of people who own a house
records the lowest of -0.62% (∆pMarch 1998 = −2.83% and average of conditional
scaled lagged housing wealth = 0.219) in March 1998, and thus the wealth shock in
March 1998 causes a decrease in consumption by 1.165%.
Relative to existing empirical studies, our wealth effect estimate is neither
exceptionally low nor high and comparable with other studies such as ? and ?.
Unlike our study, these two papers regress the first difference of log consumption
on that of log house price, so our real wealth effect is needed to be multiplied




for the sake of comparability. ? find that the
estimated coefficient for the U.K. is between 0.651 and 1.705 depending on whether
the model controls the interaction of cohort and home-ownership dummies. In
all specifications, their estimated coefficients on changes in regional house price
are significant at 1%, and comparing it with our estimated magnitude ranging
between 0.448 and 0.582, the effect is about 1.12-3.81 times larger.36,37 ? find that
the estimated wealth effect is 0.08 for Denmark, which is much smaller than our
estimates.38
Column 4 shows the estimation result of splitting the constructed wealth shock
into anticipated and unanticipated parts. The response of consumption to antici-
pated and unanticipated changes in housing wealth is 1.599 and 2.646, respectively.
These coefficients are statistically significant at 1% level and indicate that household
sensitively responds not only to the unanticipated but also anticipated changes in
housing price. The effect of a 1% positive increase in anticipated and unanticipated
34One U.S. dollar is equivalent to about 1,100 KRW.
35If we assume that a 1% increase in house price occurs in the first month of a given year,
and there are no more house price changes in the remaining months, then a one-time increase
in housing wealth causes an increase in annual consumption by $45.5 which is smaller than the
amount of increase in consumption by $94.5 suggested by ?.
36Using the coefficient on ZHit under the specification (1), 0.448 is derived by multiplying the





37? use data from a time-series of cross-section, so the huge magnitude of wealth effect would
be partly caused by the data limitation.
38? document that due to endogeneity problems, the estimate cannot be directly interpreted as
a housing wealth effect.
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is associated with 0.38% and
0.63% changes in consumption. The results are corresponding to the hypothesis
of the collateral channel from housing wealth; an increase in anticipated housing
wealth change allows borrowing constrained home-owners to consume more through
loosening lending constraints.
The estimated anticipated and unanticipated wealth effect in this study is
larger than previous studies such as ??. ? use the Italian Survey of Household
Income and Wealth and report that the estimated coefficients on both anticipated
and unanticipated changes in housing wealth are positive and significant. The
consumption sensitively reacts to anticipated housing wealth gain comparable to
wealth shock driven by unanticipated house price. They report that a 1% increase
in anticipated and unanticipated housing wealth is associated with 0.034% and
0.030% changes in consumption growth. (?) report that the estimated coefficients
on anticipated and unanticipated house price shock are 0.022 and 0.003, respectively.
However, these coefficients are not significant.
3.5.3 Estimation of Consumption Insurance
This subsection focuses on the degree of permanent ϕit and transitory ψit con-
sumption insurance with respect to the corresponding income shocks, and the
way that consumption insurance and income shocks are influenced by changes
in households’ wealth held in the form of house. To do this, we present three
empirical specifications for capturing the degree of transmission of income shocks to
consumption. The specification that controls the effect of constructed lagged wealth
shock ZH−previt−1 , lagged house ownership DHit−1, time-related variables (after-crisis
dummy I{t≥Jan.1998}, normalized linear time trend t̃ and interaction between t̃ and
I{t≥Jan.1998}), and household head’s age Ageit serves as the baseline.39 For the
purpose of checking the robustness of the estimation result, we additionally investi-
gate two alternative specifications. The Second model specification is equivalent
to the baseline except for controlling ZH−cumulit−1 defined by the multiplication of
lagged scaled housing wealth by three-month cumulative house price change between
t− 1 and t− 4 instead of ZH−previt−1 . This alternative specification is introduced for
capturing possible delayed response driven by house price changes. In order to
check the robustness of our baseline results, the third specification just controls
both time-related variables and DHit−1.
39Each household head’s age is controlled for reflecting possible changes in the ability to smooth
consumption with respect to shocks of different durability at different stages of lifetime.
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Table 3.6 reports the estimated parameters under three different specifications.
Panel 1 shows the estimation results under the baseline specification. Panel 2 and 3
report the estimates under the second and third model specification. Regardless of
model specifications, the table provides that there are considerable differences and
household heterogeneity in the ability to smooth consumption over both permanent
and transitory income fluctuation, and the degree of insurability significantly relies
on housing wealth. The estimated parameters on ZH−previt−1 (or ZH−cumulit−1 ) and DHit−1
of consumption insurance against permanent and transitory income shocks are
highly significant and imply that non-homeowner households have less ability to
self-insure even transitory income shocks. Panel 1 and 2 consistently report that an
increase in house price is associated with better ability to income fluctuation driven
by permanent component, and the coefficient is significantly different from zero. A
1% increase in the monthly and three-month cumulative house price is associated
with a decrease in the effect of the permanent income shock and can be translated
into movements in the consumption growth by -0.013 and -0.003, respectively.40
On the other hand, the effect of the wealth shock on ψ is limited. Although the
estimated coefficient on ZH−previt−1 of ψ under the baseline is positive and significant,
its magnitude is far smaller than that of the permanent one, and the sign of the
parameters is even changed and insignificant under the specification (2).
Panel 1 provides that the estimated parameters on DHit−1 of ϕ and ψ are -0.93
and -0.10, respectively. The estimated magnitude of corresponding estimates under
specification (2) is equivalent to the results under the baseline and consistently report
the positive relation between home-ownership and the ability to insure consumption
against income shocks. However, specification (3) overstates (understates) the
absolute magnitude of the effect of lagged house ownership on ϕ (ψ). With regard
to the possible structural changes, the baseline and specification (2) report that
around 20% more permanent shock to consumption is insurable after the crisis, and
the coefficient on I{t≥Jan.1998} is significant at 10% level. However, the coefficient on
the normalized linear time trend is not significant, and there is no clear evidence of
changes in the slope of time trend before and after the crisis (i.e. The coefficients
on t̃ and t̃× I{t≥Jan.1998} of ϕ and ψ are insignificant.). We also find that the ability
of insurance increases with age, however, the magnitude of the effect of Ageit on
ϕ is small and insignificant. This is consistent with previous literature such as ??
which do not support a significant age trend in ϕ.
Figure 3.4 shows the monthly average of estimated consumption insurance and
the variance of income shocks under the baseline model. Panel (a) of figure 3.4
shows that the estimated average transmission of permanent and transitory income
40−0.013 = −0.055 × 1% × 23.7% and −0.003 = −0.012 × 1% × 23.7%
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shocks to consumption growth corresponds to the argument of partial insurance
supported by ???.41 Also, the results are in accordance with a simple permanent
income hypothesis (PIH): only permanent income shocks induce substantial changes
in consumption, and transitory income shocks should not alter consumption much.
In other words, a simple PIH suggests that the effect of transitory shocks on
consumption is smoothed more than that of permanent ones, so ϕ should be greater
than ψ. Panel (b) provides the answer to the question of what is the main reasons for
the sudden hike and gradual decline in income inequality var(∆y) since it increased
greatly right after the crisis. The changes in the variance of income growth are
mainly driven by the sudden increase in transitory shocks, and the decrease in
permanent shocks also contributes to the decline in income shocks.
Row 1 in table 3.7 shows that the average estimated consumption insurance
against permanent shocks is 0.633, which is around 4.6 times greater than that
of ψ (0.136).42 These imply that 36.7% and 86.4% of permanent and transitory
shocks to consumption are insurable. The results are qualitatively inline with
previous studies. For instance, BPP find that the ability to insure consumption
against income risks in the U.S. is imperfect, and 35.8% and 94.7% of permanent
and transitory components of income shocks are insurable, respectively. ? choose
a lifecycle model and compare how the degree of consumption insurance in the
U.S. changes depending on borrowing constraint. Under the natural borrowing
constraint, around 22% and 94% of permanent and transitory components of income
shocks are insurable, however, the ability to insuring permanent and transitory
shocks decrease to 7% and 82% under zero borrowing condition.
Also, since the financial crisis, the ability to insure consumption against income
shocks has been improved. Before the crisis, the estimated average ϕ and ψ under
the baseline are 0.685 and 0.150, respectively. After then, these figures become
0.592 and 0.125. The results appropriately reflect the changes that occurred after
the financial crisis: the rapid rebound of the housing market after experiencing a
huge drop and the improvement in households’ access to financial markets after the
crisis. Moreover, row 2 and 3 of the table provide that the substitution of ZH−previt−1
by ZH−cumulit−1 or exclusion of Z
H−prev
it−1 and demographic factor (Ageit) do not change
the results much. These show the robustness of our results, and the use of different
model specification just marginally changes the size of estimated ϕ and ψ.
41i.e. The estimated consumption insurance with respect to permanent and transitory income
shocks is smaller than one.
42The average of estimated ϕ̂ is derived by ϕ̂ = 1NT Σ
T
t ΣNi ϕit, where N is the number of
households, and T is the number of months in the sample. The estimated average consumption
insurance with respect to transitory shock is 0.136.
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Figure 3.5 compares the actual variance, covariance, and auto-covariance of
income as well as consumption growth (dotted line) with their predicted values
(solid line) under the baseline specification.43 In general, the model well captures the
target moments that we use to estimate the parameters. The constructed moment
conditions properly replicate the changes in income and consumption fluctuation,
their covariance, and auto-covariance.
3.5.4 Implications on Consumption Inequality
In this subsection, we decompose the consumption growth unexplained by demo-
graphics to quantify the relative importance of the degree of consumption insurance,
income shocks, innovation to consumption, and unanticipated wealth shock in ex-
plaining changes in the variance of consumption inequality. Wealth shocks influence
consumption inequality in three ways, and these channels can be quantified as:
(1) Direct effect on ∆Cit by unanticipated wealth shock Zunexpit in the term
λZunexpit .
(2) Through effect on income shock driven unexplained consumption growth ∆cit.
There are two sub-channels: (2a) through the influence on the insurance parameters
ϕit and ψit; (2b) through the correlations with the variance of the permanent and
transitory income shocks σ2ζt and σ2ξt .
(3) Through effect on unexplained risk premium ξit.
Let consumption growth unexplained by demographics be ϑit = ∆cit + λZunexpit .
If the unanticipated wealth shock is absent from the first stage regression of
consumption, ϑit would be the unexplained consumption.
ϑit = γZunexpit + ∆cit = ∆Cit − α− γZ
H−exp
it − λDHit−1 − δXit − τt (3.20)
= γZunexpit + ϕitζit + ψitεit + ξit = γZ
unexp
it + ∆cIit + ξit
Consumption inequality can be expressed by:
var(ϑit) = γ2var(Zunexpit )︸ ︷︷ ︸
channel 1
+ var(∆cIit)︸ ︷︷ ︸
channel 2
+ var(ξit)︸ ︷︷ ︸
channel 3
(3.21)
Using the estimated coefficients summarized in column 1 of table 3.6 and the
coefficient on ZHit in column 1 of table 3.5, the changes in var(ϑit) can be decomposed
43Although we do not provide the overall fitness of the estimation results under the specification
(2) and (3), the alternative specifications also well capture the actual variance, covariance, and
auto-covariance of income and consumption growth. The results can be provided upon request.
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by the contribution of each factor as follows:
∆var(ϑit) ≈ γ2∆var(ZH−unexpit ) + var(ζit)∆ϕ2it + ∆var(ζit)ϕ2it−1 (3.22)
+ var(εit)∆ψ2it + ∆var(εit)ψ2it−1 + var(ξit),
The result of the decomposition is summarized in table 3.8. A prominent pattern
in var(ξit) is its decreasing trend. The flat var(ϑit) over time in the presence of
increases in the variance of income and wealth shocks is largely because of the
shrinking var(ξit). During the crisis and the subsequent recovery, macro risk is
elevated relative to idiosyncratic risk. The risk on the future income and wealth
increased in common, and the risk premium is better captured by the time dummy
or demographic variables. As a result the crisis reduces the heterogeneity in the
unexplained risk premium. This dynamics in the risk premium is not captured
by the variance of permanent and transitory idiosyncratic income shocks and the
wealth effects. Development in credit market may have contributed to the shrinking
var(ξit).
Overall the model fits the time series of cross-sectional moments of income
and consumption growth quite well. Income inequality jumped during the Asian
Financial Crisis and dropped as the crisis ended, while wealth suffered a significant
loss at the crisis and recovered after the crisis. Throughout the crisis and recovery,
consumption inequality stayed flat with the response to income shocks trending
downwards over time. The downward trend in consumption response to income may
be partly due to the working of a combination of wealth effects. During the crisis,
wealthy households suffered disproportionately loss in financial wealth. The wealth
effect resulted in wealthy household’s cuts in consumption, which helped to reduce
the cross-sectional variance in consumption. The credit market froze at the crisis,
which hurt the less wealthy households. Consumption and consumption inequality
of the less wealthy group tracked income and income inequality more closely. The
wealthy households’ do not rely on the credit market for consumption smoothing
so their consumption was not more closely tracking income during the crisis than
before the crisis. As the financial and housing markets recovered, both wealthy
and less wealthy households sharply raised consumption for reasons contrary to
those explained above. Another contributing factor for the post-crisis increase in
consumption of less wealthy households was the more widespread adoption of the
credit card. The combination of these developments in the asset markets made
household consumption less responsive to household income shocks.
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3.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we use high-frequency Korean household-level panel data with
comprehensive information on consumption, income, and wealth and estimate
the response of household consumption to the household wealth held in the form
of a house. Also, we extend the analysis of the housing wealth effect from the
consumption growth to the consumption inequality and its covariance with the
income shocks.
We take two steps to empirically analyse the wealth effect on consumption
growth and its inequality. First, we obtain consistent estimates of the wealth effect
on the mean of consumption growth, exploiting the differential effect of the housing
price change on households with a different fraction of remaining lifetime wealth held
in the form of a house. The use of the constructed wealth shock allows us to control
endogeneity and reduce the attenuation bias problem. Second, we decompose the
residual consumption growth from the first step estimation to identify the component
of income shocks and consumption insurance parameters. As we introduce more
heterogeneity and allow for differential consumption response varying on time,
household wealth, and exogenous housing market-driven wealth shocks, our model
quantifies the relative importance of household wealth in explaining changes in
consumption inequality.
We find that constructed wealth shock has a positive and significant effect on
consumption. A 1% increase in the nationwide house price index causes a rise
in monthly consumption by 0.45% on average. Moving on to the transmission of
income shocks to consumption inequality, the estimated consumption insurance
with respect to the permanent and transitory income fluctuation is smaller than
one. On average, 86.4% of transitory income shock can be insurable, however,
63.3% of permanent income shock is transmitted to the consumption growth. Also,
we find that a 1% increase in house price is associated with the improvement in
consumption insurance against permanent income shock by 0.013%. The results
show that there is a large degree of differences in the ability to insure consumption
against income shocks, and these differences are caused by the heterogeneity of the
household wealth held in the form of the house.
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Figure 3.1 Conditional Average of Constructed Wealth Shock of House Owners
Figure 3.2 House Price Index and Changes in Wealth by Home-ownership
Notes: The house price index comes from Statistics Korea, and wealth variables comes from our
sample
Figure 3.3 Nationwide House Price Index and Constructed Average Housing Wealth
Source: Statistics Korea
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Figure 3.4 Estimated Income Shocks and Consumption Insurance
(a) Consumption Insurance: ϕt and ψt (b) Income Shocks: σ2ζt and σ
2
εt
Note: xt = 1N Σ
N
i=1xit
Figure 3.5 Goodness of Fits Under the Baseline Specification
(a) V ar(∆yit) (b) V ar(∆cit)
(c) Cov(∆yit,∆cit) (d) Cov(∆yit,∆yit−1)
(e) Cov(∆yit,∆cit−1) (f) Cov(∆yit,∆yit−2)
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Table 3.1 Estimation Results of Nationwide House Price Process: ARIMA(1,1,1)
Constant AR(1) MA(1) Sigma
Coefficient 0.002 0.725*** 0.281** 0.005***
(0.002) (0.067) (0.140) (0.000)
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10
Table 3.2 Sample Selection Results
# of HH (HH Diff.) # of Obs. (Obs. Diff.)
Raw 10,481 301,692
Excl. HHs: Experiencing changes 8,749 (-1,732) 239,385 (-62,307)
in head of HH
Excl. Obs.: Head’s age is 8,087 (-662) 215,895 (-23,490)
below 25 or over 60
Trim top and bottom 1p of 8,083 (-4) 211,702 (-4,193)
income obs. by month
Excl. Obs.: Monthly Income Growth 8,083 (0) 209,888 (-6,007)
(below -80% or over 500%)
Note: Second row in the table implies that a household whose head’s age does not increase by up
to one year is excluded from the sample (∆Ageit < 0 or ∆Ageit > 1)
Table 3.3 Comparison of Total Wealth Composition Between FIES and KHPS
Housing Wealth Jeonse Deposit Savings Equity Others
FIES 77.4% 12.6% 8.9% 0.6% 0.5%
KHPS 74.2% 11.0% 10.6% 2.6% 1.6%
Note: The numbers in row 1 come from our sample. Row 2 uses the Korean Household Panel
Study conducted by Daewoo Economic Research Institute and show the average share of asset
holdings between 1994 and 1997
Source: Lim (2004)
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Table 3.4 Regression of Changes in Scaled Net-Wealth on Constructed Wealth Shock
Dependent







ZHit × I{t∈[Jan.1994,Dec.1997]} 0.880***
(0.027)
ZHit × I{t∈[Jan.1998,Dec.2002]} 0.927***
(0.011)
ait−1/Wit−1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Fixed-Effect N Y N N
Number of Observations 192,623 192,623 192,623 192,623
R2 0.380 0.357 0.302 0.380
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered on household: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p
< 0.10. Top and bottom 0.5 percent of ∆ait/Wit−1 are recoded to missing. R2 of specification (2)
denotes R2-between. DHit−1 has the value one if the individual owns a house in the previous
month and has the value zero, otherwise. All regressions include the following additional controls:
age, age-squared, dummies for occupation, size of household, the number of children, dummies for
educational attainment, and a full set of year-month dummies. I{t∈[·]} is an indicator function
having the value one if a time period is included in the given time period [·] and the value zero,
otherwise.
Table 3.5 Regression of Consumption Growth on Wealth Shock
Dependent
Variable: ∆Cit (1) (2) (3) (4)










Fixed-Effect N N Y N
Num. of Obs. 189,636 189,636 189,636 189,636
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered on household: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p
< 0.10. Top and bottom 0.5 percent of ∆ait/Wit−1 are recoded to missing. All regressions include
the following additional controls: age, age-squared, dummies for occupation, size of household, the
number of children, dummies for educational attainment, and a full set of year-month dummies.
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Table 3.6 Minimum Distance Estimation Results
(1) Baseline (2) Using ZH−cumulit−1 (3) Without Z
H−prev
it−1
Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.
σ2ζ Constant 0.004** (0.001) 0.003* (0.001) 0.003 (0.002)
ZH−previt−1 0.002*** (0.001) 0.001*** (0.000)
DHit−1 0.024*** (0.002) 0.024*** (0.002) 0.028*** (0.002)
I{t≥Jan.1998} 0.008*** (0.001) 0.010*** (0.001) 0.004 (0.003)
t̃ - 0.001 (0.003) - 0.001 (0.003) - 0.001 (0.001)
t̃× I{t≥Jan.1998} -0.002** (0.001) -0.002 (0.001) - 0.001 (0.001)
σ2ε Constant 0.026*** (0.004) 0.026*** (0.004) 0.027*** (0.004)
ZH−previt−1 0.000 (0.000) - 0.000 (0.000)
DHit−1 0.027*** (0.006) 0.029*** (0.006) 0.026*** (0.007)
I{t≥Jan.1998} 0.013*** (0.001) 0.012*** (0.001) 0.013*** (0.002)
t̃ - 0.002 (0.002) - 0.002 (0.002) -0.002*** (0.001)
t̃× I{t≥Jan.1998} -0.002*** (0.001) -0.002** (0.001) -0.002*** (0.001)
ϕ Constant 1.258*** (0.116) 1.306*** (0.106) 1.314*** (0.084)
ZH−previt−1 -0.055*** (0.010) -0.012*** (0.004)
DHit−1 -0.933*** (0.049) -0.964*** (0.042) -1.037*** (0.054)
I{t≥Jan.1998} -0.209* (0.109) -0.203* (0.111) - 0.085 (0.095)
t̃ 0.030 (0.030) 0.035 (0.025) 0.014 (0.026)
t̃× I{t≥Jan.1998} - 0.002 (0.033) - 0.016 (0.028) - 0.013 (0.035)
Ageit 0.001 (0.002) 0.001 (0.001)
ψ Constant 0.131*** (0.043) 0.137*** (0.043) 0.191*** (0.027)
ZH−previt−1 0.007*** (0.002) - 0.000 (0.002)
DHit−1 -0.103*** (0.014) -0.107*** (0.015) -0.089*** (0.023)
I{t≥Jan.1998} - 0.018 (0.038) - 0.031 (0.041) - 0.033 (0.030)
t̃ - 0.007 (0.018) - 0.007 (0.020) - 0.005 (0.008)
t̃× I{t≥Jan.1998} 0.010 (0.019) 0.015 (0.021) 0.013 (0.010)
Ageit 0.002** (0.001) 0.001** (0.001)
σ2ξ Constant 0.109*** (0.003) 0.109*** (0.003) 0.109*** (0.003)
I{t≥Jan.1998} - 0.001 (0.001) - 0.001 (0.004) - 0.001 (0.001)
t̃ -0.013*** (0.004) -0.012*** (0.001) -0.013*** (0.004)
t̃× I{t≥Jan.1998} -0.003** (0.001) -0.003** (0.001) -0.003** (0.001)
θ (MA(1) Parameter) -0.086*** (0.011) -0.085*** (0.011) -0.085*** (0.014)
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis. In order to meet the relative size of the coefficients,
ZH−previt−1 and Z
H−cumul
it−1 are multiplied by 1,000. t̃ is normalized by (t− 49)/10 where t has the
value 1 and 108 if the period is Jan.1994 and Dec. 2002, respectively
Table 3.7 Average of the Variance of Income Shocks and Consumption Insurance




All B.C. A.C. All B.C. A.C. All B.C. A.C. All B.C. A.C.
Baseline 0.019 0.020 0.018 0.046 0.047 0.045 0.633 0.685 0.592 0.136 0.150 0.125
Use ZH−Cumulit−1 0.019 0.020 0.018 0.046 0.047 0.045 0.640 0.693 0.597 0.135 0.150 0.124
W/O ZH−previt−1 0.019 0.021 0.018 0.046 0.047 0.045 0.623 0.664 0.591 0.136 0.151 0.125
Note: The B.C. (before-crisis) period covers the time between January.1994 and December.1997,
and A.C. (after-crisis) period covers the time between January.1998 and December.2002
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Table 3.8 Decomposition of the Variance of Consumption Growth Unexplained by
Demographics
Before-Crisis After-Crisis
Average Dec.97 - Feb.94 Average Dec.02 - Feb.98
∆var(ϑ) - 0.00007 - 0.00329 - 0.00042 - 0.02457
γ2∆var(ZH−unexp) 0.00000 0.00000 - 0.00000 - 0.00003
var(ζ) × ∆ϕ2 0.00005 0.00254 - 0.00003 0.00117
∆var(ζ) × ϕ2−1 - 0.00003 - 0.00176 - 0.00004 - 0.00549
var(ε) × ∆ψ2 - 0.00001 - 0.00048 0.00001 0.00022
∆var(ε) × ψ2−1 - 0.00000 - 0.00019 - 0.00001 - 0.00024
∆var(ξ) - 0.00007 - 0.00341 - 0.00035 - 0.02020
Notes: The average monthly value of each component is calculated by var(Yt) = 1Nt Σivar(Yit),
where Yit is an arbitrary variable. The before- or after-crisis period average level of contribution
of consumption growth variance is derived by ∆var(∆cj) = 1Tj Σt∈j∆var(∆ct) where
j ∈ {Before− Crisis, After − Crisis}. The Before-Crisis period covers the time between
January.1994 and December.1997, and After-Crisis period covers the time between January.1998
and December.2002. Dec.97 - Feb.94 implies that the monthly average values in December.1997 is
subtracted by that of February.1994
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Appendix for Chapter 1
A.1 Institutional Background
Korea provides a particularly suitable environment to study interaction between
intrafamily resource sharing and elderly people’s labour supply choice. The country
is facing unprecedented demographic changes. It became an ageing society in 2000,
and has been becoming an super-aged society rapidly. As the country undergoes a
rapid ageing process, OECD predicts that Korea becomes the oldest society among
OECD countries in the 2050s (?). Amid ageing process, a much higher proportion
of elderly Korean people aged 55 or more participates in the labour force than that
of the OECD average, while the poverty rates of people aged 65 or order is the
highest among other member countries in OECD. Weak social insurance programs
also cause people to rely more on their earned income. As a result, older people’s
labour supply is less likely to be affected by the changes in social security rules, and
there is more room for IVFT to play an important role in elderly workers’ lifetime
choice.1
A.1.1 Employment Rate
The LFP rate for elderly men in Korea has continued to be high during the period
under this study. The LFP rate for those aged 65 or more has continued to exceed
40%. Comparing it with the OECD average, a much higher proportion of elderly
Korean participates in the labour force, and these higher LFP rates translate into
around 9%p and 23%p for men aged 55-64 and 65 or more, respectively.
Various increasing demands from family members, especially children, are pointed
out as important factors which mainly force elderly people to delay retirement. The
158% of workers aged 55-79 report that their primary reason for work is to earn or supplement
their living costs, and just 35% point enjoying their work out as a major reason (?)
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rise in educational investment for next generation and the mounting competition in
the young workers’ job market increase the need for elderly people to provide more
resources and support with their children (?). For example, the unemployment
rate of young working-age adults (20-29) has increased by 1.8%p for men and
2.3%p for women between 2006-2016, respectively. A high level of unemployment
among young people leads to an extension of job search period, and thus, the initial
employment age, which was 27.3 years old in 2008, increased significantly to 31.2
years old in 2016.2
A.1.2 Public Pension System
Comparing it with other OECD countries, public pension plans in Korea are rela-
tively recent phenomenon. The government established two kinds of social security
system.3 One is the National Pension Scheme (NPS) designed as a contributory
social security program established in 1988. The NPS was originally designed for an
income replacement rate (IRR) of 70% of average monthly income if an individual
contributes over a 40-year of pension covered employment period and allowed to
draw from the age of 60. After the age of 60, individuals do not need to pay
contributions and the amount of benefits does not accrue. To be eligible for NPS,
an individual needs to be insured at least 10 years. In 2008, IRR was lowered to
50% and will be gradually decreased by 0.5%p every year until 2028 (IRR will
become 40%). Also, from 2013, pension age has increased by one year (age 61) and
will be raised by one year every five years until 2033 (full pension age will become
65). Due to pre-matured NPS, as of October 2018 just 38.8% of people aged 65 or
over has received NPS (old-age pension), and average monthly pension amount as
of December 2018 is just 501,619KRW (around U.S. $424) which is below 30% of
the minimum living cost for a two-person household.4
The other is Basic Old-Age Pension Scheme (BOAPS) designed as a public
assistance program established in 2008. BOAPS is tax-financed program which is
introduced for the people who have not contributed the NPS more than 10 years
and aimed at elderly people who are experiencing economic hardship. The BOAPS
is given for elderly people who meet the age and income-assets conditions.5 Thus,
2source: incruit.com
3It also has a separate occupational pension system; Government Employees Pension, Military
Servicemen Pension and Private School Teachers Pension
434.8% and 4.0% of people aged 65 or over receive NPS and occupational pension, respectively.
Also, the average qualifying years of NPS contribution is 12.1 years in 2018.
5When BOAPS was first introduced, eligible age was at least 70. Since August 2008, the age
limit for BOAPS has been lowered to 65. In terms of incomes and assets, lower 60% of the elderly
people are eligible, and the eligibility standard has eased to lower 70% since January 2009
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it can be regarded as a means-tested elderly welfare programmes rather than a
sort of pension. As of June 2014, 65.1% of elderly people aged 65 or older received
BOAPS, and the maximum monthly amount of support for two-person household
is 158,600KRW (around U.S. $135) which is lower than any other OECD country.
BOAPS has been replaced by Basic Pension Scheme (BPS) since July 2014, and
the size of maximum monthly benefit also has risen to 480,000KRW for two-person
household. Even after introducing the new program, however the amount of benefit
is still the lowest among OECD countries.
A.2 The Formal Proof of the Proposition 1
With the assumption of imperfect altruism (0 < ηk, κk < 1), at most one party
provides financial transfers. Because the model assumes that an IVFT provider
leads the game, a fatal contradiction may occur when there exists equilibrium
allocation which both parties provide financial transfers in the same time. Thus,
the validity of this statement can be suggested using a proof by contradiction. I
assume that it is possible for parents and child to provide IVFT for the other party
in the same period game t (i.e. assume TRpt > 0 & TRct > 0 hold at time t). In
order for simultaneous two-way transfers to occur in the same family, the equation


























If ηk, κk, and survival rate are sufficiently high, it can be an optimal for each party
in the family to provide and receive transfers at the same time. However, in this
model, altruism toward the other family member in different household is imperfect,
and death rate is not sufficiently low. Also, estimated bequest curvature K is
relatively high. Thus, the equation (A.1) does not hold in general.6 Therefore, it
must be the case that at most one party can provide IVFT during a given period
game t.
6Put somewhat differently, except in very exceptional cases, the equation (A.1) is contradiction
because of imperfect altruism.
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A.3 Health Transition Probabilities, Out-of-Pocket
Medical Costs, and Non-Labour Income
The ordered logistic estimates of health transition probabilities are given in table
A.1. The transition rates from better to poor health condition increase with age.
Also, given the age and previous period health status, the health condition of elderly
in the high educational attainment group is less likely to be deteriorated. The
estimates for medical expenditure are summarized in table A.2. As expected, there
is positive correlation between age and the amount of medical costs. The coefficient
on the level of net assets shows that a wealthier individual is more likely to choose
better quality of care (or go to the hospital more often). In addition, given the
age, asset levels and household type, the elderly with ’Good’ health pay 29.2% and
43.3% less out-of-pocket health costs than an individual with ’Fair’ and ’Bad’ state
on average, respectively.
The average marginal effects (AME) for wife’s LFP of first stage binomial probit
regression are given in table A.3. These estimates of the selection process are
used to generate inverse Mills ratio for each female household member. Panel 1
of table A.3 shows the AME of elderly wife’s participation. First, individuals face
strong retirement incentives with age. For every three years, the probability of
participation in the labour force decreases by 6.1%p. Second, although the sign of
coefficient on net-assets is positive, it is statistically insignificant at the 5% level,
and its effect on wife’s participation choice is negligible. Third, her husband’s
schooling is negatively associated with her labour supply. Lastly, a wife is more
likely to work when her husband health is more deteriorated. Panel 2 shows the
AME of young wife’s LFP. Her estimated participation probabilities increase until
mid 40s and then decreases. Also, the wife of child-household is more likely to
participate in the labour force if her husband’s education level is categorized as
high-group. The estimation results for the second stage of wife’s yearly earnings
are presented in table A.4. The coefficients on inverse Mills ratio of parents (child)
household indicate positive (negative) selection, however the null hypothesis of
no-selection is not rejected in any case.
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Dummy: Edupi = H -0.397*** (0.034)
hsit−1 1.529*** (0.022)
Cut Points between Good-Fair Fair-Bad Bad-Dead
15.394 16.827 21.158
Pseudo R2 0.227
Notes: Standard errors are provided in parenthesis: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10.
Agepit = 1 if male-parent’s age is between 55 and 57. Afterwards Age
p
it is increased by one-unit in
every three years
Table A.2 Estimates of Medical Expenses
Dependent: ln oopit Coeff. (S.E.)
agepit 0.120*** (0.026)
(agepit)2/102 -0.006** (0.003)
Log Net Assets 0.042*** (0.012)
Dummy: Edupi = H -0.025 (0.033)
hsit = Fair 0.292*** (0.043)





Note: Robust standard errors are provided in parenthesis: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10
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Table A.3 Estimates of Wife’s labour Force Participation Model: 1st Stage Probit
Regression
Parents-HH Child-HH
Coeff. (S.E.) Coeff. (S.E.)
Log Net Asset 0.010** (0.005) agec,wit -0.036* (0.019)
agep,wit -0.061*** (0.005) (age
c,w
it )2/100 0.001** (0.000)
Dummy: Edupi = H -0.053*** (0.016) Dummy: Educi = H 0.051** (0.022)
hsit = Fair 0.030 (0.021)
hsit = Bad 0.139*** (0.027)
Notes: Robust standard errors are provided in parenthesis: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10.
Figures in the column 2 and 5 show the average marginal effects. Female-parents whose age is
between 54-74 are used to estimate the participation equation. agep,wit = 1 if female-parent’s age
is between 54-56. Afterwards agep,wit is increased by one-unit in every three years. Female-child
aged 25-64 are used to estimate the participation equation
Table A.4 Estimates of Wife’s Yearly Earnings Equation: Second Stage
Parents-HH Child-HH
Coeff. (S.E.) Coeff. (S.E.)
Inverse Mills Ratio 0.870 (0.684) Inverse Mills Ratio - 0.034 (5.552)
agep,wit - 0.096 (0.071) age
c,w
it 0.068 (0.057)
(agep,wit )2/100 0.003 (0.009) (age
c,w
it )2/100 - 0.001 (0.001)
Dummy: Edupi = H 0.276*** (0.065) Dummy: Educi = H 0.296* (0.162)
Constant 6.878*** (0.337) Constant 6.156** (2.816)
R2 0.08 0.05
RMSE 0.706 0.684
Notes: Robust standard errors are provided in parenthesis: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10.
Female-parents whose age is between 54-74 are used to estimate the earnings equation.
agep,wit = 1 if female-parent’s age is between 54-56. Afterwards age
p,w
it is increased by one-unit in
every three years. Female-children aged 25-64 are used to estimate the earnings equation.




Appendix for Chapter 2
B.1 Wage, Medical Expenses, and Spousal In-
come
It is assumed that the deterministic productivity component of logarithm wage in
paid-job (ln wPJit ) and self-employment (ln wSEit ) is a linear function of individual
fixed effect, age, sector specific work experience and health:
ln wPJit =(fi + βPJ0 ageit + βPJ1 age2it + βPJ2 xPJit + βPJ3 × 1{hsit=Fair} + βPJ4 × 1{hsit=Bad})
× (1 − ς × 1{hit≤1,500}) + vit, vit = ρARvit−1 + ξit (B.1)
fi ∼ N(µf , σ2f ), ξit ∼ N(0, σ2ξ )
ln wSEit =φi + βSE0 ageit + βSE1 age2it + βSE2 xSEit + βSE3 × 1{hsit=Fair}
+ βSE4 × 1{hsit=Bad} + ψit (B.2)
φi ∼ N(µφ, σ2φ), ψit ∼ N(0, σ2ψ), Corr(φi, fi) = ρ
The functional forms of medical expenses (mit) and expected amount of married
women’s income (Et(siit)) are expressed as equation (B.3) and (B.4):
ln mit =βM0 + βM1 ageit + βM2 age2it + βM3 age3it + βM4 ln ait + βM5 1{Medicareit} (B.3)
+ βM6 1{hsit=Fair} + βM7 1{hsit=Bad} + uit, uit ∼ N(0, σ2u)
Et(siit) =E(siit|agesit, hsit, fi) = psit (agesit, hsit, Et(ln mit)) × wsiit (agesit, fi) (B.4)
psit =P{LFP sit = 1|·} = Φ
(




3hsit + βp4Et(ln mit)
)
ln wsiit =βsi0 + βsi1 agesit + βsi2 (agesit)2 + βsi3 fi
where LFP sit takes the value 1 if a married woman participates in the labour force
and has the value 0, otherwise.
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B.2 Social Security Retired Worker Benefit
Once a worker has claimed Social Security Retired Worker Benefit (SSB, ssbit),
he will receive the benefit for life. The amount of ssbit depends on many factors
such as a worker’s lifetime earnings, the choice of time for first claiming benefit and
employment decisions. The SSB has a negative effect on work incentives after a
certain age. In order to properly capture work and retirement incentives caused by
the U.S. Social Security retirement program, model trying to explain individual’s
work and retirement decision should reflect the following stylized facts adequately:
(1) Eligibility, (2) Average Indexed Monthly Earnings (AIME) and Primary Insur-
ance Amount (PIA) and (3) Full, Early and Delayed Retirement Age.
Eligibility: To be eligible for SSB, an individual needs at least 10 years of Social
Security covered employment. The earliest age when an agent can claim SSB known
as Early Eligibility Age (EEA) is the age of 62. In 2012, 47% of individuals has
claimed the benefit from the age of 62, and 63% of beneficiaries were under the age
of 65. This study assumes that every individual claims the benefit no later than
age 70 because only around 2% of beneficiaries claimed benefit at the age of 70 or
over. Moreover, due to the fact that only 5.6% of individuals in the sample have
less than 10 years of work history, and around 65% of individuals have worked more
than 35 years at the age of 62, it is assumed that every individual is eligible for
SSB and has already worked 35 years or more.
Average Indexed Monthly Earnings (AIME) and Primary Insurance
Amount (PIA): SSB are based on individual’s 35 highest earnings taken over up
to 35 years. The average earnings over these 35 highest earnings years are called
AIME. Thus, if an individual has worked less than 35 years, an additional year
of work directly increases his AIME. If he already has worked 35 years or more,
AIME will be adjusted only if his earnings from an additional year of work are
higher than the lowest earnings included in his current AIME. Because this study
assumes that every male-individual has already worked more than 35 years, his
AIME is only adjusted if his current earnings are higher than the lowest earnings
in AIME. Also, in order to reflect real wage growth in the economy, AIME are
adjusted by the growth rate of national wage index. However, this adjustment stops
at the year when workers become age 60 (i.e. After age 60, AIME is not adjusted
automatically). PIA is the basis in the calculation of SSB and is linked to the
AIME by a piecewise linear function:
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PIAt =
 0.9 ×AIMEt if AIMEt < C10.9 × C1 + 0.32 × (AIMEt − C1) if C1 ≤ AIMEt < C2
0.9 × C1 + 0.32 × (C2 − C1) + 0.15 × (AIMEt − C2) if C2 ≤ AIMEt
 (B.5)
where the 2000 bend points are used in this paper are C1 = $531 and C2 = $3,202.
Full, Early and Delayed Retirement Age: SSB depends not only on PIA but
also on age at which the individual first draws it. The age at which unreduced
retirement benefits are first available is called the Full Retirement Age (FRA) or
Normal Retirement Age (NRA). Following Social Security Amendments of 1983
(P.L.98-21), the FRA has gradually been increased from age 65 in 2002 (people
born in 1937) to 67 in 2027 (born in 1960). In this paper, I regard age 66 as the
FRA. The total amount of benefits received by individuals satisfying FRA is given
using the equation (B.6).
ssbt =

1.5 × PIAt if PIAt < D1
1.5 ×D1 + 2.72 × (PIAt −D1) if D1 ≤ AIMEt < D2
1.5 ×D1 + 2.72 × (D2 −D1) + 1.34 × (PIAt −D2) if D2 ≤ PIAt < D3
1.5 ×D1 + 2.72 × (D2 −D1) + 1.34 × (D3 −D2) + 1.75 × (PIAt −D3) if D3 ≤ PIAt
(B.6)
where the bend points correspond to 2000 are D1 = $679, D2 = $980 and D3 =
$1,278.
Although people can claim SSB from the age 62 (if he satisfies the condition
of at least 10 years of Social Security covered employment history), benefit will
be permanently reduced if they draw before the FRA, and it will be greater than
their PIA if they delay drawing it after the FRA. For every year before the FRA,
retirement benefits are reduced by 6.7% up to 3 years, and in excess of 3 years,
the benefits are reduced by 5% a year. Workers who start drawing benefit after
the FRA receive a Delayed Retirement Credit (DRC). The DRC applies starting
with the month the workers attain the FRA and ending with the month before they
become the age 70. Since 1990, the DRC has increased from 5.5% (born between
1933-1934) per year and will increase 0.5%p in every two-year until it reaches 8.0%
(born in 1943 or later) per year.1
1In this paper, if an individual draw the benefit before the age 66, it is reduced by 6.7%
(AIME × 0.933n) for every year, and if SSB application is delayed, he will get a benefit increase
by 7.0% (AIME × 1.07n) every year.
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B.3 Tax Structure
The tax system in the U.S. is composed of payroll tax, federal tax and taxes on
social security benefits (SSB). The tax rates and exemption amounts used below
are the figures in 2000.
Payroll Tax: Payroll taxes are collected under the Federal Insurance Contribution
Act (FICA) and Self- Employment Contribution Act (SECA), which are used to
finance the Old-Age Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OSADI) program and
Medicare Hospital Insurance (Medicare HI). These taxes are levied on the wages
and net self-employment income. If an individual works for an employer, the tax
is shared by the employee and employer, and each pays half of the total amount.
Thus, effective social security tax rate for employees is 6.2% of earnings up to an
upper limit of $76,200, and the Medicare tax rate is 1.45% of earnings (there is no
upper limit). The SECA tax is levied at a rate of 15.3% for self-employed, with the
same 12.4% and 2.9% split between OASDI and Medicare HI similar to the FICA
tax. The only difference is that self-employed have to bear these taxes on their own.
However, unlike paid-workers, self-employed are allowed to deduct one-half of the
SECA taxes for federal income tax purposes. Each workers’ payroll tax contribution











where τP is payroll tax rate, and 1{kjit=2} denotes an indicator variable, which has
value 1 if the agent is self-employed and has the value 0 if otherwise.
Taxable Social Security Benefits: Since 1984, SSB have been subject to the
federal income tax. Up to 50% of SSB are taxable for single taxpayers whose
provisional income (PI) exceeds $25,000 (first-tier threshold for single taxpayer).2,3
Thus, if an individual’s PI is below 1st-tier threshold, the full amount of SSB is not
taxable. Since 1993, new law (Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act) has been in
effect, and it taxes up to 85% of SSB for single taxpayers whose PI exceeds $34,000
(second-tier threshold). Therefore, if an individual’s PI is greater than 2nd-tier
2In this study, it is assumed that individuals choose the option of married filing separately.
3PI is adjusted gross income. I use individual’s earned income and 50% of SSB as PI.
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threshold, the amount of SSB subject to tax is smaller or equal to $4,500 plus 85%
of PI above the 2nd-tier threshold.4
(1 − τSSB)ssbt =
 ssbt if PI < $25, 000max(ssbt − 12 × (PI − $25, 000), 0) if $25, 000 ≤ PI < $34, 000
max(ssbt − $4, 500 − 0.85 × (PI − $34, 000), 0) if $34, 000 ≤ PI
 (B.8)
Federal Income Tax: The income tax is levied on labour and non-labour income.
I use the Federal Income Tax tables for "Single Tax Bracket". The standard
deduction for a single was $4,400. The tax bracket and marginal tax rate are
summarized in below table. Post-tax income structure is denoted as:
Y (rait, withit,τF , τP , τSSB) (B.9)
= (1 − τF )
[
(1 − τP )whithhit + rait + (1 − τSSB)ssbtBit−1
]
where τF is the vector of the federal tax structure. Bit has the value one if the
agent applied SSB and has the value zero, otherwise.
Pre-Tax Post-Tax Marginal Tax
Income ($) Income ($) Rate (%)
0 - 4,440 Y 0.0
4,440 - 30,650 4,400 + 0.850×(Y - 4,400) 15.0
30,650 - 67,950 26,712.5 + 0.720×(Y - 30,650) 28.0
67,950 - 137,000 53,568.5 + 0.690×(Y-67,950) 31.0
137,000 - 295,700 101,213 + 0.640×(Y-137,800) 36.0
292,750 and over 200,893 + 0.604×(Y-292,750) 39.6
Note: Pre-Tax Income=After payroll tax earned income+interest income from assets
4In order to generate the SSB taxation structure properly, I use IRS Publication 915 and set
τSSB(ssbt) as equation (B.8).
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C.1 Measuring Lifetime Wealth
The lifetime wealth Wit(m) of household i at age m which is evaluated at time t
is consisted of current wealth ait and the present value of expected future income
PV FIim.1
Wit(m) = ait + PV FIim (C.1)
In order to derive each household’s present value of lifetime-income when an
individual i is m-years old, it is assumed that all household heads are expected to
retire and die at the age of 60 and 80, respectively. With regard to measuring labor
income before the age of 60, we first estimate the monthly log household income Yit
for a household i in period t with following simple specification:
Yit =β0 + Ageit β1 + Age2it β2 + I{HSi=1} β3 + Ageit × I{HSi=1} β4 + I{Coli=1} β5+
Ageit × I{Coli=1} β6 +HHsizeit β7 + Childit β8 + τt + yit (C.2)
where Ageit denotes the household head’s age. I{·} is an indicator function, which has
the value one if an individual’s current state corresponds to {·} and the value zero,
otherwise. HSi (Coli) has the value one if the head received high-school (college)
or higher degree and has the value zero, otherwise. HHsizeit and Childit denote
the number of household members and children under the age of 18, respectively.
τt is year-month dummies, and yit is the idiosyncratic component of income.
1For example, if an individual i is 26 years old in February 1995, then Wit(m) is denoted as
Wi F eb.1995(26) = ai F eb.1995 + PV FIi 26.
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Using the estimated coefficients of equation (C.2), we calculate the predicted
mean of the household’s earned income Pim at all future working age.2 Also, for
the sake of simplicity, income during retirement periods is assumed a constant
fraction η of the predicted income in the last period of work life.3. Considering the
pre-matured national pension system in Korea and following ?, η is set to 0.24. This
implies that all elderly people are eligible for claiming pension which provides the
same amount until death and begins to draw the pension at the age of 61. Taken





(1 + r)τ ,
 If 25 ≤ Agei = m+ τ ≤ 60, Pim+τ = P̂m+τ × exp(yi) × 12
If 60 < Agei = m+ τ ≤ 80, Pim+τ = 0.24 × Pi60

(C.3)
C.2 Estimation Results of Alternative Specifica-
tions
C.2.1 Unscaled Wealth Shock
We investigate whether the effect of wealth shocks on consumption are still valid
when we do not scale housing market driven shocks by lifetime wealth (hereafter,
we express the unscaled wealth shock as ∆pHt aHit−1). This main empirical specifi-
cation is expressed by equation (C.4). The major interest is examining whether
changes in consumption is related to housing market-induced wealth shock, and
how different are the effects of unpredictable and predictable housing market shocks
2To be specific, Pim is derived using the following steps: 1. By age, the size of the household
and the number of children under age 18 are assumed to be fixed at the mean across households,
and the first period in our data set (Jan.1994) is used as the basis time period for the prediction
(i.e. τt = 0 for all age). Using these variables, fitted log monthly earnings logŶm between age
25-60 are calculated using the estimated coefficients of equation (C.2) at all future working age,
2. Exponential transformation is used to convert logŶm back to monetary values, and then 12
is multiplied on it to get yearly fitted earnings (P̂m = exp(logŶm) × 12), 3. In order to capture
the heterogeneity across households, household-specific average permanent income shock yi is
constructed by calculating the average stochastic component of household income (yi = 1Ni Σ
Ni
j=1yij ,
where Ni is the household i’s number of observations), and 4. Pim is constructed by multiplying
the exponential transformation of yi on yearly fitted earnings (i.e. Pim = P̂m × exp(yi)).
3It is assumed that all the household heads in the sample leave the labor force from the end
of age 60 and receive the time-invariant amount of National Pension benefits between the age of
61-80.
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on consumption.
∆Cit = α + γZHit ×Wit−1 + λDHit−1 + δXit + ∆cit
= α + γ∆pHt aHit−1 + λDHit−1 + δXit + ∆cit (C.4)
where Xit includes age, age-squared, dummies for occupation, size of household,
the number of children, dummies for educational attainment, and a full set of
year-month dummies.
Column 1-4 of table C.1 summarize the estimation results. The first column
regresses consumption growth on the unscaled housing market shocks via OLS.
Regression in column 2 controls lagged amount of total housing wealth aHit−1 in
stead of DHit−1. In order to reflect heterogeneity across households, column 3 shows
the estimated parameters of the model controlling DHit−1 by the fixed-effect method.
In column 4, the unscaled wealth shock is divided into predicted and unpredicted
shocks, and these effects are estimated by OLS.
As shown in column 1, the estimated coefficient on ∆pHt aHit−1 has a positive sign
and is highly significant. The estimated effect on consumption growth is 0.0026.
Thus, one-unit of unscaled wealth shock (∆pHt aHit−1 = 1) leads to a 0.26% change
in the consumption growth rate. Moreover, considering the fact that the mean of
housing wealth during the sample period under this study was $69,898 (76.9 million
KRW), a 1% increase in the nationwide house price index (i.e. the magnitude of
unscaled wealth shock is around $699) leads to a rise in monthly consumption by
$1.82. Column 2 shows that the estimated γ is 0.0027 which does not change much
as we replace DHit−1 with aHit−1. The magnitude of the estimated coefficient on the
unscaled wealth effect is 0.0038 which is around 48% greater than that under the
specification (1). Column 4 indicates that the estimated coefficient on the expected
price shock is 0.027 which is significant at 5% level and comparable with those
under the specification (1) and (2). However, the effect of surprise changes in house
price on consumption growth is statistically insignificant, and the consumption
growth responds less sensitive to the surprise house price shock than predicted one.
C.2.2 Additional Control for the Stock Market Wealth Shock
Under the main specification, we only control the capital gains from the hous-
ing market through the constructed wealth shock and estimate the wealth effect.
However, the household wealth in this study is constructed under the assumption
that both homeowners and equity holders expect capital gains from owning the
assets. Thus, the wealth shock induced from the stock market is defined as the
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constructed stock-holder shock ZEit and derived by the interaction of the lagged
fraction of lifetime wealth held in stocks aEit/Wit−1 with the stock market index
(KOSPI) growth rate ∆pEt . Under this specification, we use both wealth shocks
driven by the housing and the stock markets and compare the estimated results
with those in table 3.5 in terms of the wealth effect.
Comparing it with table 3.5, the estimation results in table C.2 remain largely
unchanged. Regardless of the specifications, the coefficient on ZHit does not change
much. Also, the coefficient on ZEit is relatively small and statistically insignificant.
These results support that the original wealth shock effects are robust.
C.2.3 Event Study Regression
This subsection answers the question about whether the leads and lags of constructed
wealth shock have an effect on consumption growth. If the wealth shocks are
unanticipated, household consumption should not respond to future wealth shocks.
However, it would be possible that the past shock can have an effect on the
consumption schedule through diverse channels. In order to analyse the effect of
past or future shocks on current consumption growth, we use the model specification
expressed in column 1 (OLS estimation and controlling the lagged house ownership
dummy DHit−1) of table 3.5 as the reference specification and include different leads
and lags of the constructed wealth shock.
Table C.3 provides the regression results of controlling different leads and lags
of the constructed wealth shock. Column 1 and 2 control up to 3rd lags and 1st
lag of the constructed wealth shock. Column 3 does not control any lags or lead
of ZHit . Column 4 and 5 control up to 1st lead and 3rd leads of the instrument.
Regardless of controlling past or future wealth shock, there is a highly significant
positive effect of the contemporaneous constructed wealth shock on consumption
growth. However, any of the coefficients on lags or leads are not significant except
for the coefficient on the 3rd lag in column 1. Also, all five specifications show that
the wealth changes driven by the housing market have a permanent effect on the
level of consumption.4
4i.e. The aggregation of lead, lag and contemporaneous coefficients is always greater than zero.
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C.2.4 Quarterly and Semi-Yearly Data Sets
Another robustness check is to demonstrate the importance of using high-frequency
data for estimating the causal effect of the constructed wealth shock on consumption
growth properly. One of the important advantages of our data set is that it has long
monthly panels and provides detailed high-frequency information. If households’
consumption decisions are made at higher-frequency, data at a quarter or annual
frequency are likely to suffer from aggregation bias.
Table C.4 and C.5 adopt the same model specifications used in table 3.5, however
we employ data aggregation interval of quarter and semi-annual to estimate causal
effects, respectively. Table C.4 shows that the signs of the coefficients on ZHit are all
positive and correspond to the results in table 3.5, even if the aggregated quarterly
observations are used to estimate coefficients. The same patterns are preserved,
even if we choose semi-year as a data aggregation interval. However, the coefficients
in table C.4 and C.5 are less significant than those in table 3.5, and most of the
coefficients are not significant as the data aggregation interval gets longer. These
results demonstrate that the data aggregation interval is important, and long data
aggregate interval would result in the loss of significance of the results obtained and
cause severe aggregation bias.
Table C.1 Regression of Consumption Growth on Unscaled Wealth Shock
Dependent
variable: ∆Cit (1) (2) (3) (4)










Fixed-Effect N N Y N
Num. of Obs. 189,616 189,616 189,616 189,616
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered on household: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p
< 0.10. Top and bottom 0.5 percent of ∆ait are recoded to missing. All regressions include the
following additional controls: age, age-squared, dummies for occupation, size of household, the
number of children, dummies for educational attainment, and a full set of year-month dummies.
aHit is expressed in million KRW
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Table C.2 Regression of Consumption Growth on Constructed and Stock Market
Wealth Shock
Dependent
Variable: ∆Cit (1) (2) (3) (4)
ZHit 1.886*** 1.949*** 2.452***
(0.398) (0.406) (0.536)
ZEit 0.122 0.129 0.639 0.122









Fixed-Effect N N Y N
Num. of Observation 189,636 189,636 189,636 189,636
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered on household: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p
< 0.10. Top and bottom 0.5 percent of ∆ait/Wit−1 are recoded to missing. All regressions include
the following additional controls: age, age-squared, dummies for occupation, size of household, the
number of children, dummies for educational attainment, and a full set of year-month dummies.
Table C.3 Event Study Regression: Leads and Lags
Dependent







Zit 2.664** 2.976** 1.886*** 2.639*** 3.024**







DHit−1 Y Y Y Y Y
Number of Observations 162,863 182,009 189,636 185,617 166,799
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered on household: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p
< 0.10. Top and bottom 0.5 percent of ∆ait/Wit−1 are recoded to missing. All regressions include
the following additional controls: age, age-squared, dummies for occupation, size of household, the
number of children, dummies for educational attainment, and a full set of year-month dummies.
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Table C.4 Regression of Quarterly Consumption Growth on Constructed Wealth
Shock
Dependent
Variable: ∆Cit (1) (2) (3) (4)










Fixed-Effect N N Y N
Num. of Obs. 58,911 58,911 58,911 58,911
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered on household: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p
< 0.10. Top and bottom 0.5 percent of ∆ait/Wit−1 are recoded to missing. All regressions include
the following additional controls: age, age-squared, dummies for occupation, size of household, the
number of children, dummies for educational attainment, and a full set of year-quarter dummies
Table C.5 Regression of Semi-Annual Consumption Growth on Constructed Wealth
Shock
Dependent
Variable: ∆Cit (1) (2) (3) (4)










Fixed-Effect N N Y N
Num. of Obs. 25,612 25,612 25,612 25,612
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered on household: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p
< 0.10. Top and bottom 0.5 percent of ∆ait/Wit−1 are recoded to missing. All regressions
include the following additional controls: age, age-squared, dummies for occupation, size of
household, the number of children, dummies for educational attainment, and a full set of each
six-month dummies
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C.3 Identification of Model Parameters
The model is identified by imposing variance-covariance restrictions on the process
of income and consumption growth. The identification of the idiosyncratic income
components and their impacts on consumption is well defined in BPP, and thus we
follow their identification strategy. However, we introduce more flexibility in the
model structure and reflect heterogeneity across households. These would impose
additional difficulties. Thus, in order to improve the precision of estimation, we
include additional moment conditions.
The parameters governing the income process can be identified by using the
following covariance restrictions in panel data:
cov(∆yit,∆yit−s) =

var(ζit) + var(εit) + (θ − 1)2var(εit−1) + θ2var(εit−2) for s = 0
(θ − 1)var(εit−1) + θ(1 − θ)var(εit−2) for s = 1,
−θvar(εit−2) for s = 2,
where var(·) denotes cross-sectional variances. Given that vit follows a MA(1)
process, cov(∆yit,∆yit+s) = 0 whenever s > 2.




E(ϕit)var(ζit) + E(ψit)var(εit), for s = 0
E(ψit−1)(θ − 1)var(εit−1) for s = 1,
−θE(ψit−2)var(εit−2) for s = 2,
where cov(∆yit,∆cit−s) becomes zero if s > 2. The covariance moment cov(∆yit,∆cit−s)
has been used in the literature as a test for advanced information in the income
process (?). The idea is that, if future income shocks in t+ s were known to the
consumer in earlier periods, then consumption should adjust before the observed
shock occurs and this should result in significant auto-covariances cov(∆yit+s,∆cit).
With the insurance and income shocks, the variance of consumption innovation
σ2ξit can be identified by using variance of consumption growth:
var(∆cit) = E(ϕ2it)var(ζit) + E(ψ2it)var(εit) + var(ξ2it) (C.5)
However, as the model allows the income shocks and consumption insurance to
vary over i and t, these cause difficulties in empirically estimating the parameters
which govern the changes of ϕit and ψit. In other words, the covariances of con-
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sumption and income growth provide the average of insurability over households,
and these averaging out procedure would result in significant loss of household
heterogeneity and may cause inappropriate identification of model parameters.
Thus, in order to add identification conditions in a feasible manner and improve
the efficiency of estimating procedure, we calculate the marginal effect of each






it−s−1)/∂Xmit−s−1,j, for 1 ≤ s ≤ 2





it−s−1)/∂Xmit−s−1,j, for 0 ≤ s ≤ 2
0, for s > 2,
where ∂(·)/∂Xmit−k,j captures the changes in (·) for a one-unit change in the j-th
covariate.
Empirical moment conditions me: As the auto-covariance of income and
consumption growth and the covariance between income and consumption growth
are used for the identification of model parameters, estimated variance-covariance
of income and consumption growth is a part of empirical moment conditions me.5
These lead us with 730-moment conditions (323- and 407-moment conditions for
the first and second panel, separately).
Also, considering the model assumption on ϕit, ψit, σ2ζit , σ
2
εit
and σ2ξit , the moment
conditions of average marginal effects (AME) under the baseline specification are
related with squared ∆yit and ∆cit and interaction between ∆yit and ∆cit and can
5As it is assumed that the transitory component νit of residual income difference follows MA(1)
process, We use var(∆cit), cov(∆yit,∆yit−k), and cov(∆cit,∆yit−k), k ∈ {0, 1, 2}.
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be empirically estimated by equation (C.6) and (C.10).








it−3 + αc5DHit−1 (C.6)
+ αc6DHit−2 + αc7DHit−3 + τt +ϖ
y
it




















it−3 + τt +ϖ
yy21
it (C.8)
(∆cit)2 =αc1 + αc2Z
H−prev
it−1 + αc3DHit−1 + αc4Ageit + αc5(Z
H−prev
it−1 )2 (C.9)
+ αc6Age2it + τt +ϖcit






4 Ageit−s + τt−s +ϖsit, s ∈ {0, 1, 2}
(C.10)
where τt denotes a set of full month-year dummies.
The AME is derived by differentiating equation (C.6) and (C.10) with time-
varying individual covariates as follows:
m∆y2it,j = ∂E((∆yit)
2|Iit−1)/∂Xit−1,j (C.11)
m∆yit∆yit−1,j = ∂E(∆yit · ∆yit−1|Iit−2)/∂Xit−2,j (C.12)
m∆yit∆yit−2,j = ∂E(∆yit · ∆yit−2|Iit−3)/∂Xit−3,j (C.13)
m∆c2it,j = ∂E((∆cit)
2|Iit−1)/∂Xit−1,j (C.14)
m∆yit∆cit−s,j = ∂E(∆yit · ∆cit−s|Imit−s−1)/∂Xmit−s,j, s ∈ {0, 1, 2} (C.15)
Under the baseline specification, the above calculation adds 18 moment con-
ditions separately for the first and second panel. Thus, this leads us with 766
empirical moment conditions in total (first panel: 341 / second panel: 425).
Constructed moment conditions mc: Based on the model assumptions, the
list of constructed moment conditions corresponding to identification of using auto-
covariance and covariance between income and consumption growth are expressed
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by equation (C.16)-(C.22):
var(∆yit) = Et[σ2ζit + σ
2
εit
+ (θ − 1)2σ2εit−1 + θ
2σ2εit−2 ] (C.16)




cov(∆yit,∆yit−2) = −θEt[σ2εit−2 ] (C.18)







cov(∆yit,∆cit) = Et[σ2ζitϕit + σ
2
εtψit] (C.20)
cov(∆yit,∆cit−1) = (θ − 1)Et[σ2εit−1ψit−1] (C.21)
cov(∆yit,∆cit−2) = −θEt[σ2εit−2ψit−2] (C.22)
Expectation of below equations (C.23)-(C.25) show the constructed moment
conditions related to AME:
∂var(∆yit)/∂Xit−1,j, ∂cov(∆yit,∆yit−1)/∂Xit−2,j, ∂cov(∆yit,∆yit−2)/∂Xit−3,j,
(C.23)
∂var(∆cit)/∂Xit−1,j, ∂cov(∆yit,∆cit)/∂Xit−1,j, ∂cov(∆yit,∆cit−1)/∂Xit−2,j ,
(C.24)
∂cov(∆yit,∆cit−2)/∂Xit−3,j (C.25)
Vector of moment conditions: me and mc are the vector of empirical and
constructed moment conditions which stack on the moment conditions explained






























j ∈ {e, c} (C.26)
where Xmit−s is a vector of household specific variables which govern the income
process and consumption insurance. l = 1 (l = 2) if the data come from the first
(second) panel.
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Variance-covariance matrix: In order to calculate standard errors of MSM
estimators, we need to derive the variance-covariance (var-cov) matrix V of empirical
moment conditions me. The construction of var-cov matrix of mjt is referred to V1
which is well defined in BPP. As we use AME as additional moment conditions,
V2 denotes the corresponding var-cov matrix of mjadd and is expressed by 18-by-18








V2,y2t , 0, 0, 0
0, V2,yt·yt−k , 0, 0
0, 0 , V2,c2t 0
0, 0, 0, V2,yt·ct−k
 (C.27)
V2,y2t =
 var(my2t ,1), cov(my2t ,1, yc2t ,2)




var(χ12), cov(χ12, χ13), 0, 0
cov(χ12, χ13), var(χ13), 0, 0
0, 0, , var(χ22), cov(χ22, χ23)




var(mc2t ,1), cov(mc2t ,1,mc2t ,2), cov(mc2t ,1,mc2t ,3)
cov(mc2t ,1,mc2t ,2), var(mc2t ,2), cov(mc2t ,2,mc2t ,3)




var(myct,1), cov(myct,1,myct,2), cov(myct,1,myct,3), 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
cov(myct,1,myct,2), var(myct,2), cov(myct,2,myct,3), 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
cov(myct,1,myct,3), cov(myct,2,myct,3), var(myct,3), 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
0, 0, 0, var(myct−1,1), cov(myct−1,1,myct−1,2), cov(myct−1,1,myct−1,3), 0, 0, 0
0, 0, 0, cov(myct−1,1,myct−1,2), var(myct−1,2), cov(myct−1,2,myct−1,3), 0, 0, 0
0, 0, 0, cov(myct−1,1,myct−1,3), cov(myct−1,2,myct−1,3), var(myct−1,3), 0, 0, 0
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, var(myct−2,1), cov(myct−2,1,myct−2,2), cov(myct−2,1,myct−2,3)
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, cov(myct−2,1,myct−2,2), var(myct−2,2), cov(myct−2,2,myct−2,3)
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, cov(myct−2,1,myct−2,3), cov(myct−2,2,myct−2,3), var(myct−2,3)

(C.31)
